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CHALLENGING NARRATIVES: KURDISH YOUNG ADULTS IN ISTANBUL AND 
CHICAGO 
 
 In this dissertation, I explore the interplay between youthful agency and 
state imposition. Specifically, drawing on 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork in 
Istanbul, Turkey and Chicago, Illinois, I investigate how young adults who have 
migrated within one state and to another are navigating the states and bureaucratic 
systems in which they live. My interlocutors hail from a state that is quintessentially 
twentieth century, by which I mean the state was established as a nation-state, 
promoted as existing for members of a particular ethno-linguistic identity, with a 
charismatic leader who inspired a cult of personality. This narrative of the state has 
reverberated down the generations and is central to the socio-political environment 
in which my interlocutors have lived their lives. I argue that ethno-nationalist states 
and the education systems they establish to train their citizenry do not necessarily 
produce loyal, docile subjects that conform to the state’s narrative of ideal citizens. 
Rather, as my case shows, the university environment can foster the development of 
activists who assert who they are in ethno-linguistic terms that challenge state 
narratives. My interlocutors are challenging the dominant ethno-nationalist 
narratives of a state that seeks to erase and silence them, as well as narratives of 
asylum seeking that rely on tropes of victimhood that do not reflect their lived 
experiences. In challenging these narratives, my interlocutors make emphatic 
assertions of their ethno-linguistic identity and strive for increased visibility.   
            As Kurds in Turkey, my interlocutors have been subject to narratives 
perpetuated by the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state and agents of the state, 
such as the military and the education system, that they do not have a history, they 
do not exist as a distinct ethno-linguistic group, and they are terrorists. It is these 
     
 
narratives my interlocutors are challenging. In both Istanbul and Chicago, they are 
engaged in making emphatic assertions of their Kurdishness. In Istanbul, this has 
included challenging dominant state narratives in university classrooms and 
through activities such as spray-painting Kurdish language graffiti in central 
locations in the city. In Chicago, this has included protesting in front of the Turkish 
Consulate and submitting narratives of the various forms of violence they endured 
at the hands of the Turkish state as part of their political asylum applications to the 
United States government. In migrating to the United States and applying for 
political asylum, my interlocutors continue to assert their Kurdish identities, pose 
challenges to the Turkish state, and demand visibility for themselves, and Kurds 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 “I’m not Turkish; I’m Kurdish.” I was standing at a long table in the main 
lounge at the International House at the University of Chicago (I-House), where I 
had just served a dish of ice cream to a new friend, Comerd.  It was a Sunday evening 
late in the fall semester of 2007, shortly after I began my master’s studies in Higher 
Education Administration at Loyola University Chicago. My Graduate Assistant 
position at I-House required that I work in the Programs Office, planning lectures, 
concerts, and social events for residents and the broader campus community. One of 
my responsibilities was setting up and managing weekly ice cream socials. These 
events provided an excellent opportunity to meet fellow I-House residents from 
across the United States and around the world. It was at one of these ice cream 
socials that I first met Comerd. Originally from the province of Gaziantep, in 
southeastern Turkey, Comerd had come to the University of Chicago as a visiting 
scholar for one year to study Ottoman history in the Kurdish majority provinces of 
what became the Republic of Turkey. Over the course of the next several months, I 
would learn from Comerd and other Kurdish students at the University of Chicago 
more about their history, their language, and their culture.  
 My introduction to the world of Kurdish studies and cultural anthropology 
began with an emphatic assertion of a particular ethno-linguistic identity. In 
retrospect, the circumstances of my introduction to the Kurds were fortuitous, as I 
conducted my dissertation research with university students and recent university 
graduates, in Istanbul and Chicago, respectively, looking at issues related to ethno-
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linguistic identity assertions, competing narratives, migration, asylum seeking, and 
education. In talking with my interlocutors, during preliminary fieldwork, 
conducted during the summers of 2013 and 2014, and dissertation research, 
conducted in 2016, the common themes that emerged between Turkey and the 
United States revolved around challenging narratives, both state and scholarly, 
assertions of Kurdishness, the Kurdish language, the pursuit of education, and 
migration. It also became apparent that Kurdish university students were engaged 
in several forms of challenging the dominant narratives of an ethno-nationally 
assertive state regarding who Kurds are and their role in Turkish society. I use the 
term, “ethno-nationally assertive state” to describe states that promote the idea that 
the state was created for and is populated by members of the same ethno-linguistic 
group. Additionally, the migration and asylum-seeking experiences of those who 
migrated to Chicago challenge assumptions of what asylum-seeking “looks like” in 
the anthropological literature on migration. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
the individuals with whom I worked, though geographically separated, comprise 
one analytic unit. 
 In this dissertation, I explore how young adults may respond when they are 
confronted with an ethno-nationally assertive state. My interlocutors hail from a 
state that is quintessentially twentieth century, by which I mean the state was 
established as a nation-state, promoted existing for members of a particular ethno-
linguistic identity, with a charismatic leader who inspired a cult of personality. This 
narrative of the state has reverberated down the generations and is the socio-
political environment in which my interlocutors have lived their lives. I argue that 
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ethno-nationalist states and the education systems they establish to train their 
citizenry do not necessarily produce loyal, docile subjects that conform to the state’s 
narrative of ideal citizens. Rather, as my case shows, the university environment can 
foster the development of activists who assert who they are in ethno-linguistic 
terms that challenge state narratives. My interlocutors are challenging the dominant 
ethno-nationalist narratives of a state that seeks to erase and silence them, as well 
as narratives of asylum seeking that rely on tropes of victimhood that do not reflect 
their lived experiences. In challenging these narratives, my interlocutors make 
emphatic assertions of their ethno-linguistic identity and strive for increased 
visibility.  My interlocutors who are university students are agentively challenging 
an ethno-nationalist state narrative that conflates the majority ethno-linguistic 
category with citizenship. Indeed, they use a carefully constructed form of linguistic 
nationalism to challenge ethno-nationally assertive state narratives and power, 
while simultaneously asserting their own ethno-linguistic identity. Moreover, my 
interlocutors who are recent university graduates are using the furtherance of their 
educations as a means to migrate to the United States, where their navigation of 
immigration bureaucracy and the asylum-seeking process challenges dominant 
narratives of asylum seekers as tragic figures found in anthropological literature on 
asylum seeking. My interlocutors who have migrated have engaged in a careful 
selection of a particular path to migration to the United States, and their experiences 
highlight the role that engagement with institutions, in this case higher education 
institutions, can play in the crafting of a path away from a hostile state and into a 
future in which one is able to freely assert one’s collective identity. While these 
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migrants to the United States are no longer physically present in Turkey, they are 
not completely removed from the watchful eye of the Turkish state, as there is a 
Turkish consulate in Chicago with which they must interact from time to time. Both 
segments of my research population are asserting their ethno-linguistic identity in 
their interactions with and reactions against the states in which they live. In doing 
so, they are demonstrating a kind of agility in their interactions with these states 
and in their assertions of their Kurdishness. Their assertions can be variously loud 
or soft, as the situation in which they find themselves warrants. Thus, this 
dissertation explores an interplay between youthful agency and state imposition, 
and how young adults who have migrated within one state and to another are 
navigating the states and bureaucratic systems in which they live.  
 Underlying the experiences of my interlocutors is a theme of the pursuit of 
higher education. University-level education in Turkey is a continuation of the 
primary and secondary education system that was designed, in the years 
immediately following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, to 
further the homogenization and Turkification efforts of the Turkish state and train 
ideal Turkish citizens (Navaro-Yashin 2002a; Altınay 2004). My interlocutors were 
among the first generation of Kurds to attend university in large numbers in 
Turkey.1 Their pursuit of higher education supports their ethno-linguistic identity 
                                                        
1 There is a striking lack of demographic statistical data in Turkey. For example, no ethnicity or 
language census data has been published since 1965. However, this assertion about my interlocutors 
being among the first generation of Kurds to attend university in large numbers in Turkey was 




assertions. For example, through finding space in state-sanctioned Kurdish language 
classrooms on a Turkish university campus to explore their identities as Kurds in 
Turkey.  Or, by using enrollment in a language institute and the resultant student 
visa as a means to migrate to the United States and subsequently make the decision 
to apply for political asylum based on their experiences as members of an oppressed 
ethno-linguistic minority group in an ethno-nationally assertive state. 
 As Kurds in Turkey, my interlocutors have been subject to narratives 
perpetuated by the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state and agents of the state, 
such as the military and the education system, that they do not have a history, they 
do not exist as a distinct ethno-linguistic group, and they are terrorists. It is these 
narratives that my interlocutors are challenging. In both Istanbul and Chicago, they 
are engaged in making emphatic assertions of their ethno-linguistic identity: 
Kurdishness. They are also engaged in striving for increased visibility for Kurds. In 
Istanbul, this has included challenging dominant state narratives in university 
classrooms and through activities such as spray-painting Kurdish language graffiti 
in central locations in the city. In Chicago, this has included protesting in front of the 
Turkish Consulate and submitting narratives of the various forms of violence they 
endured at the hands of the Turkish state as part of their political asylum 
applications to the United States government. Ultimately, my interlocutors are 
engaged in making emphatic assertions of ethnic identity, in their case Kurdishness. 
Inherent in this is challenging the dominant ethno-nationalist narrative of the state 
in which they live or from which they hail, the Republic of Turkey, which has sought 
to erase and silence Kurds since its establishment in 1923. In migrating to the 
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United States and applying for political asylum, my interlocutors continue to assert 
their Kurdish identities, pose challenges to the Turkish state, and demand visibility 
for themselves, and Kurds more broadly. 
 
Terminology and Positionality 
 I have chosen to predominantly use the noun form, Kurd(s), in discussing my 
interlocutors and their experiences. I acknowledge that, as Diane E. King (2014) 
described, the norms for how we discuss identity labels has shifted in recent years. 
There has been a movement away from using ethnic identifiers in the noun form 
(e.g., “Kurd”) to the adjective form (e.g., “Kurdish people”) in anthropology. While I 
understand this linguistic shift, I find it at odds with the ways in which my 
interlocutors tend to describe themselves. My interlocutors almost exclusively use 
the noun form, “Kurd(s),” when talking about themselves, their local communities, 
and the broader Kurdish population. To confirm this impression, I asked one of my 
interlocutors, Azad, about it, and whether he preferred the use of “Kurd” or 
“Kurdish.” This was his, somewhat indignant, reply: “’Kurdish’ is an adjective. ‘Kurd’ 
is a noun. I want to be a noun!” I am committed to allowing my interlocutors to drive 
the conversations about their own identities. Thus, I tend to use the noun form, in 
accordance with the form favored by my interlocutors, though I do use both forms 
interchangeably throughout this dissertation. 
 In a similar vein, I also felt I needed to make a decision about how to render 
place names. Villages, towns, and cities in the southeastern, Kurdish-majority region 
of Turkey all have at least two potential names: one Kurdish and one Turkish (with 
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some places also having names in other languages spoken in the region, such as 
Syriac). Conferring new Turkish place names on places with non-Turkish names was 
part of the Turkification policies of the early Republic of Turkey, which was 
established in 1923, and thus, these Turkish place names are inherently politicized. 
That being said, I have found that the Turkish place names are more prevalent in 
map resources. Additionally, my interlocutors tend to use both forms of place names 
interchangeably. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I have elected to predominantly 
use these Turkish place names, unless I am quoting an interlocutor or other scholar 
who used a Kurdish place name, for the purposes of clarity, and to make it easier for 
readers who may wish to look for any of the places mentioned throughout this 
dissertation on a map. My use of Turkish place names should not be construed as 
any sort of political statement or support for sole use of these Turkish place names. 
 As an American anthropologist, who identifies as female and white, 
conducting ethnographic fieldwork with members of the Kurdish ethno-linguistic 
minority in Turkey and the United States, I was particularly concerned about issues 
of my own positionality. Nearly all ethnographies I have read include some 
discussion of the researcher’s positionality vis-à-vis their research population, as 
positionality, and specifically positionality of the ethnographic researcher, has been 
an ongoing concern of anthropology. These analyses tend to center on questions of 
access to research populations, power dynamics, and questions of representation 
(Rosaldo 1993; Wilson 2004; Cerwonka and Malkki 2007; Borneman and 
Hammoudi 2009). For my research, this meant empowering the people with whom I 
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worked, facilitating dialogue through language, and relying on my position as a 
university student. 
 While I did not set out to conduct my fieldwork almost exclusively with 
young men, this is what ended up happening. I made initial contacts with the 
community in Chicago, and then relied on snowball sampling to find individuals who 
were willing to participate in my research project in both Chicago and Istanbul. My 
initial entrée into the communities in which I conducted research began by reaching 
out to a member of the Kurdish Cultural Center of Chicago (KCC, now known as the 
Kurdish Cultural Center of Illinois) in the fall of 2012. I asked if I could visit the 
Center on my next visit to Chicago and was told I would be welcome. That initial 
contact at the KCC was Azad, a young man who had migrated to Chicago about two 
years before we first met. He invited me to the KCC to have tea with members of the 
Kurdish community in Chicago. When I arrived, I was greeted by Azad, two other 
young men, and an older gentleman. We talked for a couple of hours, over seemingly 
bottomless cups of tea. They told me about their community and activities, and I 
shared my ideas for my dissertation project. I also told them I planned to go to 
Istanbul the following summer for preliminary fieldwork. As I was preparing to 
leave, Azad told me that if I needed contacts in Istanbul for the summer, to let him 
know. I took him up on his offer, which is how I was introduced to my initial contact 
in Istanbul, Welat. Welat was a political science student who took it upon himself to 
essentially act as my research assistant for the month I was in Istanbul, introducing 
me to his friends and answering my endless questions. While in Istanbul, and then 
later in Chicago, on several occasions I found myself the only female member of 
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small groups otherwise composed entirely of young men. I do wonder if I might 
have been granted access based on my outsider status that I might not have enjoyed 
if I were a Kurdish woman. Regardless, one thing was certain. My positionality as an 
outsider, and in particular, an American, who was interested in the plight of Kurds 
in Turkey seemed to open many doors to social interaction. Almost everyone I met 
was eager to share their thoughts on the “Kurdish issue,” and often also, snippets of 
their own experiences. I asked those who seemed particularly eager if they would be 
willing to let me interview them.  
 One way I attempted to empower the people I interviewed was through 
representation. I went into my fieldsites with a grounding in the particular historical 
and political contexts that have led to the current position of Kurds as a 
marginalized ethno-linguistic minority within the Turkish context. Indeed, I see the 
dual meanings of marginality, as described by Kostas Gounis (1996), in that being 
labeled a Kurd both excludes and confines Kurds in Turkey, from the point of view 
of the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state. Yet, I have also seen interlocutors 
take on this label as a point of pride. Thus, in conducting my research, I never aim to 
label individuals as Kurd or non-Kurd, but rather allow them to tell me who they 
are, what identity their experiences have led them to assert for themselves and why. 
As one who is not Kurdish it is not my place to decide who is or is not Kurdish.  
 I relied on language to facilitate access and the building of rapport among my 
research population. I developed working proficiency in the Turkish language 
through two summers of intensive language study in Turkey as an awardee of the 
United States Department of State Critical Language Scholarship program. My 
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interlocutors, university students in Istanbul and recent university graduates in 
Chicago, had been educated in Turkish since primary school. Those who attended 
private universities and more prestigious public universities also knew English, as 
the language of instruction at these institutions is English. Thus, I had two languages 
in common with my interlocutors, though, in almost all cases, interviews were 
conducted primarily in English. Additionally, while a National Security Education 
Program Boren Fellow carrying out three months of fieldwork in Istanbul, I worked 
with a Kurdish language tutor, followed by a few Kurdish language classes at the 
Kurdish Cultural Center of Chicago (now known as the Kurdish Cultural Center of 
Illinois). I found that actively working toward learning Kurdish during fieldwork 
helped in building rapport with my research population.  
 Finally, I found that my own position as a student made it easier to connect 
with and build rapport with my interlocutors, who were themselves either 
university students or recent university graduates. That we were in a similar life 
stage, despite the fact that I was at least 10 years older than all my interlocutors, 
seemed to make it easier for my interlocutors to understand what I was doing and 
why. My doing research to fulfill a requirement for a university degree was 
something they understood, as they had all done research projects as a part of their 
own university educations. My own positionality as a student facilitated the 
establishment of relationships with my interlocutors and access to the spaces in 





 In designing my research plan, I sought to follow the story of my 
interlocutors from the villages in which most were born, to the city of Istanbul, 
through their university educations in Turkey, and, finally, their migration to the 
United States in pursuit of educational and economic opportunities. This 
dissertation project was multi-sited in design, inspired by what George E. Marcus 
(1995) calls the “follow the people” (106) mode of constructing multi-sited 
ethnographic research. In designing my project in this manner, I sought to explore 
the ways in which two geographically distant segments of the same population were 
grappling with similar questions of identity, education, and challenging narratives.  
 I collected the data for this dissertation over a period of approximately five 
years, including informal data collection and observations made while living in the 
capital city of Ankara and teaching English language classes at one of the top-
ranking universities in Turkey during the 2011-12 academic year, preliminary 
research conducted in Istanbul and Ankara during the summers of 2013 and 2014, 
while in Turkey for summer language institutes, and formal dissertation research 
conducted in Istanbul and Chicago during the 2016 calendar year.  
 I conducted the bulk of my research in Turkey in Istanbul, the largest city in 
Turkey and the Turkish (and global) city with what is said to be the largest Kurdish 
population (Günay 2019). However, it is impossible to know the exact number of 
Kurds in Istanbul. Ethno-linguistic demographic data, which had been collected in 
responses to questions about the language spoken in the home, has not been 
collected as part of the Turkish census since 1985. The Turkish state has actively 
 
 12 
suppressed the distribution of ethno-linguistic data, preventing the publication of 
ethno-linguistic data beyond that collected as part of the 1965 census. (Dundar 
2014). This means that the most recent ethno-linguistic data that can be accessed is, 
at present, 56 years old. For Istanbul, in particular, which has received sizeable 
groups of internal migrants from the Kurdish majority areas in southeastern 
Turkey, the age of available data renders it essentially useless for understanding the 
current ethno-linguistic demographics of the city. 
 Istanbul straddles the Bosporus straight, with one foot in Europe and the 
other in Asia, where it has been a major hub of trade between Asia and Europe for 
hundreds of years, and is the location of numerous consulates. It is, thus, a very 
diverse city. Most of my interlocutors had moved to Istanbul in the early to mid-
1990s with their families, due to violence in their home villages in the Kurdish 
majority region in the southeast of Turkey. For the majority of my interlocutors, 
their formative years were spent in Istanbul. I also conducted a bit of additional 
preliminary research in Ankara, the capital, which sits squarely in the middle of 
Turkey. Ankara is very much a planned city. In the early years of the Republic of 
Turkey, which was established in 1923, Ankara was designed to be the capital of the 
Republic of Turkey, and features wide boulevards lined with government buildings. 
It is also a hub for higher education and serves as home to a number of the best 
universities in Turkey. 
 Chicago is a large midwestern city located along the shore of Lake Michigan, 
in northern Illinois. It is the third largest city in the United States, and serves as a 
cultural, economic, and transportation hub. A number of foreign governments have 
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established consulates in Chicago, including Turkey. The greater Chicagoland area is 
also the location of about 100 institutions of higher education, by which I mean 
education beyond the high school level, including several well-regarded research-
intensive universities. Chicago is home to migrants from around the world, 
including a small Kurdish community that had, at the time of my dissertation 
research, predominantly migrated from Turkey.2  
 Again, reliable demographic data is difficult to come by. The United States 
Census does include a question about the language spoken in the home. According 
to U.S. Census Bureau data, there were 160 reported speakers of Kurdish in the 
Chicago metropolitan area during the years 2009-2013. This provides some 
statistical insight into the number of Kurds in Chicago. Of course, there is no Kurdish 
box to check included in the “race” section of the United States Census, nor is there a 
box for some version of “Middle Eastern.” One evening, while talking with a group of 
my interlocutors after dinner, the discussion turned to what box they check when 
they are filling out forms with demographic sections. The answers were varied, 
including “white,” “Asian,” and “other.” However, it was made clear to me that the 
Kurdish community in the greater Chicagoland area did a fairly good job of keeping 
track of the members of their own community. I asked Azad about numbers in 
November of 2015, and he told me that there were about 200 Kurds from Turkey in 
Chicago and the surrounding suburbs, including about 15 families with children. 
                                                        
2 Since completing my dissertation research, a growing number of Kurdish migrants, or refugees, 
from Rojava (the Kurdish term for western Kurdistan, or the part of Kurdistan that lies within the 
borders of Syria) have migrated to Chicago to flee ongoing violence in Syria. 
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Most were recent migrants who were university graduates. It was common 
knowledge among my interlocutors that the largest Kurdish community, by far, in 
the United States is in Nashville, Tennessee. Yet, as Azad told me, the majority of the 
thousands of members of the Kurdish community in Nashville are those who fled 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in the 1990s, and their descendants.  
 
Methods 
 For this project, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Istanbul, Turkey and 
Chicago, Illinois over the course of the 2016 calendar year. I was in Chicago during 
the months of January and May-December. During the months of February-April, I 
was in Istanbul. This dissertation research was a continuation of research begun 
during preliminary stints in Turkey (2011-2012, 2013, and 2014) and Chicago 
(2013-2015). The following methods were employed: 
 Participant Observation: I engaged in participant observation on university 
campuses, in cafés, and in other locations in Istanbul where students tend to 
congregate. In Chicago, I engaged in participant observation at the Kurdish Cultural 
Center of Chicago (now known as the Kurdish Cultural Center of Illinois) and in the 
homes of interlocutors. In all cases, I was invited into these spaces by my 
interlocutors. My entrée into these spaces was initiated by my reaching out to a 
board member of the Kurdish Cultural Center of Chicago, Azad. He invited me to 
visit the center and talk with some of the community members. He then introduced 
me to Welat, who became my initial point of contact in Istanbul for my preliminary 
research during the summer of 2013, and the person who introduced me to the 
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spaces in which I conducted participant observation in that city. This method of 
participant observation allowed me to take part in and experience the daily lives of 
my research participants, including interpersonal interactions, individual and group 
activities, and community events (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002); the “being there” 
(Borneman and Hammoudi 2009:14) that has been the hallmark of anthropological 
research. Participant observation provided the opportunity to collect detailed 
fieldnotes (Sanjek 1990) based on extensive time spent engaging with interlocutors 
during the course of their daily lives (Bernard 2005; Emerson et al. 1995). 
Participant observation also allowed for the development of ongoing relationships 
with interlocutors.  
 Ethnographic Interviews: In addition to participant observation, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews (Schensul et al. 1999) with seven Kurdish 
university students and one university instructor in Istanbul and nine Kurdish 
university graduates who had migrated to Chicago. Research participants were 
identified through snowball sampling. Again, my initial contact was Azad, in Chicago. 
He introduced me to Welat, who participated in my first interview in Istanbul during 
preliminary fieldwork in the summer of 2013. Welat then introduced me to his 
Kurdish language instructor and several of his classmates. After building rapport 
with them, I was able to conduct additional interviews. By the time I was ready to do 
fieldwork in 2016, Welat had moved to Chicago, but Azad had by this point also 
introduced me to Zana, who I first met during the summer of 2014. She served as my 
main contact during the time of my fieldwork in Istanbul (February-April 2016). 
Zana introduced me to several of her friends, through informal hangouts, such as 
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studying at a small independent library, drinking tea at a café, and visiting an art 
gallery. After building rapport with this second group of university students, I was 
again able to conduct a few interviews. In Chicago, Azad introduced me to other 
members of the Kurdish community and invited me into the spaces that seemed to 
be the main spaces for social activity within the community: the Kurdish Cultural 
Center of Chicago and the apartment Azad shared with an ever-changing group of 
several other members of the community from the first dinner I attended there in 
December of 2013 until Azad moved out in August of 2016. It was in these spaces 
that I was able to build rapport with the members of the Kurdish community in 
Chicago with whom I conducted interviews during my fieldwork in 2016. 
 Semi-structured ethnographic interviews, which rely on open-ended 
questions and allow for follow-up questions (Bernard 2005), provided both the 
structure needed to gather data and the freedom for my interlocutors to direct the 
conversation and talk about what they considered to be most meaningful. My 
“interview guide” (Schensul et al. 1999) was designed to focus on the following 
topics: concepts of Kurdishness; what it “means to be Kurdish”; experiences of 
moving to Istanbul and/or migrating to Chicago; experiences of being Kurdish in 
Istanbul and/or in the United States; education; and political engagement. Beyond 
these topics, the open-ended format of semi-structured interviews allowed for 




“I Am Different” 
 In Turkey, to state that one is Kurdish, out loud, is an always already political 
act. In the Turkish state, the largest ethno-linguistic group is Turkish. For the last 
century, the second largest ethno-linguistic group is Kurdish. The Turkish state, 
since its founding in 1923 has been engaged in various tactics to “Turkify” its 
citizenry, by which I mean the promotion of the Turkish language and national 
symbols and the erasure of competing languages and national symbols. These 
efforts included outlawing the use of the Kurdish language, denying the existence of 
Kurds as a distinct ethno-linguistic group, impelled migration, and state violence 
against those who were deemed to be acting in opposition to the Turkish state. 
Indeed, since 1926, some form of a law outlawing “denigrating Turkishness” has 
been on the books. The most recent version of this is Article 301 of the Turkish 
Penal Code, which went into effect in 2005 (Algan 2008). High profile cases, such as 
that of author Orhan Pamuk, who was arrested under an earlier version of Article 
301 for making a statement about the numbers of Kurds and Armenians who had 
been killed in Turkey, point to the liberalness with which the article has seemingly 
been interpreted (Freely 2005). As we will see in the next chapter, too, Turkishness 
is an integral part of the nation-building and nation-sustaining efforts of the Turkish 
state. Thus, it would not be a stretch to be concerned that anything that could been 
seen as in opposition to the homogenous narrative of the state could also be seen as 
a violation of Article 301. The Turkish state uses the penal system… And it has 
become clear to me, through my research, my conversations with interlocutors, and 
my own experiences living in Turkey, that Kurdishness is seen as threatening by the 
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Turkish state. It is this environment in which my interlocutors grew up, and in 
which they first learned they did not quite fit the state narrative of an “ideal” 
Turkish citizen, that they were somehow “other.” It is in the shadow of Article 301, 
and the Turkish ethno-nationalism that produced it, that my interlocutors are 
making their emphatic assertions to Kurdishness.  
 Many of my interlocutors recounted first realizing they were Kurdish in a 
way that referenced, or was entirely in, a school setting, which is part of the 
underlying ties to education that run throughout this dissertation. Much work in 
anthropology has shown how educational institutions can by key drivers in the 
shaping of national identity and the quashing of minority identities (e.g., Adely 
2012; Kaplan 2006; Coe 2005; Luykx 1999). The following account, relayed to me by 
Heval, encapsulates the themes in this dissertation. I first met Heval in 2013, shortly 
after he arrived in Chicago, from Atlanta, where he had been living for several 
months. He moved in with Azad and was in the process of getting his paperwork 
together to apply for political asylum. Heval grew up in Suruç, a town in Şanlıurfa 
Province. He went to Balıkesir, a small city in western Turkey, for high school and 
then began his undergraduate studies at Dicle University in the city of Diyarbakır, 
often referred to as the “unofficial capital of Kurdistan,” where he studied 
archaeology for two years before transferring to Ankara University, where he 
graduated with a degree in journalism. When asked about why he transferred from 
one university to the other, he said, “I had a problem with the Turkish police and 
other officials. They threatened me, and I had to leave… I was working for, I mean, 
voluntarily of course, we were protesting the Turkish government because of their 
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Kurdish policies. We were protesting and sometimes we were gathering, and we 
were discussing Kurdish issues, you know, and that’s why I had a problem with 
them.” Before leaving Turkey, Heval had been studying for a master’s degree in 
political science at Ankara University and working as a journalist. He was also very 
politically active, regularly participating in protests related to Kurdish issues in 
Turkey. His political activities led to his being arrested while he was a master’s 
student, which ultimately led to his decision to migrate to the United States, as we 
will see in Chapter 5. 
 I asked Heval about the first time he realized he was Kurdish: 
Lydia: Do you remember the first time you thought to yourself, “I am 
Kurdish”? Or the first time you realized you were Kurdish, do you remember? 
 
Heval: Yeah, I remember. 
 
Lydia: What happened? 
 
Heval: I was a student in high school, and, you know, there was a program on 
TRT [Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu, or Turkish Radio and Television 
Corporation], which belongs to the Turkish state, and I was watching that 
program and the Turkish army killed many Kurdish villagers. [Members of 
the military] were talking and they were claiming that [the villagers] were 
members of the PKK and that’s why they deserved to die, you know, and it 
influenced me a lot. I believed that they weren’t terrorists, and they were just 
villagers, you know. But, [the Turks] were showing that they were terrorists. 
They were claiming that they were terrorists. It influenced me a lot, and, I 
mean, there were kids and women. At that moment, I said, “Hey, okay you are 
a student in a Turkish city, but as you see, they are killing your people. I am 
different.” And then, my life changed, you know. I decided to struggle for my 
society, for Kurds, you know, and at that moment I realized I am different and 
that’s why they are targeting us. 
 
Heval’s account of the narrative being shared by members of the Turkish military, as 
agents of the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state, on a state-owned television 
channel highlights the types of narratives my interlocutors were challenging. Heval 
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is also one of my interlocutors who migrated to the United States and applied for 
political asylum, on the basis of the work he had done challenging the narratives of 
the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state as a university student, and later as a 
journalist. I find Heval’s story particularly striking because his realization of his own 
Kurdishness was not simply about something that was said directly to him, but 
rather he came to the realization through seeing what was done to and said about 
others he recognized as being like him. His feelings of solidarity with the Kurdish 
villagers he saw on television and identity-based belonging are key to this 
realization of his own Kurdishness. Indeed, in this account, we can see the exact 
moment when Heval decided to challenge the narratives of the ethno-nationally 
assertive Turkish state, and particularly the narrative that Kurdish villagers are 
“terrorists.”. It is clear that he could not tolerate this narrative of Kurds, of people 
like him, as terrorists that was being put forth my members of the Turkish military, 
as agents of the Turkish state. Therefore, he decided to fight back and challenge this 
narrative.  
 Heval’s realization of his Kurdishness led him to the activism that would 
eventually lead to his arrest and, by extension, his decision to migrate to the United 
States. Shortly after arriving in Chicago, he initiated the political asylum application 
process. Throughout these experiences, Heval, as with my other interlocutors, 
challenged the narratives of the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state as well as 
narratives of what asylum seeking should “look like.” Central to all of this were 
continuous assertions of Kurdish ethno-linguistic identity and attempts to render 




Organization of the Dissertation 
 The body of this dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter Two is 
focused on providing a brief overview of the historical and geopolitical context of 
the situation of the Kurdish population of the Republic of Turkey and the 
establishment of a Kurdish community in Chicago. In Chapter Three, I explore the 
concept of “the State” as well as the double displacement my interlocutors have 
experienced. I address both their migration from villages in southeastern Turkey to 
the city of Istanbul in northwestern Turkey and their migration from Istanbul to 
Chicago. In doing so, I explore how my interlocutors’ experiences interact with 
concepts of hospitality, citizenship, and diaspora. Chapter Four explores the 
experiences of Kurdish university students in Istanbul, Turkey. It relies on stories 
about university-level Kurdish language classes and a Kurdish language graffiti 
project to highlight the ways in which Kurdish university students are challenging 
the dominant narratives of the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state regarding 
who or what makes an “ideal” Turkish citizen. Chapter Five focuses on the asylum-
seeking process in the United States and the ways in which my interlocutors’ 
experiences challenge the dominant narrative of this process found in the 
anthropological literature on migration. 
 This dissertation contributes to discussions about the assertion of ethno-
linguistic identities by addressing how Kurdish university students in Istanbul, 
Turkey and recent university graduates who have migrated to Chicago, Illinois 
conceptualize their own ethnic identity, in this case Kurdishness. Through my 
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participant observation, I have seen a conceptualization of Kurdishness in Turkey 
that privileges linguistic and political elements of Kurdish identity. I see this as a 
departure from other narratives of Kurdish identity found in the literature, that 
place the emphasis on patrilineally conferred collective identity and shared 
histories of trauma.  
 I also see my work as unique within Kurdish studies, which encompasses a 
growing anthropology of Kurdishness. I focus on Kurdish young adults, and Kurdish 
university students and recent graduates in particular. Little sociocultural 
anthropological research focuses on Kurdish youth or young adults, and no 
ethnographies focus on university-educated Kurds, specifically. Yael Navaro-Yashin 
(2002a) and Ayşe Gül Altınay (2004) touch briefly on the impact of Turkish state 
policies on the education system, generally, including the assimilationist aspects 
that disproportionately affect Kurds and other ethnic minorities. However, these 
accounts focus primarily on primary and secondary education, rather than 
universities. Kurdish youth are, of course, present in more comprehensive 
discussions of Kurdish life (e.g., Yalçın-Heckmann 1991; Grabolle-Çeliker 2013), 
especially in discussions of marriage and child-rearing, but there is no ethnography 
that focuses specifically on Kurdish young adults, university students, or recent 
university graduates. Therefore, I see my focus on this particular segment of the 
Kurdish population in Turkey and the United States as an expansion of the scope of 
anthropological literature on Kurds and Kurdishness. Further, as mentioned, I have 
found that my interlocutors are making specific choices about migrating to the 
United States, through initially securing student visas to study English, that result in 
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rather calm migration and asylum-seeking experiences. These experiences challenge 
tropes found in the anthropological literature of asylum seekers as tragic figures. 
Rather, my interlocutors are exercising agency in making decisions about how to 
migrate to the United States and working together to successfully navigate the 
asylum application process. As they do so, they continue to make emphatic 
assertions of their Kurdishness and strive for increased visibility in their 





CHAPTER 2. SETTING THE SCENE: HISTORICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT  
So, the first day of class [at university], the professor, I don’t know how he 
came to this, but he said, “Well, the Kurds, they don’t have history.” We were 
history students, you know. I said, “Well, we have some sources, you know? 
Kurdish and Persian sources.” He said, “Oh, no, they are not, blah, blah.” So, 
then, the Kurdish students wanted to respond, you know, or they wanted to 
prove that Kurds have history. … It was kind of an honor, you know. Someone 
says you don’t have history and then the Kurdish students say, “No. Here. We 
can show you some books, some sources.” 
 
 This account was relayed to me by Azad in 2016. He had graduated from 
Istanbul University with a degree in history before migrating to Chicago in 2010. His 
account of his first day at university highlights the ways in which the Turkish state, 
and state actors, including professors at public universities, are involved in an 
ongoing project to silence (Trouillot 1995) the history of Kurds in Turkey. The 
Turkish state, since its founding in 1923, has been engaged in various tactics to 
Turkify its citizenry and promote the narrative that the Turkish state is a homeland 
for Turks, by which the state means ethnic Turks who speak the Turkish language. 
These efforts included outlawing the use of the Kurdish language, denying the 
existence of Kurds as a distinct ethno-linguistic group, impelled migration, and state 
violence against those who were deemed to be acting in opposition to the Turkish 
state. As I will discuss in the chapters that follow, this narrative of Turkey as a 
homeland for Turks remains, for my interlocutors, a visceral part of the state 
narrative in Turkey. Understanding the foundations of this narrative, and the history 
of Kurdish opposition to it, is important for understanding the experiences of Kurds 
in the present.   
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 Those who get to create the historical narratives are the ones with the power 
over determining “that which is said to have happened” (Trouillot 1995). Thus, 
there is also the potential for power in challenging dominant narratives and creating 
alternative narratives; in bringing the silences out into the open and speaking them. 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995) asks us to consider history, in order to better 
understand power relations in the present. In doing so, he tells us we should look to 
narratives of history and pay particular attention to the silences in that history. 
Trouillot asserts that, “in vernacular use, history means both the facts of the matter 
and a narrative of those facts, both ‘what happened’ and ‘that which is said to have 
happened.’ The first meaning places the emphasis on the sociohistorical process, the 
second on our knowledge of that process or on a story about that process” (2). Thus, 
there can be a disconnect between historical facts and historical narrative. As 
Trouillot points out, “in history, power begins at the source” (29). In their challenges 
to the dominant narratives of the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state, I see my 
interlocutors challenging the state’s account of that which is said to have happened 
and creating space for alternative sources of historical accounts and narratives. 
 This project specifically focuses on the experiences of Kurdish university 
students in Istanbul, Turkey and recent university graduates who have migrated 
from Turkey to Chicago, Illinois.  These young adults, as citizens of the Turkish state, 
find themselves in a situation in which a claim to be a Turkish citizen who is not 
ethnically Turkish is provocative and challenges historical and contemporary state 
narratives. This dissertation deals with a population that asserts a particular ethno-
linguistic identity. This ethno-linguistic identity does not match the national 
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moniker of the state in which the population lives, or from which they hail. My 
interlocutors challenge the dominant narrative promoted by this ethno-nationally 
assertive state. In particular, the state in question here is Turkey. The anthropology 
of the state, nationalism, and ethnicity happens in particular contexts. In this 
chapter, I set the stage for the later arguments of this dissertation by summarizing 
some of the relevant history and geopolitical context in order to build an 
anthropology of youthful agency in the face of an ethno-nationally assertive state. 
This chapter addresses how a state has set up this situation to which my 
interlocutors are reacting. The imaginings of the state and the construction of state 
narratives are central to this understanding. 
 History, as marshalled by the state in order to make its arguments about 
what the state “should” be, looms large in Turkey. It is ever-present. I was made 
acutely aware of this fact while living and teaching in Turkey in 2011-2012. One of 
the first things I noticed on the bus ride from the airport to the university campus 
that would be my home for the forthcoming academic year was a massive statue of 
the first Turkish president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who served in this role from the 
founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 until his death in 1938, in the middle of a 
major intersection, seemingly keeping an eye on the capital of the country he helped 
found. I found it to be an imposing statue, but, as I would soon learn, not an 
uncommon sight in Turkey. The cult of personality around the founding president of 
the Republic is palpable. This phenomenon has been explored by Esra Özyürek 
(2006), in her book, Nostalgia for the Modern, in which she describes the cult of 
personality around Atatürk as a particular longing for the hope of the early 
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republican era and its modernization projects. Similarly, Lisa Wedeen (2015) 
describes the cult of personality around Hafiz al-Asad as the “father” of Syria, in 
much the same way that Atatürk was, and continues to be seen, as the father of the 
Turkish nation-state. Atatürk’s image was seemingly everywhere I turned in Turkey. 
A photo of Atatürk hung in the security booth at the entrance to campus. I passed a 
bust of him twice a day as I walked from my apartment to the building in which I 
worked and back again. Photos of him hung in the communal office I shared with 
other teachers in my unit. Banners of his image were unfurled on the sides of 
buildings across the city for every national holiday, such as Republic Day, Youth and 
Sports Day, and Victory Day. I routinely spotted stickers bearing his signature on the 
rear widows of cars. Various images of him could be found on all manner of 
souvenirs, from coffee mugs to evil eye amulets. One of the most striking images I 
saw was on the back of a black t-shirt one of my coworkers purchased at a rest stop 
on a weekend trip organized by the university for foreign teachers not long after we 
had initially arrived in country. It is something I have since seen countless times 
throughout Turkey. It was a black and white image of Atatürk, in profile, with 
“1881-193∞” inscribed underneath. The infinity symbol clearly implied that, 
despite having died in 1938, Atatürk was actually immortal. 
 For those who displayed his image or signature, Atatürk seems to represent 
the ideals of the early republic, including modernization and secularism. However, 
these images are also incredibly political. For those, like my interlocutors, who are 
members of a minority ethno-linguistic group that has experienced a history of 
political violence, physical violence, erasure, and silencing at the hands of the 
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Turkish state and its agents, a history that is, indeed, very much tied up with the 
foundations of the Turkish Republic in 1923, these images are a constant reminder 
of their othering by the Turkish majority and the state. Atatürk’s ever-present 
vissage brings to mind his assertion on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 
founding of the Turkish Republic, “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!” (How happy is one 
who says I am a Turk!). The implication being, of course, that those who cannot, or 
will not, call themselves Turkish cannot be happy, because Turkey is a place for 
Turks. 
 Kurds in Turkey have been fighting against this state narrative since the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, in 1923. My interlocutors are among the most recent generations to take up 
this fight, this challenging of the dominant state narrative. While the fight is not new, 
it appears that some of the tactics are. In particular, the mobilization of their 
language and their educations to create their own narratives of their shared history 
and assertions of their shared ethno-linguistic identity. The fact that my 
interlocutors are part of the most recent chapter in the longue durée of this struggle 
points to why it is so important to have a solid grounding of the history of the 
Turkish nation-state-building project and its impact on Kurdish citizens of Turkey, 
as well as some of the ways in which Kurds have challenged and fought back against 
this project over time.  
 The contemporary struggle in which my interlocutors are engaged emerged 
in localities in the Kurdish majority regions in southeastern Turkey, as a part of 
Kurdish interactions with and reactions against agents of a hostile ethno-nationally 
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assertive Turkish state. This struggle has since expanded beyond the villages of the 
southeast to the most populous city of Turkey, Istanbul, in the northwest. In this 
case, I would argue, it is impossible to understand how it is that my interlocutors 
have come to challenge Turkish state narratives without understanding the 
foundations of those narratives. Thus, in this chapter, I will provide an overview of 
the historical context that is necessary for understanding the circumstances of my 
interlocutors’ lives. 
  
Kurds in Turkey: State Policy and Attempts at Assimilation 
 States strive to define (and redefine) who legitimately belongs and who does 
not. The incompleteness of the state points to the need for state discourse, or 
narrative, to explain what and who, comprises the state. I argue that this need to 
constantly define the state leaves the space for challenges, and it is these spaces that 
my interlocutors target in challenging the narrative of the ethno-nationally assertive 
Turkish state. As Veena Das and Deborah Poole (2004) assert, “the state is imagined 
as an always incomplete project that must constantly be spoken of—and 
imagined—through an invocation of the wilderness, lawlessness, and savagery that 
not only lies outside its jurisdiction but also threatens it from within” (7). In defining 
the citizenry of the state, mechanisms (e.g., identification cards, the police; but also, 
state apparatuses such as the military and the education system) are employed in an 
“attempt to ‘manage’ or ‘pacify’ these populations through both force and a 
pedagogy or conversion intended to transform ‘unruly subjects’ into lawful subjects 
of the state” (Das and Poole 2004:9). In their challenges, my interlocutors are 
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speaking, and in some cases writing, Kurds and Kurdishness into public spaces in 
Istanbul. This carries over to the United States, for those who migrate, as my 
interlocutors in Chicago continue to challenge the Turkish state narrative through 
such actions as protesting in front of the Turkish Consulate. 
 Kurdish university students in Istanbul must contend with the ethno-
nationally assertive Turkish state’s narratives on a daily basis as they pursue their 
educations and engage with the political process in Turkey. Young adult Kurds who 
currently reside in Chicago, Illinois, while no longer physically in the Republic of 
Turkey, are not entirely removed from the watchful eye of the Turkish state. The 
Turkish government has a consulate in Chicago, where Kurds living in the city, and 
elsewhere in the region, must go for the purposes of securing official state 
documents (e.g., renewing a passport) or to conduct other official business with the 
state (e.g., voting), and the state watches them in other ways as well. Thus, they 
continue to grapple with Turkish state control over aspects of their lives. 
Additionally, most of the Kurds with whom I conducted research in Chicago were 
engaged in, or preparing for, the asylum-seeking process in the United States. Thus, 
they were also interacting with the United States government on a regular basis. 
These two research populations, Kurdish university students in Istanbul and recent 
university graduates who have migrated to Chicago, share a common historical 
context that is tied to the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state’s treatment of its 
Kurdish citizens. The following historical events and forces form the backdrop 
against which my interlocutors have lived their lives. 
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 The environment in which my interlocutors were raised is intimately 
connected to the establishment of the Turkish state. These events happened nearly a 
century ago, yet traces of them turned up in conversations throughout my fieldwork. 
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, after the First World War, during a 
period when the idea of the hyphenated nation-state was promoted in colonial 
centers and by nationalist and indigenous movements alike (Hobsbawm 1992).  
Within this political environment, Turkish political leaders put forth an idea of 
“Turkey” as a state for “the Turks,” based on claims to history (Tambar 2014). In the 
early republican era, the state, under the leadership of its first president, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, instituted a series of nation-building reforms aimed at modernizing, 
westernizing, secularizing, and homogenizing the Turkish citizenry. At the core of 
the Kemalist reform project were a form of modernization that broke with the past 
in its quest to create a new kind of future for Turkey (Çınar 2005; Silverstein 2011) 
and promotion of the ideal of a “pure” Turkish nation, what has been called 
“Turkification” (Navaro-Yashin 2002a). This process led to the formation of an 
ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state.  
 Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish state has 
presented itself as a monolithic state that exists for Turks, rather than for people of 
other ethno-linguistic categories. In doing so, the Turkish state othered its non-
Turkish citizens, considering them to be “foreigners,” whose status as citizens is 
always experienced as “being-in-question” (Derrida 2000:3). As such, they have 
been subject to various attempts at Turkification. One of the main ways in which the 
ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state continually imposed Turkification on the 
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populace was through educational institutions (Navaro-Yashin 2002a; Zürcher 
1998), beginning with Atatürk famously touring the country promoting education 
and stressing the importance of youth and university students to the future of the 
republic (Saktanber 2001). Atatürk also oversaw the adoption of a new alphabet, 
replacing the Perso-Arabic script of Ottoman Turkish with the Latin alphabet of 
modern Turkish (Lewis 1999). This alphabet reform was done in the name of 
increasing literacy and increasing access to education, but it has been widely 
interpreted by scholars (Yılmaz 2013, 2011; Gürçağlar 2008) to have been integral 
to Atatürk’s vision of creating new modern senses of the self in twentieth-century 
Turkey. A system of education that requires a high school course on the Turkish 
military called “National Security Knowledge” (Altınay 2004:119) is one example of 
the ways in which education continues to be used to promote Turkish nationalism.  
Turkification further included efforts such as banning the Kurdish language and 
denying the existence of a separate Kurdish ethno-linguistic group (van Bruinessen 
1992). Instead, Kurds were, for many years, beginning in 1938, referred to in official 
discourse as “mountain Turks” (McDowall 2007:210), an attempt to symbolically 
“erase” (Abu El-Haj 2001) Kurds from Turkish state history. Through the process of 
Turkification, entire groups of the ethnically diverse citizenry of the Turkish state, 
including the Kurdish population on which this project is focused, either chose or 
were forced to identify as “Turkish.” Those who refused found themselves subject to 
the razing of villages, forced migration and resettlement, and disappearances 
(McDowall 2007). These Turkification efforts were aimed at all ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious minorities in Turkey, including Armenians (Biner 2007, 2010), Syriacs 
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(Biner 2007), Sabbatean Jews (Neyzi 2002), and Alevis (Tambar 2014), in addition 
to Kurds. They were by no means passive, but at certain times in some locations, 
involved a great deal of violence, including during significant population transfers, 
such as the forced population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923 (Cowan 
2008; Hirschon 2003). 
 Turkishness comprises historical, territorial, and ethno-linguistic 
components that privileges Turkish historical, linguistic, and cultural elements at 
the expense of any alternatives that might be put forward. As Yael Navaro-Yashin 
(2002a) describes, “the notions of Turkey, Turks, and Turkish culture are products 
of historical agency and contingency... Nationalisms, as they were formulated at the 
time [of the founding of the Turkish Republic], were based on primordialist claims 
to represent the unitary and original ‘culture of circumscribed pieces of territory’” 
(11). In addition to this historical component of the newly imagined Turkish nation, 
Anna Secor (2004) contends that “Turkishness, as constructed within the discourse 
of the new republic, referred variously to a civic, territorially defined identity (all 
those within the Turkish state) and to an exalted ethnie, the Turkic people of 
Anatolia whose language and culture the architects of the new regime historicized 
and valorized” (355).   
 Early in my time in Turkey, I learned that one way the nascent Turkish state 
sought to legitimize its existence as a territory of and for Turks was by making 
claims to ancient Anatolian history, particularly through making connections 
between the ancient Hittite civilization, an ancient civilization that encompassed 
most of Anatolia (i.e., the Republic of Turkey), and modern Turks (Erimtan 2008). 
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Signs of these claims are still prevalent in Turkey. A massive Hittite monument 
stands in central Ankara, the capital city of the Turkish state. Similarly, the symbol 
of Ankara University, a public university, is a Hittite symbol. The Ankara University-
affiliated TÖMER language institutes, through which I took Turkish language 
courses, use a series of textbooks called Yeni Hitit (New Hittite). Even snacks make 
claims to history in Turkey. The name of a popular snack food company, Eti, is an 
alternative Turkish term for Hittites, and also utilizes a Hittite symbol for their logo. 
Indeed, claims to a long and glorious history in Anatolia are everywhere in Turkey. 
Connections between history and the state in Turkey are also considered by Michael 
Meeker (2002), in his discussion of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the 
modernizing project of the Turkish state. Modernity, as discussed by Alev Çınar 
(2005), is often about transformation, and “the transformative power of modernity 
comes from the idea of progress, which reorients the subject toward an ideal future, 
where movement itself becomes a virtue… Therefore, modernity is not only about 
the contemplation of an ideal future, but also about the construction of the present 
as deficient and flawed” (23). It was, of course, this very idea about modernity that 
drove the modernization project of the early Turkish state, which desired to make a 
clean break from the then still Ottoman present. Meeker (2002) looks at how this 
modernization project affected his research fieldsite in the Black Sea region and 
argues that the organizational practices of the new Turkish state continued state-
like social organizational structures that began to emerge under the late Ottoman 
Empire, thus making the transition from Ottoman subjects to Turkish subjects 
easier. Thus, the modernization project of the nascent Turkish state may not have 
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been as radically different from its Ottoman precursor as intended (or, at least, as 
publicly advertised). 
 
Figure 1 At the TÖMER language institute in central Ankara. A photo of Atatürk hangs over the whiteboard, on 
which vocabulary for a lesson on “traditional” Turkish clothing is written. In the foreground is a copy of a Yeni Hitit 
(New Hittite) textbook, with a Hittite symbol at the center. (Photo by the author.) 
 
 A disconnect between the promises of early republican modernity and the 
reality nearly 100 years later is a subject of Esra Özyürek’s (2006, 2007a, 2007b) 
work. She argues that “in the late 1990s, the memory of a strong, independent, self-
sufficient state and its secularist modernization project that dominated the public 
sphere through the past century was challenged by the rise of political Islam and 
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Kurdish separatism, on the one hand, and the increasing demands of the European 
Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, on the 
other” (2006:2). Thus, the unity and secularity of the Turkish state were both 
perceived as under attack. This led, Özyürek argues, to nostalgia, a kind of yearning, 
not for the past, but for the promise of a future that had yet to be fully realized in 
Turkey. This nostalgia has resulted in the creation of a cult of personality around the 
figure of Atatürk, who is seen as the symbol of this as yet unfulfilled promise of 
modernity. Özyürek further addresses history, and memory, in her edited volume 
(2007a, 2007b). In her introduction, she claims that the early republican reforms 
were, at least in part, designed to force people to forget their Ottoman past (2007a). 
And yet, she argues, memories of the Ottoman past are everywhere in Turkey, 
commodified for modern consumption (this is also seen in Potuoğlu-Cook’s [2006] 
discussion of the commodification of belly dance in Istanbul). Özyürek also argues 
that “memory is… productive of social relations by managing identities and helping 
individuals and groups come to terms with the suppressed or commemorated 
traumas of the past” (2007a:11). These themes of history, nostalgia, and collective 
memory are ever present in the background of my research. I have heard 
invocations of collective memory in conversations with my interlocutors, 
particularly in their accounts of their families being violently displaced from their 
villages.  
 History and the past are also implicated in early republican projects to 
rewrite history in such a way that supported the claims of the nascent Turkish state 
and promoted Turkish nationalism. Carol Delaney (1991) states that “Atatürk 
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himself was well aware that his vision of the future of Turkey rested on his revision 
of the past; this was the motivation behind his energetic investigations into 
linguistics and history. If people were to be reoriented, they needed to be given a 
new sense of where they came from, a new sense of history and identity” (224). This 
rewriting of history was based on a pre-Ottoman, pre-Islamic past that traced the 
legitimacy of the Turkish nation in Anatolia from the “glorious” ancient history of 
the Hittites to the founding of the modern Turkish Republic (Houston 2008). The 
result was to create a new narrative account of “that which is said to have 
happened” (Trouillot 1995:2), an indication of the power relations between the 
ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state leadership and the Turkish ethnic majority 
on the one hand, and various ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious minority 
populations of the Turkish state on the other, as well as an important part of the 
creation of the imagined Turkish state community. 
 The creation of the Turkish state has also been equated with the creation of a 
national family (Delaney 1991), based on the dominant patrilineal kinship system of 
Anatolia. Delaney (1991) contends that the Turkish state was not imagined 
(Anderson 1991), but born:  
 The birth of a nation is not merely a colorful way of describing the creation of 
a new state, for the symbols and meanings of procreation form an integral part of its 
conceptualization. Mustafa Kemal capitalized on peasants’ deep relation to the 
soil—their own memleket [roughly, “hometown”]… All those born upon and 
nurtured by her soil were henceforth to be related as one people. By decree of the 
Grand National Assembly, the founder of the Republic was to be called Atatürk, 
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“father of the Turks.” The people could trace their descent to the ata (ancestor-
father) and recognize their consubstantiality by being born on and nurtured by the 
same soil. (272-273) 
 Thus, Atatürk was literally named “father Turk,” symbolically becoming the 
lineage founder of the new Turkish national patriline and father of the citizens of the 
Republic, and the Turkish citizens were imagined as children of the same mother-
soil and father-state (Özyürek 2006; Najmabadi 2005). This idea of citizens of the 
Turkish Republic being seen as children is further addressed by Esra Özyürek 
(2006), when she describes those who were children and adolescents during the 
early years of the Republic being considered “children of the republic” (31) for their 
entire lives, even into old age. 
 
Kurdish Internal Displacement/Migration 
 More recently, Turkification policies have carried over into interactions 
between the Turkish state and its Kurdish citizens. Beginning in the late 1970s, the 
PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party) emerged as a 
militant Marxist-Leninist separatist group in southeastern Turkey. Starting in 1984, 
the PKK engaged in violent struggle with the Turkish military (Houston 2001). This 
struggle has been called a “low-intensity war” (Ahmetbeyzade 2007), though at its 
height in the 1990s, it was referred to by the PKK as Şerê Qirêj (“The Dirty War”). 
Resistance to the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state and military has been 
ongoing, taking the form of occasional attacks, called Serhildan (“Rebellion”) by 
Kurdish participants. Due to violence in the Kurdish-majority region, many Kurds 
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left their villages for cities in the region and further afield, particularly in the early 
1990s (Secor 2004; Ahmetbeyzade 2007). Indeed, many were forced to do so as 
entire villages were evacuated and razed (Secor 2004; Houston 2005).  
 Members of my research populations in both Istanbul and Chicago have 
recounted stories of being evacuated from their villages as small children, and the 
lingering effects of these evacuations on their lives and those of their families. It has 
been estimated that since 1993 the residents of as many as 3,500 Kurdish villages 
were forced to flee their homes (Houston 2005). Beginning in 2015, and lasting 
throughout my dissertation research in 2016 and beyond, this tension between the 
Turkish state and the PKK, along with tensions between the Turkish state and its 
Kurdish citizens, intensified. During this time, the Turkish military bombed PKK 
camps in the mountains along the border region between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, 
often while claiming to be fighting ISIL. The state also imposed curfews in Kurdish-
majority cities, such as Nusaybin and Cizre, in southeastern Turkey, and there were 
violent clashes between Turkish police and Kurdish civilians (Human Rights Watch 
2015; Allen 2016; Zalewski 2016). During the latter part of my fieldwork in Chicago, 
in November 2016, the co-leaders of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party 
(Halkların Demokratik Partisi, or HDP) were arrested along with 10 other HDP 
Parliamentarians (Shaheen 2016). 
 For the generation of Kurds to which my interlocutors belong, a critical mass 
now lives at a distance from the main conflict zones, where asserting their Kurdish 
ethno-linguistic identity is now both facilitated and made possible. The university 
student population among whom I conducted the phase of my dissertation research 
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based in Turkey has been living a relatively stable life in urban Istanbul. Estimates 
for the Kurdish population of Istanbul range from 2 to 3 million (Bird 2007; 
Nachmani 2003). Istanbul is now recognized as “the world’s largest Kurdish city” 
(Nachmani 2003:90), a title it has held for less than a generation (Wedel 2001), with 
many Kurds living in well-established, predominantly Kurdish communities in 
several areas of the city (Grabolle-Çeliker 2013).  
 Rural to urban migration of Kurdish citizens of Turkey is tied to the history of 
the relationship between the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state and its 
Kurdish citizens, as well as the nation-building project of the early Turkish Republic. 
Villages, and the systems of governance found in them, have been a key component 
of state relations with rural citizenry since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. 
Paul Stirling (1953, 1960, 1965) examined the Kemalist reforms of the early Turkish 
state and their impact on both village life and relations between the central 
government and rural villages. He focused on the importance of lineages, and 
patrilineal kinship reckoning systems in particular, as the foundation of social 
relations in the villages in which he worked. He argues that these lineages were the 
foundation for the hierarchical systems found in the villages in which he worked, 
and that those hierarchical systems are the basis for keeping order and settling 
disputes.  
 The relationships between the nascent Turkish state and rural villages were, 
in the first couple of years of the new Republic of Turkey, essentially a continuation 
of the decentralized governance system that had been in place under the Ottoman 
Empire. In this system, local leaders were often allowed to continue governing over 
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local populations. There were various levels of allegiance to and oversight by the 
central Ottoman government, based in Istanbul, but these local leaders generally 
enjoyed a good deal of autonomy. Atatürk initially allowed this system to continue 
as the system of governance for the Republic of Turkey was being established. For a 
whole host of reasons that are beyond the scope of this dissertation, it quickly 
became apparent that this was not a viable system, and a major Kurdish nationalist 
rebellion was organized in early 1925 and led by Sheikh Said, a powerful local 
leader. Ultimately unsuccessful, the Sheikh Said Rebellion, as it is called, marked a 
turning point in the relationship between the Turkish state and its Kurdish citizenry 
(van Bruinessen 1992; Olson 1989).  
   Active relocation projects, aimed in particular at Kurdish villages, began in 
1934, with the passage of Law No. 2510, which divided the country into three 
regions, classified by varying degrees of perceived Turkishness: a region for those of 
“Turkish culture,” a region to be devoted to assimilation of non-Turks, and a region 
to be evacuated (İskân Kanunu 1934). Dersim (Tunceli, in Turkish), an area 
perceived by the Turkish state to have a history of being particularly defiant, was 
the first to be targeted for evacuation, and “at least 1,500 Dersim Kurds were 
determined to resist” (McDowall 2004:208). Resistance was met with bombing and 
gas attacks, and as many as 40,000 (though David McDowell admits this is likely an 
exaggerated number) were killed. According to McDowell, “Dersim marked the end 
of the ‘tribal’ revolts against the Kemalist state” (209). Deportation of Kurds from 
the southeastern area of the new Turkish state, and resettlement of Turks in the 
southeast, continued through the 1930s. The next major wave of migration from the 
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rural southeast to urban areas in the northern and western parts of Turkey resulted 
from the escalation in violent clashes between the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, 
or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and the Turkish military during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. In 1984, the PKK started attacking Turkish military stationed in the 
Kurdish-majority area. The government countered by arming citizens and forming 
“temporary village guards” (McDowall 2004: 424), which the government saw as 
particularly crucial along the mountainous border region. In 1987 the PKK initiated 
a series of attacks on this village guard system, focusing their attention on agha 
(tribal chieftain) and village guard families. The Turkish military then began 
conducting arbitrary security sweeps in villages, ostensibly to look for PKK 
supporters. The escalating conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military 
resulted in government evacuation of Kurdish villages. It is estimated that at least 
3,500 villages were evacuated, many of which were razed, during this period of 
conflict, throughout the 1990s (Houston 2005; McDowall 2004).  
 One of my informants, Welat, a 25-year-old recent university graduate who 
moved from a village in the province of Mardin to Istanbul when he was five years 
old, described one of these evacuations during research in the summer of 2013: “In 
1992, the soldiers burned the village. They just came and burned the village. There 
was no information. No warning. In that time the Kurdish movement [the PKK] was 
very strong. The village wanted to help the Kurdish movement.” In this statement, 
Welat is making the implication that because his village was sympathetic to the 
Kurdish movement, by which he meant the PKK, it was targeted for “evacuation” by 
the Turkish military, acting as agents of the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state. 
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I see these evacuations of the early 1990s as directly connected to Law No. 2510 of 
1934. The Kurdish-majority region in southeastern Turkey having been designated 
as “a region to be evacuated” (İskân Kanunu 1934), appears to have allowed the 
Turkish state to continuously view the area in this way. Thus, a claim of sympathy 
for the PKK became easy justification for evacuating villagers and razing villages.  
 In addition to forced evacuation, many other Kurds decided to leave their 
villages in Turkey’s southeast for the relative security of cities (McDowall 2004). As 
Şervan, who was, in 2013 when we talked, a 21-year-old law student who moved 
from a village in Diyarbakır Province to Istanbul in 1994, explained: “In the eastern 
part of Turkey, there was a war. There still is. But, in the past, it was different… We 
came because of the political problems, because of the economic problems. We 
couldn’t live in Diyarbakır.” Rural to urban migration of Kurds continues in Turkey, 
both for the pursuit of economic opportunity and to escape harassment from 
members of the Turkish military. 
 In her account of rural to urban migration of Kurds within Turkey, Anna 
Grabolle-Çeliker (2013) discusses the importance of the village in the imaginations 
of Kurds. She argues that “rural-urban migrants use memories of rural life in their 
narratives in order to locate themselves spatially, temporally, and culturally in their 
migratory social field” (27). Thus, memories and stories of the village, and the past 
more generally, play a role in the way Kurds situate themselves, understand their 
position in Turkish society, and make meaning of their lives as Kurdish migrants in 
the Turkish city. Drawing on Sherry Ortner’s (1973) concept of key symbols, 
Grabolle-Çeliker asserts that the village is a key symbol for Kurdish migrants who 
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“use narratives about village life to make sense of their current lives” (2013:45). 
This importance of the village, and a specific piece of land in particular, is echoed by 
King (2014), in her discussion of patrilines, and thus identities, being linked to 
particular pieces of land “in the heart of the Kurdish homeland” (81). While my 
interlocutors generally spoke favorably about the villages from which their families 
migrated, they also expressed feeling disconnected from those villages, as I will 
discuss in subsequent chapters. 
    
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have provided a brief overview of the historical context that 
is necessary for better understanding the lives of my interlocutors in the present. In 
both of my fieldsite locations, Kurdish university students in Istanbul and recent 
university graduates in Chicago share a common history of Turkish state 
oppression, erasure, silencing, and violence. This history is at the root of why those 
of my interlocutors who have migrated to Chicago chose to leave their lives and 
families in Turkey to come to the United States. Additionally, as I will describe in the 
following chapters, this shared history is also at the heart of the ways in which my 
interlocutors are constantly challenging narratives, in both Istanbul and Chicago.  
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CHAPTER 3. CONTENDING WITH THE STATE 
 After arriving in Istanbul for dissertation fieldwork at the beginning of 
February 2016, one of the first people I talked with was Zana. We met in front of the 
ornate gate of Galatasaray High School on İstiklal Caddesi and walked together to a 
café just off İstiklal for tea. As we were nearing the end of our first glass of tea, Diyar, 
one of Zana’s friends, came to join us and we ordered another glass of tea. We 
finished our tea, and then all walked together to a bookstore that had books by 
Kurdish authors and books translated into Kurdish for sale. At one point, Zana 
pulled a book from the bookshelf, turned to the bookstore owner, and said, “Don 
Quixote? It’s translated from Spanish?” “Yes,” the book seller replied, “from 
Spanish.” She turned to me and said, “It is from Spanish. Wow. Cool,” seemingly 
pleasantly surprised that a Spanish novel had been translated into Kurdish. 
 As we left the bookstore, Diyar said he needed to go, so we said our 
goodbyes. Zana announced that she was hungry, and I admitted that I was, too. “We 
can have lahmacun,” she announced. “Good idea,” I said, “I love lahmacun.” Zana led 
the way to a small lahmacun restaurant nearby, located just below street level with 
a barrel-vaulted ceiling. There were only a handful of small, low tables with small 
square stools. A counter stood at the back of the narrow space. At the table nearest 
the counter, a young man sat alone, eating lahmacun and chatting with the young 
man behind the counter. We sat down at one of the empty tables and ordered two 
lahmacun each. At this point I noticed a young man was sitting at a table in the 
corner, right next to the door, eating a bowl of lentil soup with a large chunk of 
bread. He was completely engrossed by a soccer game that was playing on the small 
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television set mounted on the wall, next to the door. Zana asked, “Do you know 
Amedspor?” I nodded, knowing it was one of two professional soccer teams based in 
Diyarbakır. “It is Amedspor and Fenerbahçe,” she continued. Fenerbahçe is one of 
several Istanbul-based teams, and one of the most popular soccer teams in Turkey. 
One thing I learned quickly from my students after I arrived in Ankara is that having 
a favorite soccer team is a necessity in Turkey. Pressured by my students to take 
sides, I had chosen Beşiktaş, another of the most popular Istanbul teams, simply 
because it was the oldest, having been founded in 1903, during the latter years of 
the Ottoman Empire.  
 “It is a big deal,” Zana said. “Why is it a big deal?” I asked. “Fenerbahçe is the 
best team in Turkey. Well, one of the best teams in Turkey, and Amedspor is from 
Diyarbakır.” I asked her what the score was, as my back was to the television. 
“Amedspor has 3 and Fenerbahçe has 2,” she replied with a smile that I read as a 
look of satisfaction. Soon, Fenerbahçe scored a goal, tying the game, which ended in 
a 3-3 tie. Zana told me that despite having not managed to beat Fenerbahçe, it was 
still a big deal, because Amedspor had not lost the game. The implication being that 
a team from the unofficial capital of Kurdistan coming close to beating one of the 
best teams from the cultural capital of Turkey served as some sort of proof that, in 
direct contradiction to Turkish state narratives, Kurds are, and should be 
acknowledged as, equal to Turks. Yes, in Turkey, even soccer can be political. Our 




Figure 2 One of many lahmacun enjoyed while talking with Zana. (Photo by the author.) 
 
This became our routine, meeting for lahmacun periodically over the course of my 
three months in Istanbul. We would often follow our meal with a stroll to a café for 
tea. During these meetings, we would talk about our lives. I asked about how her 
family came to Istanbul. Zana told me that the family had first moved from their 
village to the town of Dargeçit in 1995, and from there to Istanbul in 2000: 
Lydia: So, why did your family leave the village to go to Dargeçit in 1995? 
 
Zana: Because, you know, in 1980, the PKK started to fight against the 
government, and then the government started to… And the government 
insisted that you have to be a korucu [village guard]. If you don’t work for us, 
you have to go from here. And my mother didn’t accept it. 
 
Lydia: Your mother or your father? 
 
Zana: My father, because you know, my father is dominant in the family to 
say something [on behalf of the family]. He didn’t accept it, and we had to 




So, the family’s initial migration experience, from their village to a nearby city, was 
prompted by Zana’s father refusing to become a village guard. The village guard 
system in the early 1990s, as my interlocutors explained it to me, was essentially a 
militia system in which the military, acting as agents of the Turkish state, would 
present a so-called “option” to adult males living in Kurdish villages thought to be 
sympathetic to the PKK. The villagers could agree to serve as village guards, in 
which case they would be given a gun and a salary, in exchange for agreeing to fight 
against the PKK if necessary, and would be allowed to stay in the village with their 
families. Those who refused to serve as village guards would be evacuated from the 
village along with their families. In cases where no one in the village agreed to be a 
village guard, villages were completely evacuated and razed. 
 As our conversation continued, I asked Zana about the family’s second 
migration experience: 
Lydia: And, why did you leave Dargeçit to come to Istanbul? 
 
Zana: Because village people can earn money with their land in the village, 
but in Dargeçit we had no land. Our land was in the village. Like, we couldn’t 
find money to buy something or eat something. We had to come to Istanbul 




Zana: And, we are nine siblings, and my father had to earn a lot of money 
because nine children is such a large family in a city or in a town. In the 
village it is okay, because there is a lot of work to do, and you don’t need to 
spend a lot of money in the village because everything is ready to eat and to 
live. But, in a big town or in a city, no. 
 
So, the decision to migrate from the Kurdish-majority southeast to the city of 
Istanbul in northwestern Turkey was largely an economically motivated move. 
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Zana’s family consisted of 11 family members, and there were not enough 
opportunities in the small city of Dargeçit for them to earn an adequate living to 
support themselves. Zana’s narrative about her family moving from the village to 
Istanbul echoed stories I had heard during preliminary fieldwork. The story of 
clashes between the PKK and the Turkish government leading to a dangerous 
situation that families felt compelled to flee, is a common one for Kurds in Turkey, 
and especially for Kurds in Istanbul. As is the decision to migrate in pursuit of 
economic opportunities. And yet, the conditions that led to Zana’s father and so 
many others making the decision to migrate with their families to Istanbul in 
pursuit of economic opportunities were the direct result of state action in the 
villages. If they had not been forced to leave their villages, or if their villages had not 
been razed, these families might not have made the same decisions to migrate. Thus, 
a direct line can be drawn from internal rural to urban migration in Turkey and the 
actions of the Turkish military in Kurdish villages. 
 In this chapter, I address the role of “the state” in the experiences of my 
interlocutors and argue that the very nature of the state provides space for 
challenging state narratives. To do this, I delve more deeply into the anthropology of 
“the state,” and the difficulty of defining the term. I am particularly interested in the 
notorious difficulty in pinning down exactly who and what constitutes the state. The 
fact that the state is perpetually in the process of being defined, or, more precisely, 
defining itself, leads to a certain flexibility and room for challenges to dominant 
state narratives. I see my interlocutors taking advantage of this in making emphatic 
assertions of their particular ethno-linguistic identity that is at odds with the 
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narrative of the ethno-nationally assertive state in which they live or from which 
they hail. In doing so, they are exercising agency.  
 I also argue that my interlocutors have been “doubly displaced,” once from 
their villages, and again from Turkey. I look at the violent displacement experiences 
most of my interlocutors endured with their families as young children. This 
displacement was perpetrated by the military, as agents of the state. These military 
actions, and armed resistance to them, have contributed to state narratives in which 
an entire ethno-linguistic minority group is classified as “terrorists.” My 
examination of this narrative leads to critical reanalysis of the concepts of 
hospitality and citizenship in the context of “the state.” In doing so, I assert that the 
ethno-nationally assertive state is, in fact, inhospitable to Kurds. This inhospitality 
has contributed to my interlocutors being what I call “doubly displaced.” By this I 
mean that my interlocutors, as members of an ethno-linguistic minority group that 
has been the target of state violence and narratives that vilify them, have felt 
compelled to engage in “onward migration” (Jeffrey 2010, 2017). In onward 
migrating, they move beyond the borders of the ethno-nationally assertive state of 
which they are citizens, in pursuit of educational and economic opportunities 
beyond the borders of that state and in pursuit of the freedom to express their 
identities without persecution.  
 
“The State” 
 The amorphous interlocutor at the heart of this dissertation is “the state,” 
and by extension the “nation-state,” concepts that many scholars have noted are 
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particularly difficult to define, and thereby to study (Aretxaga 2003; Das and Poole 
2004; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Gupta 1995; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; 
Abrams 2006). In part, this is because the state is always in the process of redefining 
and reforming itself (Brooke and Strauss 2018). I argue that the difficulties in 
pinning down what the state is actually provides the flexibility and space for 
challenges to the concept and dominant state narratives in specific contexts, 
including alternative narratives about the citizenry. This section is a response to 
Begoña Aretxaga’s (2003) model of the state as “maddening” (393) entity to study, 
or even define. Aretxaga claims that “the difficulty in studying the sate resides in the 
fact that the state—as unified political subject or structure—does not exist; it is a 
collective illusion, the reification of an idea that masks real power relations under 
the guise of public interest” (400). By claiming that the state is an illusion, Aretxaga 
is saying that states are fictions, that they are ideas created in the minds of those 
who have power, and in contexts in which there is the illusion of consent on the part 
of citizens. This can be seen clearly in the context of Turkey, as the evidence of the 
creation of the illusion of the Turkish state less than 100 years ago is ever present in 
Turkey. Indeed, the Turkish state is clearly proud of the Kemalist state-building 
projects of the early Republic of Turkey. One place in which this pride is on full 
display is Anıtkabir, the massive mausoleum complex of Mustafa Kemal Ataürk, 
located in central Ankara. When I first visited Anıtkabir in the fall of 2011, shortly 
after I arrived in Ankara to teach English at Bilkent University, I was struck by just 
how palpable the Turkish patriotism was in this place that was, ostensibly, a 
memorial to one man. Yet, as I would soon learn, the identity of the Turkish state 
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and the mythos of the founding president of the Turkish Republic are inextricably 
intertwined. A key component of the celebration of the Kemalist reforms of the early 
republic is the Vault Galleries that are part of the museum on the grounds. These 
galleries depict the story of the early years of the newly established Republic of 
Turkey. There is patriotic music playing throughout, seemingly to help maintain a 
feeling of nationalistic awe. In the niche labeled “Reforms in Education, Language, 
and History” is the following note on history reform: “History is one of the 
fundamental ties that creates a nation. Common history consolidates national unity 
and cooperation.” This, perhaps perfectly, sums up the nation-building project. The 
imagining and creation of a homogeneous shared history is central to the promotion 
of a nationalistic ideal. One also learns in this niche that the Turkish History 
Research Society was established on 12 April 1931 (renamed the Turkish History 
Society in 1935), and that Atatürk claimed on 23 August 1931 that, “Writing history 
is as important as making history. If the writer is not faithful to the maker, the 
unchangeable truth would have a misleading nature for the mankind.”  
 In the same niche, regarding language reform, we learn that “Language is one 
of the fundamental ties that constitutes a nation. In a country lacking language unity, 
the national unity is in jeopardy.” And so, we learn that language reform and making 
Turkish the sole national language of Turkey were steps to ensuring national unity 
and strength. However, the Ottoman Empire, the remnants of which were re-
imagined into the Turkish Republic, was far from homogeneous, serving as home to 
a diverse group of ethnicities, religions, and languages. What of this diversity? It was 
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subordinated in the name of establishing a new Turkish nationalism in the early 
Republic. 
 What is conspicuously missing from the narrative presented at Anıtkabir is, 
of course, the presence of alternative voices or perspectives on Turkish history and 
the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. This is not 
surprising, given the nature of the nation-building project undertaken in the early 
years of the Turkish Republic, a project that is continued for contemporary 
generations in the displays at Anıtkabir. Through a series of sweeping reforms in 
such areas as education, language, dress, and history, Atatürk strove to create a new 
Turkish national community and to unify, and in many ways homogenize, the 
Turkish nation. The idea of the state was, and continues to be, sold to the public in a 
way, as something that is in the public interest, though it really only serves to 
reinforce power relations. The dynamic between those who govern and those who 
are governed is an important element in the illusion of the state, as it is the 
complicity of the governed that grants legitimacy to the government and, by 
extension, to the illusion of the state. 
 In presenting the state as a set of power relations in which the governed are 
complicit in their own governing, Aretxaga (2003) is echoing Foucault’s (1979) 
concept of a strong nexus of power supported by self-subjugation of the people. This 
idea also supports her claim that the illusion of the state can be seen as a hollow 
“state form” (395) that can be shaped in any number of ways by those in power to 
serve their own ends. She then goes on to claim that this creation of the illusion of 
the state is a form of violence in itself, as it is an imposition of the will of those in 
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power on those over whom they hold power, though the illusion of the state can also 
be maintained through the use of physical (i.e., not illusory) violence as well. The 
physical violence of the Turkish state was on stark display just before and during my 
fieldwork. I did preliminary fieldwork in Istanbul early in the summer of 2013. 
When I returned to the United States, I learned of the Gezi Park protests and the 
violent response of the Turkish military, which had started while I was on my flight 
back. These protests were initially a response to the government unveiling plans to 
renovate Gezi Park and the surrounding area, in central Istanbul, including 
reconstructing an Ottoman-era military barracks that had once stood on the site. 
However, due to the violent reaction of the government to initial protests, the 
movement rapidly grew into a much larger protest, airing various grievances 
against the government. More violent crackdowns ensued. Turkish state violence 
was on display for the whole world to see, and the world was watching. This was 
undoubtedly embarrassing for those in political power in Turkey. The tension 
between the government and citizens who dared to be even the least bit critical 
remained palpable while I was doing my fieldwork in early 2016. This tension came 
to a head about a month and a half after I returned fieldwork in Istanbul when, on 
15 June 2016, an attempted coup was violently suppressed by the Turkish military, 
acting as agents of the state. 
 Perhaps the most well-known definitions of “the State” are predicated on the 
concept of the use of force. Max Weber (2010), building on Leon Trotsky’s assertion 
that “every state is founded on force” (O’Kane 1996:5), claimed that “a state is a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
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physical force within a given territory” (115). Thus, for Weber, states incorporate 
two things: force and territory. This is certainly true in the case of Turkey, in which 
we see uses of force such as: the forced population exchanges between Greece and 
Turkey in 1923 (Hirschon 2003); the passage of Law 2510 in 1934 (İskân Kanunu 
1934), which designated certain areas for evacuation on the basis of, essentially, not 
being Turkish enough; and the evacuation and razing of villages in the early 1990s 
(McDowall 2007). Yet, I would argue, the force of the Turkish state also appears in 
less overtly violent ways, such as through the language reform policies and 
programs such as “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!” (“Citizen, Speak Turkish!”) that sought 
to linguistically homogenize the citizenry of the Turkish state. Education is also 
implicated in nation-state-building projects centered around language.  
 In educating its citizens to know the official state language and the official 
state version of “that which is said to have happened” (Trouillot 1995), the state is 
also educating its citizens to consent to regimes of domination, through which the 
state transforms individuals into citizens. Antonio Gramsci (2006) argues that 
beyond force, states require the consent of their citizens. Yet, rather than allowing 
citizens to freely consent to being governed, Gramsci argues that states are involved 
in various forms of hegemonic coercion to “create and maintain a certain type of 
civilization and of citizen” (77). This is done through the law, which Gramsci 
considers to be “the repressive and negative aspect” (77) of the state. Further, he 
argues that “the State does not have and request consent, but it also ‘educates’ this 
consent” (78). This concept of educating citizens to be “good,” consenting citizens in 
the eyes of the state is echoed in Navaro-Yashin’s (2002a) and Altınay’s (2004) 
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discussions of the links between education and ideas of “ideal” Turkish citizens in 
Turkey. And yet. As I experienced during preliminary fieldwork in May of 2013, a 
bureaucratic decision to allow Kurdish language classes at Turkish universities, 
provided enough flexibility in the education system to allow space for Kurdish 
students to explore their identities as Kurds in Turkey.  
 Governmentality, the system of processes and regulations designed to 
manage populations and make them more visible, is necessary because “the state 
can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general 
tactics of governmentality” (Foucault 2006:143). Thus, these tactics of 
governmentality are the tactics of being a state. Tied to the concept of 
governmentality is the concept of discipline. For Foucault (2006), the means for 
managing the population is discipline. This, then, leads Foucault to describe “a 
triangle, sovereignty—discipline—government, which has as its primary target the 
population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security” (142). 
Ultimately, then, there four elements, or “tactics” (143), of governmentality: 
sovereignty, discipline, government, and security. These seem to map onto Weber’s 
(2006, 2010) and Gramsci’s (2006) ideas of state management of populations. 
Sovereignty is, of course, concerned with territory. Security can be linked to the 
legitimate use of force. Government, and particularly the use of statistics, clearly 
connects to bureaucracy. Finally, discipline appears to link up nicely with Gramsci’s 
idea of consent, which implicates education and other forms of coercion. Foucault 
(2006) asserts that states are not simply concerned with sovereign control of their 
territories but are also concerned with the security of their populations. The way in 
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which states determine who is included in their populations and the specifics of 
their collective lives, what Foucault calls “regularities” (140), is through the use of 
statistics. Statistics can also then be used to justify governing and managing the 
population in the interest of the “welfare of the population, the improvement of its 
condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.” (141). Of course, the 
irony here is that there is no reliable demographic statistical data available for 
Turkey. The first Turkish census was conducted in 1927. Every census from 1927 to 
1985 included a question about language, asked as some form of language spoken at 
home and/or in the family. However, the Turkish state has not disseminated ethno-
linguistic demographic data beyond that collected for the 1965 census (Dundar 
2014). The language question was the only question on the census that got at some 
form of ethnicity data. Thus, because there has been no question on the Turkish 
census that specifically asks about language or ethnic identity sine 1965, there is no 
accurate up-to-date statistical data for the number of Kurds in Turkey.  
 Aside from statistics, populations can be made more legible in a variety of 
ways. James C. Scott (1998) apparently builds on Foucauldian concepts of state 
management of populations through his discussion of “seeing like a state.” 
According to Scott, for states to effectively govern their populations, and collect 
taxes, they must simplify and make their populations more “legible” (2). 
Standardization of measurements and the drawing of maps is one way states can 
make populations legible, as it allows for individuals to be mapped onto the 
territory of the state, and also allows for more clear and specific delineations of the 
borders of state territory. Similarly, the planning and building of “rectilinear streets” 
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(62) as part of the transformation of central Paris in the late 19th century allowed 
for more efficient management and administration of the urban population than had 
been possible when the city was still comprised of winding alleyways. Through 
urban planning, states are able to make both the cities themselves and the 
populations of those cities more legible. In Turkey, this is seen in the built 
environment of Ankara, the city to which Atatürk moved the capital at the time of 
the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. While Ankara was an old city, 
the areas designed for government offices are, indeed, comprised of wide 
boulevards that make the city more legible. 
 Language is another means through which states attempt to make their 
populations more legible. One way that language is used to achieve legibility is 
through the creation and mandated use of surnames. Scott (1998) asserts that 
“tracing property ownership and inheritance, collecting taxes, maintaining court 
records, performing police work, conscripting soldiers, and controlling epidemics 
were all made immeasurably easier by the clarity of full names” (71). Thus, the 
mandated use of surnames led to easier practice of the bureaucratic elements of 
state governance. The case of the mandated adoption and use of Turkish citizens, as 
part of the new Turkish state’s Kemalist reforms aimed at modernization and 
westernization, is discussed by Meltem Türköz (2007). The surname was, according 
to Scott, “a first and crucial step toward making individual citizens officially legible, 
and along with the photograph, it is still the first fact on documents of identity” (71). 
Pradeep Jeganathan (2004) also discusses the use of identification cards as sites of 
legibility and control of populations, and indeed as sites of violence, in a discussion 
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of checkpoints. Jeganathan argues that the “marginal location of the checkpoint is 
mapped again through the identification card, which… is the illegible, illegal demand 
of the checkpoint” (75). In describing checkpoints and identity cards in this way, 
Jeganathan draws attention to the ways that seeking legibility at the borders (the 
margins) of state sovereignty violently highlights who does and does not “belong” in 
the eyes of the state. Thus, state legibility is implicated in concepts of inclusion and 
exclusion, belonging and not belonging, legitimate and illegitimate residents, and by 
extension definitions of citizenry. Citizenship is really about being defined as a 
legitimate (legible) member of a state; one who belongs in a particular state. Thus, 
in the marginal border areas the definition of who belongs and who does not is 
thrown into sharp contrast, especially when a piece of paper with a name and a 
photograph may be the only thing standing between being defined by agents of the 
state (border guards, police at checkpoints, etc.) as belonging or not belonging, as 
being worthy of hospitality or not. Or, as in the case of one of my interlocutors, 
Welat, the presence of a birthplace on one’s identity card. As Welat described it, this 
birthplace information is used to discriminate against those from Kurdish majority 
regions in the hiring process.  
 In addition to surnames, the establishment of an official state language is 
linked to legibility, and particularly the simplification of state control. According to 
James C. Scott (1998), “of all state simplifications, then, the imposition of a single, 
official language may be the most powerful, and it is the precondition of many other 
simplifications” (72). Indeed, requiring all citizens to learn to speak, read, and write 
the same language makes bureaucratic things, such as forms of government 
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communication with citizens simpler, as forms and instructions can be issued in a 
single language. Adopting an official language further implicates educational 
institutions, as schools are the location in which the standardized form of the official 
language is taught to young citizens. Further, according to Scott, an official state 
language is also tied to national identity. Thus, Scott links language and nationalism 
to the idea of the state. This connection between language, nationalism, and the 
state was a key component of the Turkish nation-building project of the early 
republic. Language was one of Ataürk’s first areas of reform (Lewis 2002). The 
ramifications of this are felt by my interlocutors, such as when Serhad expressed 
exasperation at falling into speaking Turkish because being formally educated in 
Turkish meant “we think in Turkish!” 
 As we see in the early work of Michael Meeker (1971), these issues of 
linguistic imposition by the state can affect regional populations that speak 
distinctive dialects of the national language as well. Meeker looked at regional and 
national identity reckoning in Turkey among the Black Sea Turks, also known as 
Laz. He was looking at village life in Turkey, but beyond just a classic ethnography of 
Black Sea Turks in contrast to dominant Turkish society, Meeker grapples with 
issues of identity and naming. One issue he points out is that the term “Laz,” used by 
outsiders to name Black Sea Turks is problematic, as it is often “used by Anatolian 
Turks” to refer “to all Black Sea peoples of Turkey,” while the Lazi, as they call 
themselves, are a distinct ethno-linguistic group. So, “Laz” is an essentializing term 
used by non-Black Sea Turks to describe anyone living within a particular 
geographic area. However, the Lazi speak a distinctive dialect of the Turkish 
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language and share certain cultural systems of meaning amongst themselves. The 
key here is that the Lazi are othered by members of the dominant Turkic group in 
Turkey. This distinction serves to further the dominant narrative of the Turkish 
state: that Turkey is a land for Turks who speak Turkish, and specifically the form of 
Turkish on which the national language is based, Istanbulu Turkish, the dialect 
predominantly spoken by those who lived in Istanbul (Lewis 1999). Thus, those 
who speak a different dialect, are marked as different, and by extension as inferior 
citizens.  
 As we shall see, this distinction between those who speak the standardized 
Turkish promoted by the Turkish Language Association and those who do not or are 
not ethnically Turkish is a key component in the othering my interlocutors have 
experienced as Kurdish citizens of the Republic of Turkey. Indeed, what is going on 
here, is that the Turkish state and the various ethno-linguistic groups living within 
the borders of the Turkish state are grappling with categorization, and specifically 
identity labels. Anthropology has acknowledged that all categories of classification 
are constructed, and yet humans seem to love categorizing things to make meaning. 
The state, and most certainly the Turkish state, relies on categorization as part of 
the ongoing project of defining who and what constitutes “the state.” If Turkey is a 
place for Turks who speak Turkish, then there must be a definition of who fits into 
that particular category. Those who do not fit into this category must then, by 
extension, be defined as something else, as something “other.” Those “other” 
categories are then, as we shall see in the case of Kurdish citizens of Turkey, 
potentially considered suspect, or dangerous to the ongoing nation-state-building 
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project. The ultimate manifestation of this for the Turkish state vis-à-vis its Kurdish 
citizenry is a narrative that categorizes Kurds as “terrorists.” It is this narrative that 
my interlocutors are fighting against. 
 Ultimately, “the State,” is an incredibly difficult thing to define and to study, 
in large part because it is predominantly a conceptual construct; an illusion. 
Maintenance of the illusion of the state is a continual process that requires 
establishing the state vis-à-vis what the state is not, or those who belong vis-à-vis 
those who do not. Veena Das and Deborah Poole (2004) agree that the state is 
difficult to define and study. They critique anthropologists as embodying “forms of 
administrative rationality, political order, and authority” (5) in their work. In other 
words, they think that anthropologists have been overly concerned with finding 
neat, orderly state forms to study. They assert that the state is more difficult to pin 
down because “the state is imagined as an always incomplete project that must be 
constantly spoken of—and imagined—through an invocation of the wilderness, 
lawlessness, and savagery that not only lies outside its jurisdiction but also 
threatens it from within” (7).  
 This idea of who belongs and who does not, or who is a citizen and who is a 
foreigner, and how the categories are defined, is raised by Jacques Derrida (2000) in 
his discussion of hospitality. Derrida begins by addressing the concept of the 
foreigner. For Derrida, the status of foreigner is related to language. Thus, as with 
Scott’s (1998) discussion of citizens, language is a requirement of belonging. 
According to Derrida, foreigners do not speak the language of the society in which 
they find themselves. Derrida asserts: 
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Among the serious problems we are dealing with here is that of the foreigner 
who, inept at speaking the language, always risks being without defense 
before the law of the country that welcomes or expels him; the foreigner is 
first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is 
formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc. He has to ask 
for hospitality in a language which by definition is not his own, the one 
imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the king, the lord, the 
authorities, the nation, the State, the father, etc. This personage imposes on 
him translation into their own language, and that’s the first act of violence. 
[15]  
 
 Thus, language serves as a way to mark the foreigner as a foreigner, an 
“other,” and it is a violent marking. Yet, for Derrida, there is also the idea that 
foreigners can be understood in some way; at the very least they are understood as 
being foreigners. Further, foreigners are in question (much as they are at the 
checkpoints described by Jeganathan [2004]); that is, they are in a liminal state of 
sorts, in which they are knowable and recognized but never fully incorporated into 
society. This “being-in-question” status of the foreigner can be destabilizing for 
society, as their liminal state can highlight and serve to call into question the 
existence and sovereignty of the state. The presence of foreigners, thus, challenges 
the very concepts of the structure and legitimacy of the state. However, hospitality, 
or the gesture of welcoming the foreigner, can also be seen as an expression of 
sovereignty. The gesture of welcoming, of offering hospitality, implies the state’s 
claim to power or sovereignty over the space into which the foreigner is being 
welcomed. These connected concepts of foreigners, state sovereignty, and language, 
while implying that the foreigner comes from outside the state, could also be useful 
in addressing state interactions with ethno-linguistic minorities who reside within 
the borders of a particular state, as in the case of Kurds in Turkey.  
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 In addressing the concept of the state, it is also useful to address the idea of 
the nation. In this, Aretxaga (2003) again proves useful, as she addresses what she 
calls the “untenable hyphen” (396) of the concept of the nation-state. She asserts 
that the ideas of nation and state are often conflated, though the two concepts 
actually describe two different entities, though she also claims that the two ideas are 
often intertwined, as states can engage in projects of nationalism and nationalist 
movements can demand states. For Aretxaga the ideas of nation and state are both 
illusions. The illusion of the nation lies in, drawing on Anderson (1991), an 
imaginary concept of unity and commonality of language, culture, history, and other 
shared aspects of the nation. The illusion of the state, on the other hand, is based on 
organizational structures and power relations that are experienced in different 
ways by different groups, based on “class, gender, ethnicity, and status” (396), 
thereby highlighting difference. This difference is experienced as differences in 
citizenship. Differences in citizenship require a “‘scapegoat,’ an outsider, or an 
outsider-insider, a ritual repository of the jarring violence inhabiting the national 
community” (397). These outsiders, who can come either from within or from 
without the borders of state territory, are often ethnic minorities or migrants who 
are seen as not full members of the illusory concept of the nation-state and are 
therefore susceptible to structural and physical violence. Violence against outsiders 
is seen as necessary for the maintenance of the illusions of nation and state. This 
outsider (or outsider-insider) sounds very much like the foreigner described by 
Derrida (2000). So, while the state can choose to offer hospitality to the foreigner, 
the state could just as easily enact violence against the foreigner. 
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 These ideas of foreigners and outsiders highlight the importance of the 
concept of borders. Das and Poole (2004) describe these borders as margins. They 
argue that the concepts of nation and state are most evident in the margins, and the 
central question of the margins is “the relationship between violence and the 
ordering functions of the state” (6). Margins can be locations where violence is seen 
by the state as legitimate for the maintenance of order. For Das and Poole, margins 
can be seen in three ways: 1) as “containers” (9) for marginal groups, and locations 
where these groups can be managed in areas where they are simultaneously 
included and excluded from the state; 2) as sites where legibility or illegibility is 
determined, since margins and borders are the sites where official documents, such 
as identity cards or passports, must be produced for inspection by agents of the 
state; and 3) as sites where the law and discipline comes into contact with 
individual bodies. All three of these concepts of margins center on issues of 
inclusion and exclusion, belonging and not belonging, which are, of course, concerns 
of the state. Yet, inclusion and exclusion, belonging and not belonging, are also 
concerns of nations. It is specifically to the concepts of nations and nationalism to 
which I now turn. 
 In looking at the concept of nation, I began with French historian Ernest 
Renan (1882), who defined a nation as “a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the 
feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is 
prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in 
the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to 
continue a common life” (1) From this definition, we can conclude that nationalism, 
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or sense of belonging to a nation, is a shared experience that involves a supposed 
shared history, as well as commitment and sacrifice on the part of the individual for 
the idea of the nation. 
 For a more contemporary definition of nationalism, I turn to Ernest Gellner 
(2006), who states that “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (1). He continues by 
saying that “nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in 
terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the 
violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A 
nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind” (1). Here, then, we 
see the primacy of the political in formulating a concept of nationalism. For Gellner, 
as for Renan, nationalism is necessarily a shared phenomenon; it is a social 
experience. It is Gellner’s definition that Eric Hobsbawm (1992) draws on in setting 
up his discussion of nations and nationalism, before concluding that “nationalism 
requires too much belief in what is patently not so” (12), thus equating nationalism 
to something that is imaginary. 
 This connection between nation and imaginary points us to Benedict 
Anderson’s (1991) description of the nation as an imagined political community: 
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion… The nation is 
imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps 
a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which 
lie other nations… Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless 
of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation 




 Thus, nations are not an actual “thing” that can be pointed to, they have ideas 
membership that include some and exclude others, and they are predicated on the 
idea of equal membership for all members. So, while nations, as with states may be 
better conceived as an idea than a thing, and while both incorporate ideas of 
inclusion and exclusion, as well as ideas of belonging (citizenship for states, 
community for nations), nations do not seem to be concerned with sovereignty over 
territory in the same way states are. Though, to return briefly to Aretxaga (2003), 
nations may desire to establish sovereignty over territory in order to become 
nation-states. 
 I find these perplexing ideas of nation and state compelling as an 
anthropologist. While the concepts of nation and state may be difficult to define and 
understand, they certainly hold sway in the imaginations of groups of people around 
the world. I see these concepts as useful for describing what I see in my research 
context. Ideas about what and who the Turkish state is and who belongs or does not 
belong, including ideas about who a Turkish citizen is, including specifically what 
language he or she speaks, has very real ramifications for my interlocutors. 
Reactions against these ideas about the Turkish state have resulted in the fostering 
of Kurdish nationalism, which raises its own set of questions about who belongs or 
does not belong, including ideas about who Kurds are, including specifically which 
dialect he or she speaks, and whether or not the Kurdish nation should pursue a 
future Kurdish state. These problems and questions affect the lives of my 
interlocutors in Istanbul and in Chicago. While the concepts of state and nation may 
not be neat categories, perhaps it is in their “maddening” (Aretxaga 2003:393) 
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qualities, their flexibility in a way, that make them useful for understanding 
concepts that can be maddening not only for the researcher, but for the individuals 
who are living within the imagined borders of various states and nations. 
 
Kurds in Urban Turkey 
 Mehmed was a 31-year-old history doctoral student at a university in Ankara 
when we spoke in 2012, during my time teaching in Ankara. Mehmed had moved 
from a village in Gaziantep Province to the provincial capital city of Gaziantep as a 
small child, with his mother and two older brothers, after his father passed away. Of 
his experience in the city, Mehmed stated: 
In the city many families do not talk to their children in Kurdish. In the case 
of my family, we were always talking in Kurdish, but when we were 
downtown my mother tried to talk in Turkish with us. Switching to Turkish 
was a kind of automatic reflex for us. We were scared we might face negative 
consequences if we spoke Kurdish. On the other hand, Kurds were convinced 
that their culture was useless and inferior. So, for many families living in the 
cities, Turkish was one of the only things that could bring them self-esteem in 
their terrible life conditions. Turkish is much more identified with city life, 
and city life is always preferred by poor people of rural backgrounds. 
 
 At the time when Mehmed and his family moved to the city, the Kurdish 
language was completely outlawed by the Turkish state. Kurds, such as Mehmed and 
his family, felt the pressure to speak Turkish, to publicly perform Turkishness, for 
fear of retribution. Further, speaking Turkish was a way for Mehmed and his family, 
as well as other Kurds, to “fit in” to their new Turkish urban environment, and was 
seen as a means of social elevation. The Turkish focus on language, according to 
Secor (2004), is in line with the idea that “Turkey has historically viewed emergent 
claims to Kurdish linguistic, cultural, or political rights as sources of instability and 
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threats to national unity” (356). Therefore, enforcing a Turkish-language-only policy 
was one attempt by the Turkish state to maintain and strengthen conceptions of a 
unified Turkish citizenry. It also resulted in Kurdish speakers feeling othered and as 
less than welcome if they were speaking Kurdish on the streets of urban Turkey, as 
is clear from Mehmed’s account of developing a nearly automatic reflex of switching 
from speaking Kurdish to speaking Turkish on the streets of Gaziantep.  
 My interlocutors spent their formative years in urban environments, and 
particularly in Turkish cities. For some, their families moved directly from the 
village to Istanbul. Other families initially moved to provincial cities, before moving 
on to Istanbul. In these cities, as in the villages for those who had started school 
before their families were evacuated, their schooling was conducted in the Turkish 
language. Thus, my interlocutors had the linguistic knowledge to navigate the 
Turkish cities in which they lived.   
 Christopher Houston (2008) introduces the concept of the “Kemalist City.” 
Kemalism is the political ideology named for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that served as 
the foundation for the modernizing state reforms instituted in the early years of the 
Republic of Turkey. For Houston, through these Kemalist state policies, and in 
particular the ones aimed at constructing or reconstructing cities such as Ankara 
and Istanbul, the built environment became a social actor in the promotion of 
Turkish nationalism. Houston (2008) then goes on to link this physical concept of 
space with the aural space created through language reforms, claiming that through 
the establishment and enforcement of Turkish as the national language, the 
Kemalist regime imposed particular sounds on the citizens who moved through the 
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physical spaces constructed by the state. This aural space “was intended to produce 
the acoustic dimension of the new nationalist built environment…[;] a project to 
soundproof the institutions of modernity” (122) against non-Turkish sounds, 
specifically languages other than Turkish. It is within the constructed spatial and 
aural environments of these “Kemalist Cities” in the ethno-nationally assertive 
Turkish State that Kurds living in urban Turkey must negotiate their ethno-
linguistic identities.  
 Mehmed continued by describing the difference between knowing formal 
Turkish and actually being able to communicate in daily life with Turks: “When I 
moved to the city, I already knew Turkish. There was another problem. We learned 
Turkish from teachers and television, but Turks learned it from their parents. The 
Gaziantep accent is a unique Turkish accent. It was weird for me. I could never be 
successful in talking like them. I was used to formal Turkish, but daily language was 
alien to me.” Thus, in addition to the distinction between speaking Kurdish and 
Turkish, Mehmed also felt a distinction between the formal Turkish he learned in 
school and the colloquial Turkish spoken by the Turks he encountered in his daily 
life. This echoes Meeker’s (1971) description of the Lazi and serves as an interesting 
example in which standard Istanbulu Turkish, or the Turkish typically spoken in 
Istanbul, is the marker of difference, rather than a regional dialect. Even if the 
foreigner, in this case Kurds in Turkey, learns the language imposed on them by the 
entity from whom they are seeking hospitality, it may still serve to mark them as a 
foreigner. Beyond personal experiences, like the one described by Mehmed, in 
which he felt othered based on the way he spoke Turkish in school, a common 
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concern expressed by my interlocutors was for their mothers, who often did not 
speak any Turkish at all. 
 The experiences of their non-Turkish speaking mothers in urban Turkey 
were described by several of my interlocutors. Not only did their mothers not know 
Turkish, as they had lived their whole lives in their villages speaking Kurdish, most 
of them were also illiterate. So, while their children, who had been receiving 
education in Turkish in their local primary schools, the mothers had none of the 
language education necessary for navigating the Turkish city. While talking with 
Welat in 2013, I asked about his family’s experience moving to Istanbul: 




Lydia: How old were you then? 
 
Welat: Five years old. When we immigrated, it was painful for us. ... Home 
was sometimes like a prison because you don't have any friends. My mother, 
for maybe ten years, she didn't leave home, because she doesn't speak 
Turkish and she doesn't have any friends here. ... When you come here, the 
government takes all of your things; they burn everything. 
 
Lydia: In the village? 
 
Welat: Yes, back in Mardin. … 
 
Lydia: Did they give you any warning? How did it happen? 
 
Welat: No, they just came and burned the village. There was no information. 
No warning. In that time the Kurdish movement was very strong. The village 
wanted to help the Kurdish movement. There were protests in Dargeçit, in 
Mardin. 
 
As if destruction of their village were not enough, Welat shared the upheaval of 
moving from a Kurdish village to a Turkish city. This abrupt change brought about 
feelings of disconnectedness, expressed through his assertion that they did not have 
 
 72 
any friends in Istanbul. The most striking part of Welat’s account, perhaps, was his 
assertion that his mother did not leave home for as long as ten years because she did 
not speak Turkish. That he followed this information about his mother with 
recounting that the government, by which he meant the military, had “burned 
everything” in the village, seemed to imply that these two things were linked in 
Welat’s mind: his mother not going out in Istanbul because she did not speak 
Turkish, and the fact that those who had impelled them to leave their village were 
members of the Turkish military.  
 Welat also relayed a story about learning Turkish and the feelings of 
otherness that came with it: “My brother and sister gave up on school. They didn’t 
know Turkish, and their teacher was sometimes violent with them. They felt 
pressure at school, and they didn’t want to go to school, because school was like a 
small prison for them. The reason is, when you go to school you don’t know their 
language [Turkish]. Actually, the most important thing is, when you are 
participating in class, it’s like your mouth is different, and all of the other children 
laugh when you speak in class.” This last sentence, in which Welat expresses the 
frustration of his mouth not being able to properly form the sounds of Turkish is 
likely familiar to anyone who has worked at learning a foreign language. It certainly 
resonated with me, as I was struggling to learn Turkish myself when we had this 
conversation. Welat goes on to describe being made fun of by the Turkish children 
in his class for what they seemed to have perceived as an inadequacy because Welat 
sounded different when he spoke Turkish with a Kurdish accent. This, then, is 
another example of language being used to mark Kurds as foreigners. When taken 
 
 73 
with the experience relayed by Mehmed above, it points back to Navaro-Yashin’s 
(2002) contention that the education system has been an important means of 
attempting to assimilate Kurds (and others) into “good Turkish” citizens.  
 This pressure to speak Turkish, specifically the “correct” version of Turkish, 
and the sense of being an other that came from not speaking Turkish, as described 
by Mehmed and Welat, echo Derrida’s (2000) discussion of the language and the 
foreigner. Though Mehmed and his family were citizens of the Turkish state, as 
Kurds and speakers of the Kurdish language, they were marked as foreign. Their 
Kurdishness was not accommodated by the Turkish state; it was not welcome in 
Turkish cities. Mehmet’s discussion of language was echoed by Ahmed, a 30-year-
old history doctoral student at a university in Chicago, Illinois. Ahmed’s family 
moved from a village in the province of Muş to the city of Adana when he was five 
years old because his father was appointed to a new job in Adana. When asked what 
“Turkish citizenship” means to him, Ahmed replied, “Something that keeps an eye on 
you, always. Being under surveillance, not feeling at home with your own language, 
and having to speak Turkish.” Clearly, for Ahmed, Turkish citizenship is intimately 
tied up with language expectations and state surveillance, and it is something he 
finds unsettling. The state easing restrictions on speaking Kurdish in recent years 
has done little to make Kurds feel more welcome in Turkish cities. This also echoes 
Welat’s description of his mother being confined to their home in Istanbul because 
she did not have the Turkish language skills to successfully navigate the Turkish 
city. Language serves as a marker of difference for Kurds in Turkey and a means for 
excluding Kurds from full participation in daily life in Turkish cities.  
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 The negotiation of identity, for Kurds in urban Turkey, is connected to 
concepts of citizenship. According to Secor (2004), “citizenship works not only at 
the state level to assemble identities and position them variously in relation to 
discourses of ‘belonging’ and ‘rights,’ but also at the scale of everyday, urban life… 
Cities are prime sites where identities are staked, belonging is negotiated, and rights 
are pursued” (353). Secor described an urban environment in which gender, class, 
religion, and ethnicity, in addition to citizenship, must be navigated in the formation 
of identity for the Kurdish residents of urban Turkey. This ethno-linguistic identity 
formation is further complicated by the particular historical-political context 
described above, since Kurds who assert their identity as Kurds are doing so against 
the nationalist narrative of the ethno-linguistically assertive Turkish state. 
 Though identity is not her main project, Öykü Potuoğlu-Cook (2006) is 
looking at performative gentrification in Istanbul, through the lens of belly dance. By 
virtue of looking at the individual bodily practices of those living in the urban 
environment, however, she is addressing issues of identity. This is most evident in 
the distinction Potuoğlu-Cook draws between the women who engage in belly 
dancing for pay, and those members of higher economic status who take belly dance 
classes for entertainment. For the women who are professional belly dancers, there 
is a need to navigate and negotiate tensions between a lucrative job that is a major 
part of the tourism industry in Istanbul and forms of societal shaming. Here, we see 
market forces intersecting with cultural forces in ways that can help to shape 
identities; in this case, identities as performers. Regarding those women who 
consume belly dance for entertainment, Potuoğlu-Cook describes their practices as 
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“a classed and gendered self-Orientalism” (634), a reappropriation of the tropes of 
the Ottoman past; a reappropriation that is predominantly engaged in by middle-
class or upper middle-class women. This “neo-Ottomania” (634) can be seen as an 
aspect of these women’s identities as women who occupy a particular socio-
economic position in Istanbul society. 
 Nationalism, collective memory, and the built environment intersect in 
Turkish cities to influence identity formation and expression. Amy Mills (2010) 
looks at identity in a particular neighborhood in Istanbul, Kuzguncuk, to explore 
what it means to live in a neighborhood that was ethnically and religiously diverse, 
but no longer is, and the ways life in this type of neighborhood might influence 
conceptions of identity. Central to this is the ways in which the concept of and 
production of cosmopolitanism, or a “sense of world citizenship” (30) and 
nationalism play out against one another in this particular Istanbul neighborhood. 
One of Mills’s main arguments is that “so-called cosmopolitan spaces represent 
European identity and are economically and culturally exclusive, as they leave out 
many others, be they religious, rural, Kurdish, or otherwise not secular, upper class, 
and Turkish” (31). So then, while the elites that live in Kuzguncuk like to point to the 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious past of the neighborhood as a symbol of the 
neighborhood’s continuing cosmopolitanism and their identities as cosmopolitan 
individuals, they simultaneously work to keep “others” out of the neighborhood. 
They like the idea of a diverse past, but do not want to live in a diverse present. 
Rather, they have internalized the dominant narratives of the ethno-nationally 
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assertive Turkish state, and therefore are suspicious of anyone who can be classified 
as “other.” 
 A contentious marker of difference is the Turkish state identity card. 
Citizenship, and being identified as a Turkish citizen on an identity card is no simple 
thing for Kurdish citizens of Turkey. Most people in Turkey have a strong awareness 
as to what parts of the country are majority Kurdish and those which are not. 
Therefore, when someone born in the Kurdish majority region presents their 
identity card, the person looking at the card can immediately infer the identity card 
bearer’s ethnicity. When asked about his thoughts regarding Turkish citizenship, 
Mehmed said, “I do not feel anything about Turkish citizenship. I do not want to 
carry anything that contains the word ‘Turkish.’ In this context, citizenship is not for 
me. Yes, I am a citizen of this country, but my identity card makes me another kind 
of citizen.” By “another kind of citizen,” Mehmed was referring to the presence of his 
place of birth on his identity card. For Kurds, the presence of this information, and 
having a birthplace in one of the predominantly Kurdish provinces in southeastern 
Turkey, immediately marks them as different, as Kurdish, as an “other.” Laure 
Guirguis (2016) describes a similar marker of difference on identity cards in Egypt, 
where religious affiliation marks Coptic Christians as “other,” vis-à-vis the majority 
Muslim population of Egypt. The Muslim majority in Egypt represents the nation, 
just as the Turkish majority represents the nation in Turkey. In both cases, this 
marker of difference is literally carried for life, because it is printed on a person’s 
identity card. Additionally, while identity cards serve as a marker of Turkish 
citizenship with everything that Turkish citizenship implies, including the 
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imposition of Turkish ethnicity on citizens who are not ethnically Turkish, identity 
cards are constant reminder of the Turkish state’s treatment of its Kurdish citizens. 
 One reason Turkish state identity cards are particularly contentious is 
because the Kurds who carry them know the information on the cards is often false. 
One day, while talking over tea, Welat pulled out his identity card. On the front, I 
saw his name, the name of his father and mother, his place of birth, and his birth 
date. “The date is not correct. It was later that they [the Turkish government] gave 
us identity cards. We went to a government institution, and my father said, ‘This is 
my son, this is my daughter.’… A government official decided. They said, ‘All of you 
will go to this government institution, and they will give you birth dates.’ I don’t 
want to carry it, but I have to because the police can ask for my ID card anywhere. 
It’s bullshit.” Not only was his birthdate wrong, so was his place of birth. Welat 
clearly had strong feelings about his identity card. It seemed to serve as a constant 
reminder that the Turkish state had imposed identifying information on his family, 
and that the state did not care enough to get the information correct. Welat is not 
alone in this. All of my interlocutors who were born in villages have had Turkish 
identity cards with at least an incorrect birth date, if not more than that. 
 As with so many things in Turkey, land has been politicized. I remember 
telling Turkish coworkers at Bilkent University that I was planning to travel to the 
Diyarbakır and Mardin for a long weekend with some other colleagues in the spring 
of 2012. Their reactions were not encouraging, in fact, they asked why we would do 
such a thing. “It is dangerous,” they told me. This was emblematic of Turkish state 
discourse about the land east of an invisible, but very real, border between the 
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“safe,” predominantly ethnically Turkish north and west and the “dangerous,” 
predominantly ethnically Kurdish southeast. I saw this same discourse echoed by 
the United States government, as well, when, while participating in a Department of 
State-sponsored intensive summer language program in 2013, my fellow 
participants and I were forbidden from traveling to southeastern provinces because 
of “safety concerns.”  
 One afternoon, while talking to Reşo at a café near Istiklal Street in Istanbul, 
our conversation was interrupted because he got a phone call. He stood up and 
walked away from the table to take the call and was gone for several minutes. When 
he came back, I noticed that he seemed nervous or worried. I asked him if 
everything was okay. He explained, “My friend thinks one of our friends has been 
arrested. No one has heard from him for two weeks. I’m really scared.” A little later, 
Reşo got a text. He read it, and then said, “It’s my friend. They found him. He just 
said, ‘Don’t worry.’ I don’t know where he was. He does this sometimes. He will just 
disappear; not talk to us for a few days.” 
 Not being able to get ahold of his friend was distressing to Reşo because our 
meeting was taking place in the midst of a particularly tense period that had begun 
in July 2015, of renewed armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military. 
This phase, in the “low-intensity war” that has been ongoing since the mid-1980s led 
to the imposition of strict curfews in towns in the southeast that were seen by the 
Turkish government as particularly “problematic” or supportive of the PKK, 
including Nusaybin, Sur, and Cizre. It had also led to the destruction of entire towns, 
or parts of them. One of the more horrific reports from this phase of the conflict, that 
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the Turkish military had killed more than 150 civilians in three basements in Cizre 
(Charlton 2016), had come just a month before I talked to Reşo. In light of the 
increased political tension, Reşo’s concern for his friend’s safety as a Kurd was 
certainly understandable. 
 Our conversation turned to recent events in Turkey and Rojava: 
 
Lydia: What do you think about the current political situation in Turkey? 
 
Reşo: You saw. I just got the phone call. One of our friends disappeared. My 
knees got weak. You get scared when it happens to you. Three years ago, I 
wouldn’t have thought it would be like this. Cities of Kurdistan ruined. I’m 
not very hopeful or optimistic about the future. I’m pessimistic. I think things 
will get better, but in 10 years, 20 years. I don’t think people will forget this. 
We will have more protests.  
 
Lydia: Do you want to stay in Turkey? 
 
Reşo: I think I can do something here. I can have a job, I can buy a home, I can 
have a wife. I won’t give up. I know people who have given up, who thought 
they couldn’t do anything in Turkey. 
 
Lydia: What do you think about the situation in Rojava? 
 
Reşo: I am so happy about this. When I saw this news. It means peace, at least 
for some people. Not just for Kurds, for peace. If they get a state—a 
federation—if they are democratic, I think it will be peaceful. More peaceful, I 
hope. 
 
Hope. Despite his very real fears for his own safety and that of his friends, and his 
pessimism for the short term, Reşo still maintains hope for the future of the Kurdish 
people and hope for some form of increased autonomy for Kurds in the region.  
 These problems with identification cards are particularly interesting when 
considered in light of Das and Poole’s (2004) contention that state forms of 
identification are one way through which states can exercise some form of control 
over their citizens and attempt to make the state more legible. Any potential 
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legibility is created by the Turkish state, with seemingly little regard for the reality 
of Kurds’ lives. So, Kurdish citizens of Turkey may be made more legible by the state 
on the state’s terms, but the process of their being made legible seemingly serves to 
further alienate them from the state. Indeed, I argue that this process is evidence of 
the inhospitable nature of the Turkish state vis-à-vis its Kurdish citizens. 
 
Hospitality and Citizenship 
 The presence of perceived foreigners challenges the very concepts of the 
structure and legitimacy of the state, particularly an ethno-nationally assertive state. 
Yet, hospitality, or the gesture of welcoming the foreigner, can be seen as an 
expression of sovereignty. The gesture of welcoming, of offering hospitality, implies 
a claim to power or sovereignty over the space into which the other is being 
welcomed. Jacques Derrida (2000) begins his discussion of hospitality by addressing 
the concept of the foreigner. For Derrida, the status of foreigner is related to 
language, as foreigners do not speak the language of the society in which they now 
find themselves. Derrida asserts: 
Among the serious problems we are dealing with here is that of the foreigner 
who, inept at speaking the language, always risks being without defense 
before the law of the country that welcomes or expels him; the foreigner is 
first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is 
formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc. He has to ask 
for hospitality in a language which by definition is not his own, the one 
imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the king, the lord, the 
authorities, the nation, the State, the father, etc. This personage imposes on 





 Thus, language serves as a way to mark the foreigner as a foreigner, an 
“other,” and it is a violent marking. Yet, for Derrida there is also an idea that 
foreigners can be understood in some way; at the very least, they are understood as 
being foreigners. Further, foreigners are “in question;” that is, they are in a liminal 
state of sorts, in which they are knowable and recognized but never fully 
incorporated into society. This “being-in-question” (3) status of the foreigner can be 
destabilizing, as their liminal state can highlight and serve to call into question the 
existence and sovereignty of the state.  
 Citizenship, as a category, is a tricky concept to definitively define, as is 
evident from the literature (Bloemraad et al. 2008; McNevin 2011; Luibhéid 2013). 
According to Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul (2008), 
“Citizenship is usually defined as a form of membership in a political and geographic 
community. It can be disaggregated into four dimensions: legal status, rights, 
political and other forms of participation in society, and a sense of belonging” (154). 
The ways in which these four potential dimensions of citizenship might interact, 
however, can vary from one context to another. 
 Context is particularly important when talking about citizenship, as each 
nation-state has the power to define and redefine how citizenship works within its 
borders. Eithne Luibhéid (2013), in her discussion of the ways in which the 
pregnancy of potential immigrants to Ireland has been reclassified by the state in 
order to make immigration more difficult, points to the historical connection 
between citizenship and birth, what is called “birthright citizenship” (15). Birthright 
citizenship can fall into one of two categories: jus soli (citizenship determined by 
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where one is born) and jus sanguinis (citizenship determined by the citizenship of 
one’s parents) (Bloemraad et al. 2008). Beyond the ways through which we can 
determine to which state(s) one is entitled citizenship, is the question of what 
citizenship can mean for both the citizen as well as the state. Anne McNevin (2011) 
draws attention to the state-centric nature of the concept of citizenship, as well as 
connections between citizenship and the neoliberal global economic system: “In its 
conventional form, citizenship is tied to the systems of sovereign states that 
emerged from the European Treaty of Westphalia more than 360 years ago. Since 
then, this system has expanded through processes of colonization and 
decolonization to be global in scope” (16). McNevin then moves to an analysis of the 
ways in which migrants can challenge concepts of citizenship, thereby highlighting 
the malleability of citizenship and the importance of context. For example, 
citizenship in Turkey, according to Anna Secor (2004), “has increasingly been seen 
not merely as a legal category, but as a set of discourses and practices that are 
translated unevenly across unequal social groups and local contexts” (354). 
Citizenship, as a concept, can serve to both give identity and legitimate belonging. 
Secor further contends that “citizenship, as a set of practices and discourses, is open 
to constant renegotiation” (366). Thus, it appears that citizenship, the mark of 
legitimate membership in the state, is a fluid concept that can be altered or 
expanded. This has certainly proven true in the context of Turkey. 
 As has been mentioned, the Republic of Turkey was created in 1923, from the 
remnants of the former Ottoman Empire, after the conclusion of World War I and a 
hard-fought War of Independence. The geographical area that became the modern 
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Turkish state was comprised of a mix of ethno-linguistic and religious groups 
(Mango 1999). However, shortly after the establishment of the Republic, and under 
the leadership of Turkey’s first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the state set about 
establishing the Turkish nation-state as a nation of Turks and “Turkifying” (Navaro-
Yashin 2002; Houston 2008; Güvenç 2011) the populace. Ethno-nationally assertive 
state reforms were centered on creating a homogenized concept of Turkishness, 
Turkish citizenship, and the Turkish state (Houston 2008; Özyürek 2006). State 
rhetoric has consistently supported this notion of Turkey as a nation of Turks and 
has sought to ostracize those elements of the populace who do not fall in line. A 
stark example of this is the trope of Kurd as “Terrorist.” 
 
Kurds as “Terrorists” in the Turkish Context 
When I first came to the school, the teacher was asking, “Where are you 
from? Where does your family live? How are you? How was your day?” These 
kinds of questions. When I said, “I’m from Mardin, and my family, they live in 
Istanbul,” most of the class, they looked at me like this, “You’re from Mardin? 
You’re a terrorist.” (Welat, Chicago, 2016) 
 
 Being called a “terrorist” was a commonality expressed by my interlocutors. 
Their experiences being called terrorists, taken together with my own experiences 
hearing the term used by ethnic Turkish people in conversations about Kurds and 
news media accounts that used quotes including the term, have made it clear that it 
is a common derogatory term used against Kurds in Turkey. I see the use of this 
term as tied to ongoing othering and minoritization (Klein 2020) of Kurds in Turkey. 
Historian Janet Klein (2020) traces the minoritization of Kurds in Turkey from the 
latter years of the Ottoman Empire, through World War I, to the early years of the 
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Republic of Turkey. She contends that the minoritization of Kurds was tied to 
territoriality, as the Turkish state sought to erase territory named as “Kurdistan” 
from maps, and thereby to establish Kurds as a minority in Turkey, rather than 
allowing them to become a majority in the territory they had historically inhabited 
in what was newly named the territory of the Republic of Turkey. This 
minoritization of Kurds is certainly tied to ongoing othering of Kurds in Turkey. I 
see clear connections between the territoriality of minoritization, as described by 
Klein, and the use of memleket (hometown/familial place of origin) as a marker of 
difference and “otherness,” as expressed by my interlocutors, as I will describe in 
Chapter 5. As I will show, the use of the term “terrorist” is tied directly to Turkish 
state narratives and rhetoric. Contending with this rhetoric is an experience that 
almost all of my interlocutors share. 
 I had first met Welat when he was a political science student at Bilgi 
University in Istanbul. At the time of the conversation from which this extract 
comes, he had migrated to Chicago and was working as a furniture salesman. Welat 
recounted this experience of starting high school in Istanbul, and the verbal abuse 
he suffered at the hand of his fellow students when they found out that his family 
was originally from Mardin. Mardin is a province in the Kurdish-majority region of 
southeastern Turkey, a region commonly referred to by my interlocutors as 
Northern Kurdistan, or simply Kurdistan. At a conference on the Kurdish language 
held on 25 May 2013, hosted by the Bilgi University Cultural Group, a Kurdish 
student group to which Welat belonged, ethnic Turkish sociologist and advocate for 
Kurds in Turkey, Ismail Beşikçi, stated, “In Turkey there is not a name for the Kurds. 
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The only name for them is ‘terrorist.’” This is a bold statement, but it is supported by 
my own experiences in Turkey and the stories my interlocutors shared with me. 
 I chatted with Zana, a 20-year-old linguistics student, about her experience as 
a Kurd in Istanbul. She said: 
I am so relaxed in Istanbul, because there are a lot of Kurdish people, 
especially in my life, and my friends, most of them are Kurdish. When I went 
to Ankara, I have a friend from Rojhilat [the Kurdish-majority region of Iran], 
and we spoke in Kurmanji. We were on the Metro, but we had some big bags, 
and I saw these looks in people’s eyes, like “We will kill them,” because they 
were looking at us like we were terrorists. It is so sad. I didn’t like Ankara 
and Eskişehir, and I think the only city to live in Turkey, for Kurdish people, 
is Istanbul. You can’t live in another city. 
 
For Zana, the people she saw while waiting for the Metro did not verbally express 
that they thought Zana and her friend were terrorists. However, the looks on their 
faces clearly expressed this feeling to Zana. I had a similar experience while riding 
on a bus with Welat in the summer of 2013. The bus was quite full, so I was kind of 
sandwiched in between Welat and an older gentleman. Welat got a phone call. He 
clearly knew who was calling, as he answered in Kurdish. I felt the man on the other 
side of me immediately tense up as soon as Welat answered the phone, “Rojbaş!” 
These experiences highlight that, while it is technically not illegal anymore to speak 
Kurdish in Turkey, ethnic Turks seem to be skeptical of those who do. 
 One afternoon, in January of 2016, I was in the apartment that several of my 
interlocutors shared, sitting at the kitchen table having tea with Wedat. We were 
chatting about the political climate in Turkey and the relationship between Kurds 
and Turks in Turkey.  
Wedat: When my friend’s mom sees me, she says, “Hello peshmerga” or 




Lydia: How do you feel when she says that?  
 
Wedat: She’s just kidding me, but I know, inside, she is scared.  
 
Lydia: Scared of you? 
 
Wedat: Yes, because I’m Kurdish. 
 
 A terrorist is “a person who uses violent and intimidating methods in the 
pursuit of political aims; esp. a member of a clandestine or expatriate organization 
aiming to coerce an established government by acts of violence against it or its 
subjects” (OED 2021). The peshmerga, in the Turkish context, are members of the 
PKK (not to be confused with the military forces of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, also 
known as Peshmerga). To call someone “peshmerga” or a “terrorist” is a slur. That a 
friend’s mother feels she can call a Kurdish young adult “peshmerga” and a 
“terrorist,” even if she is “kidding,” is notable.  
 The term “terrorist” came up again when I asked Serhad, a 26-year-old 
journalism master’s student and Uber driver, originally from Kars, about the first 
time he thought to himself, “I am Kurdish”: 
When we were in Kars, you know, you struggle with the government, with 
the soldiers, with the system, but you don’t know what’s going on. After we 
moved to Istanbul, I started school, and people were treating me really badly. 
I didn’t know what was going on. They would say, “You are Kurdish,” and 
they were pushing me. I said, “Okay, what is it? I don’t know what’s going on. 
Why are you guys attacking me like this?” When I started school, I said, 
“Okay, we are different than other people,” you know? Like, in Kars, 
everybody is Kurdish, you know? You know something bad is going on, but 
you don’t know what it is. But, when we moved to Istanbul, I noticed that 
people were calling me, like, Kurdish, or “dirty Kurdish,” or “terrorist.” So, 
that is when I realized it, when we moved to Istanbul. 
 
As with my other interlocutors, Serhad’s realization of his own Kurdishness 
coincided with his education in the Turkish state system, but also with being called 
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out as different by the Turks he encountered in his everyday life. The way he 
describes it, “terrorist” is a common slur used against Kurds in Turkey. His account 
also echoes that of Heval, a former journalism master’s student who had migrated to 
Chicago in 2016, that I shared in Chapter 1. Heval recounted becoming aware of his 
own Kurdishness while watching a state-owned television station and seeing 
members of the Turkish military calling Kurdish villagers terrorists. The narrative of 
the Turkish military that he shared, was one that painted all Kurds as terrorists in 
the eyes of the state, resulting in a sense of “collective terrorism” (Ghassem-
Fachandi 2012:61) among the Turkish public that implicates all Kurds, regardless of 
whether or not they are involved in political activism on any level, let alone being 
somehow involved with the PKK. 
 While talking with Jîro, who had studied healthcare management at Dicle 
University in Diyarbakır before migrating to Chicago, I asked him what it means to 
say, “I am Kurdish.” He replied, “Well, for Turkish people, it’s a terrorist thing. For 
me, it means, like, fighting for freedom.” This juxtaposition, between what Jîro sees 
as the Turkish understanding of being Kurdish as being a terrorist and his own 
understanding of being Kurdish as fighting for freedom, points to what appears to 
me to be the origin of the Turkish state narrative of “Kurds equal terrorists” that, 
according to my interlocutors, has become an accepted narrative by many Turks: 
the conflict between the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party) and the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state. These two factions have 
been at war virtually nonstop since 1984, despite a ceasefire from 1999 to 2004 and 
an attempt at a peace process in the period from 2013 to 2015. The Turkish 
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government and media routinely refer to the PKK as terrorists (White and Gündüz 
2021).3 In the early 1990s, the Turkish military used supposed support of the PKK 
as the impetus for razing entire villages. 
 Azad provided perhaps the most vivid example of this from his own 
experience: 
When we lived in the village, some soldiers came to our village. I knew 
something was wrong with them, you know, they were not Kurdish. They 
were not friendly. So, one time, they gathered the people, like middle aged 
people, like my dad, he was around 30. So, they gathered people. Before that, 
they said, “Okay, you have to leave your village.” Well, they offered two 
options: One was fighting against the PKK, taking up weapons, guns, and then 
going to the mountains and fighting against the PKK. The other option was, 
you have to leave, because you fed the PKK members. So, the villagers said, 
“We are not going to take up arms,” you know, “we don’t want to kill anyone.” 
Well, they were not some people from outside, you know, so most of them, 
the villagers, they knew each other, and the PKK members. So, they rejected 
this offer. For example, one of them, our cousin, he joined the PKK, and then 
when he came to the village, my grandma always prepared some dried foods, 
like figs or grapes, and she tied them to the trees, you know, and then our 
cousin, he knew my grandma did that. When he came to the village he would 
go directly to those trees, and he knew some stuff would be there for them. 
One time, I remember, my crazy dad, he hosted like 80 PKK members. Yeah, it 
was crazy. And then, someone told the military. So, the soldiers came to the 
village in the morning, and then the soldiers were searching the places, you 
know, and our village is kind of big actually, we had around 150 houses. So, 
they couldn’t find them. The PKK members said, “Okay, we will be quiet, 
because of the children and the civilians, we are not going to fight.” So, we 
were lucky, and nothing happened. They just left.  
 
                                                        
3 See the following articles for just a few examples from the news media: 
Burton Bollag, “Silenced Minority.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 19 Jul 2002. 
Semih Idiz, “The Kurdish Phobia Rears Its Head Again,” Hürriyet Daily News, 31 Jul 2012.  
“Siirt District Mayor Unseated Due to Charges of Aiding, Abetting PKK,” Daily Sabah, 30 Jun 2016. 
“35 PKK Terrorists Killed in Operations in Turkey’s Southeastern Hakkari Province,” Daily Sabah, 30 
Jul 2016. 
“Germany Harboring Terrorists: Turkish President Erdoğan,” Hürriyet Daily News, 3 Nov 2016. 
“Turkey Won’t Stop Pursuing Its Goals in 2017, Erdoğan Says in New Year’s Message,” Daily Sabah, 31 
Dec 2016. 
“Terrorists to Have No Relief: President Erdoğan,” Hürriyet Daily News, 30 Mar 2017. 
“Terrorists Being Buried in Trenches They Dig: Erdoğan,” Hürriyet Daily News, 16 Dec 2018. 
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So, the soldier thing. I knew they were different. On their hats they had 
Turkish flag patches. They gathered people in the middle of the village, and 
they tortured people in front of the whole village. They rode people, like 
horses. And then, with their guns, they wanted to race, a human race. Yeah, 
the soldiers, some of the higher-ranking ones, they rode the people. Some of 
them, the soldiers, were heavy and the villagers fell down. The soldiers were 
cursing, and they beat them. And then, after, they took these people to the 
town. There was a prison there. My dad was one of them. They took them for 
almost one week or ten days. When he came back, he was… They didn’t feed 
them, you know, and he was really bad. So then, after our evacuation, at that 
time I realized we have some problem with the soldiers. So, we are Kurds, 
but the state is something else, you know, obviously they are not Kurds. 
 
Later in our conversation, Azad revealed that the soldiers had ordered everyone to 
the center of the village, even having an old woman who could not walk carried on a 
blanket, and forced those who were tortured to strip down to their underwear in 
front of everyone. It appears that by connecting these two stories, of the search for 
the PKK members hosted by his father, and the torture, which also involved his 
father, Azad is connecting the torture to the military’s suspicion that the village was 
supporting the PKK. And the villagers’ refusal to take up arms against the PKK is 
directly linked to their evacuation from their village.  
 
Conclusion 
 Kurds have long had a contentious relationship with the Turkish state. 
Beginning after the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Kurds have been 
subject to the Turkish nation-building project and continuing conceptions of what it 
means to be a Turkish citizen that conflate citizenship with ethnicity and privilege 
Turkish ethnicity over any potential alternatives, including Kurdishness. Questions 
of Turkishness, and by extension citizenship, in Turkey often center on the question 
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of language. As mentioned above, Turkishness has frequently been tied to language, 
as Turkish is the official state language and has been the mandated language of 
education in Turkey since the early years of the republic. Additionally, as seen in the 
accounts of my interlocutors, Turkish has been the de facto language on the streets 
in Turkish cities, sometimes serving to exclude other languages from the urban 
space. Language continues to serve as a means for marking citizens of Turkey who 
are not ethnically Turkish as internal “foreigners,” or others. Yet, the Turkish state 
does not extend hospitality to these internal others. Rather, as my interlocutors 
explained it, the Turkish state and ethnic Turkish citizens of Turkey seem to use 
language as a way to maintain a system of distance between “us” and “them,” that is 
anything but hospitable, despite the fact that “they” are also citizens of the Turkish 
state. 
 Indeed, the inhospitality of the Turkish state toward its Kurdish citizens has 
led to a situation in which the majority of my interlocutors have been doubly 
displaced. Most of them went through violent displacement events with their 
families as young children, as they were compelled to leave their villages due to the 
ongoing violence between the Turkish state and the PKK (Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Worker’s Party). Then, many of them chose to migrate to 
Chicago, for one or more of several reasons, including educational opportunity, 





CHAPTER 4. LANGUAGE AS POWER; LANGUAGE AS RESISTANCE 
Lydia: Do you follow Kurdish political issues? 
 
Zana: Yes, because if you are Kurdish in Turkey, you have to be political. 
 
Lydia: So, you consider yourself political? 
 
Zana: If I say, “I am not,” it is a big mistake for me, because you speak 
Kurdish, and your friends are Kurdish. It’s a political [action], because you 
speak your own language. 
 
Lydia: So, speaking Kurdish is a political action? 
 
Zana: [with emphasis] Yes. 
 
 In this chapter, I argue that language has been politicized as a component of 
the ethno-nationally assertive state’s nation-building project, and that this 
politicization can fuel resistance in a population even as its members migrate to new 
and less restrictive political environments. This politicization is made manifest 
through state policies and narratives that render language as a political symbol of 
the nation, such as those that promote the national language. These policies include 
such measures as language reform and standardization, as well as educational 
programs promoting use of the language. This promotion of the national language is 
furthered through statutes passed with such aims as outlawing the language of an 
ethno-linguistic minority group that is perceived by the ethno-nationally assertive 
state to be particularly “problematic.” This results in situations such as children 
being prohibited from attending school in the language they have learned to speak 
in the home, what is often referred to as the “mother tongue,” because it is often 
mothers who are the primary conveyors of this linguistic knowledge. My 
interlocutors consistently communicated to me that this sort of system is untenable. 
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Thus, language is further politicized by my interlocutors, who are members of an 
ethno-linguistic minority group living in an ethno-nationally assertive state with 
which they do not share a common ethno-linguistic identity. Through politicizing 
their own language, my interlocutors are able to use their language as a means of 
challenging dominant ethno-nationally assertive state narratives that have sought to 
silence them, other them, and even deny their existence as a separate ethno-
linguistic group. One way my interlocutors have challenged these state narratives is 
through their university educations. That my interlocutors are university students 
places them in a privileged position, vis-à-vis other members of their ethno-
linguistic group, as well as older members of their own families, as they are among 
the first generation of their ethno-linguistic group to attend university in large 
numbers. Their university educations seem to have contributed to their feeling 
emboldened to challenge the dominant narratives of the ethno-nationally assertive 
state in which they live. In doing so, they present an example of youthful agency in 
action and use language as a potent symbol of their resistance to the state. It is in 
their challenges to the narratives of the ethno-nationally assertive state in which 
they live that I see Kurdish university students in Turkey asserting their ethno-
linguistic identities and pushing back against Turkish state narratives of what it 
means to be a Turkish citizen. In so doing, they are also striving for increased 
visibility, as they are engaged in activities that make Kurds and Kurdishness more 
visible in spaces deemed as “Turkish” by the Turkish state. 
 Kurds have long had a contentious relationship with the Turkish state, 
especially with respect to issues related to language. Beginning after the founding of 
 
 93 
the Turkish Republic in 1923, Kurdish personal and place names were Turkified, the 
Kurdish language was banned, and the mere existence of a separate Kurdish ethnic 
group was denied (Houston 2008). From the early days of the Republic of Turkey, 
language has been politicized by the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state as a 
central component of defining and legitimizing the Turkish state. As discussed in the 
last chapter, these efforts in large part began with language reforms. As Susan 
DiGiacomo (2001) describes in her anthropological consideration of the case of the 
Catalan language in Spain, one of the first steps in language reform undertaken by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the creation of a Language Commission (Dil Encümeni) 
in 1928 (Dil Derneği n.d.), which was the precursor to the Turkish Language 
Association (Türk Dil Kurumu), formed in 1932 (TDK n.d.). The tasks of these 
organizations included reforming the alphabet to adopt Latin script and 
standardizing the Turkish language, including removal and/or replacement of 
words deemed to be of non-Turkish origin, respectively. This was then extended 
through such public campaigns mandating that Turkish was to be the language of 
instruction in schools and the “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!” (“Citizen, Speak Turkish!”) 
program. Together, these reforms contributed to the ethno-nationally assertive 
state narrative that Turkey was a land for Turks who spoke Turkish. In much the 
same way that Camille C. O’Reilly (1999) examined the “politics of language and 
culture” (1), in the Irish language revival movement in Northern Ireland, I am 
interested in the politics of the Kurdish language, and the ways it is variously 
politicized by both the Turkish state and Kurdish university students in Istanbul. 
The political act of speaking the Kurdish language will be considered with particular 
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attention to the importance placed on language as a key component of “asserting” 
Kurdish ethno-linguistic identity and challenging the narratives of the ethno-
nationally assertive Turkish state.  
 
Figure 3 Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk introducing the new Latin Script Turkish alphabet in the city of 
Kayseri in 1928. (Photo from Wikimedia Commons; public domain.) 
 
 These Kurdish young adults, as citizens of the ethno-nationally assertive 
Turkish state, find themselves in a situation in which a claim to be a Turkish citizen 
who is not ethnically Turkish is provocative and challenges state narratives. I argue 
that in making claims to Kurdishness, they challenge the dominant narrative of 
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Turkishness that is promoted by the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state. As Das 
and Poole (2004) assert, “the state is imagined as an always incomplete project that 
must constantly be spoken of—and imagined—through an invocation of the 
wilderness, lawlessness, and savagery that not only lies outside its jurisdiction but 
also threatens it from within” (7). States must then continually define (and redefine) 
who legitimately belongs and who does not. The incompleteness of the state points 
to the need for state discourse, or narrative, to explain what and who, comprises the 
state. I argue that this need to constantly define the state leaves the space for 
challenges, and it is these spaces that my interlocutors target in challenging the 
narrative of the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state. In their challenges, my 
interlocutors are speaking, and in some cases writing, Kurds and Kurdishness into 
public spaces in Istanbul. This carries over to the United States, for those who 
migrate, as my interlocutors in Chicago continue to challenge the Turkish state 
narrative by engaging in such activities as protesting in front of the Turkish 
Consulate. 
 
Language, Nationalism, and the State  
 The reality of having been educated in the Turkish language, which is the 
dominant language of Turkey, is part of the lived experience of my interlocutors. 
During fieldwork in Chicago, I was having dinner at the apartment shared by Azad, 
Welat, and Heval. Welat and his girlfriend, Mei, who was Chinese American, had 
made dinner and invited me to join them, along with Serhad and Wedat. At one 
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point, the guys were talking to each other in Turkish. Mei asked, “Are you speaking 





Welat: We were educated in Turkish. 
 
Mei: But, if you speak in Kurdish, will you understand each other? 
 
Welat and Serhad, simultaneously: Yes. 
 
Mei: Why don’t you speak in Kurdish, then? 
 
Serhad (sounding exasperated): Because we think in Turkish! 
 
The implication of Serhad’s statement was that after many years of education in 
Turkish, including primary and secondary school, and university for most of them 
(Welat had attended an English language medium university), they had been trained 
to think primarily in Turkish. This fact points back to the language reform policies of 
the early Republic of Turkey, including the policies that targeted education in 
particular (Navaro-Yashin 2002) and the “linguistic engineering” (Houston 
2008:116) aimed at creating a Turkish space filled with speakers of the Turkish 
language. This sentiment, and the frustration felt because of it, was brough up by 
several of my interlocutors a number of times during my fieldwork.    
 Language is a symbol and mechanism of power. One clear example of how 
this is done is through the educational system, which, by teaching children the same 
standard language, and by extension the ways of thinking implied in that standard 
language, helps to reify the social hierarchies and power relations expressed by the 
standard language. Pierre Bourdieu (1991) argues power relations are made 
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manifest through systems of language. As a result, Bourdieu asserts that “there are 
no longer any innocent words” (40). Words delineate and reinforce power relations 
and social hierarchies. Bourdieu (1991) focuses on what he calls the “linguistic 
field,” or “a system of specifically linguistic relations of power based on the unequal 
distribution of linguistic capital” (57). One acquires linguistic capital by knowing the 
“standard language” (48) of a particular society. It is at this point that the 
educational system is implicated in the promotion and perpetuation of a standard or 
official language in a particular society. According to Bourdieu,  
In the process which leads to the construction, legitimation and imposition of 
an official language, the educational system plays a decisive role: ‘fashioning 
the similarities from which that community of consciousness which is the 
cement of the nation stems.’ And Georges Davy goes on to state the function 
of the schoolmaster, a maître à parler (teacher of speaking) who is thereby 
also a maître à penser (teacher of thinking): ‘He [the primary school teacher], 
by virtue of his function, works daily on the faculty of expression of every 
idea and every emotion: on language. In teaching the same clear, fixed 
language to children who know it only very vaguely or who even speak 
various dialects or patois, he is already inclining them quite naturally to see 
and feel things in the same way; and he works to build the common 
consciousness of the nation. [1991:48-49] 
 
Thus, education is clearly implicated in the nation-building projects of ethno-
nationally assertive states. 
 The case of Turkey provides an excellent example of just this. Language and 
nationality became conflated in the early years of the Republic of Turkey. In 
attempting to define the nascent state, the Turkish language became a “key symbol” 
(Ortner 1973) of the Turkish nation. And thus, the Turkish state became ethno-
linguistically assertive, defining the nation and its citizenry largely on the imagined 
basis of a shared ethno-linguistic identity, most clearly symbolized by the Turkish 
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language. Clifford Geertz (1973) points to the selection of a national language as one 
of the components of nationalist ideologizing. He asserts: 
[T]he ‘language problem’ is only the ‘nationality problem’ writ small, though 
in some places the conflicts arising from it are intense enough to make the 
relationship seem reversed. Generalized, the ‘who are we’ question asks what 
cultural forms—what systems of meaningful symbols—to employ to give 
value and significance to the activities of the state, and by extension to the 
civil life of its citizens [242]. 
 
In this passage, Geertz is saying that nationalism and language are often two sides of 
the same coin. The national language is so tied to the concept of the nation itself, and 
by extension concepts of nationalism and citizenship, that it apparently becomes 
something akin to a proverbial chicken and egg scenario.  
 Scholars of nationalism and the state have highlighted the connections 
between language and power, nationalism, and state-building (Eriksen 2010; 
Anderson 1991; Gellner 2006; Scott 1998). Benedict Anderson (1991) draws an 
explicit connection between language and nationalism when he asserts that “the 
nation was conceived in language, not blood” (145), thereby implying that use of a 
common language is a key aspect of creating and fostering nationalist sentiment. 
Ernest Gellner (2006) echoes this concept, and arguably takes it a step further, by 
proposing a conflation of culture and language and asserting that nationalism seeks 
to reconcile the cultural and the politico-territorial aspects of society: “Nationalism 
has been defined, in effect, as the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to 
endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that. 
Culture, an elusive concept, was deliberately left undefined. But an at least 
provisionally acceptable criterion of culture might be language, as at least a 
sufficient, if not necessary touchstone of it” (42). 
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 An official language also creates a social hierarchy between the educated 
classes who know the official language and marginalized populations who do not 
know the official language. In looking at state-building projects, James C. Scott 
(1998) contends that states strive to make their citizenry more “legible,” that is 
more easily counted and controlled. To do this, states engage in forms of 
“simplification,” or means of “rationalizing and standardizing” (3) the populace. 
Scott further contends that “of all state simplifications… the imposition of a single, 
official language may be the most powerful, and it is the precondition of many other 
simplifications” (72). Through the mandating of an official language, then, ethno-
nationally assertive states are able to require education in the official language, 
thereby shaping the way the citizenry thinks and speaks, and establishing a 
hierarchy based on linguistic knowledge.  
 This hierarchy, and its existence in Turkey between those who are fluent in 
Turkish and those who are not, was made evident in the way my interlocutors spoke 
about their mothers. Most, at one point or another during our conversations, 
described a similar situation. One of the most striking descriptions of the language 
divide came from a conversation with Welat, during preliminary fieldwork in 
Istanbul, when he was telling me about his family migrating to the city in 1992, and 
what life was like when they arrived: “Home is sometimes like a prison, because you 
don't have any friends. My mother, for maybe ten years, she didn't leave home, 
because she doesn't speak Turkish and she doesn't have any friends here.” Clearly, 
Welat felt that his mother’s life in Istanbul was constrained by her lack of Turkish 
language skills. When Welat’s family arrived in Istanbul in 1992, speaking Kurdish 
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on the street would have been incredibly dangerous due to the heightened tensions 
between the PKK and the Turkish military and the fact that the Kurdish language 
was still outlawed. Restrictions on the use of languages other than Turkish, 
including Kurdish, were loosened in 1993, during the presidency of Halil Turgut 
Özal, who was of partial Kurdish descent. 
 
Turkish Nation-Building and Language 
 The Turkish Republic was created in 1923, from the remnants of the former 
Ottoman Empire, which had been comprised of a mix of ethno-linguistic groups, 
including Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, and Greek communities. However, after the 
emergence of the modern Turkish Republic, the ethno-nationally assertive state, 
under the leadership of President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, embarked on a series of 
“Turkification” policies aimed at forcing the populace to conform to the state 
narrative of the Turkish state as a geographical area for the Turkish nation; a nation 
of Turks (Meeker 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Houston 2008; Güvenç 2011). This 
narrative left no room for other ethno-linguistic identities. 
 In 1924 the Kurdish language was banned, which had a profound impact on 
education. David McDowall (2007) contends that the banning of Kurdish resulted in 
the fact that in 1925 only 215 of Turkey’s 4,875 schools were in the Kurdish region 
of southeastern Turkey. This was compounded by the initiation of the Vatandaş 
Türkçe Konuş! (“Citizen, Speak Turkish!”) campaign in 1928. “This campaign aimed 
to eradicate the public visibility and audibility of non-Turkish languages” (Aslan 
2007:246). The campaign was perpetuated mainly by Turkish teachers, university 
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students, and intellectuals who were particularly committed to promoting national 
homogenization. Aslan goes so far as to call those who worked to advance the 
Turkish language campaign “Kemalist missionaries” (246), whose goal was the 
conversion of non-Turkish citizens of Turkey into “good” Turks in the name of 
Turkish nationalism. 
 As another part of the Kemalist reforms, Turkish surnames were first 
imposed on the ethnically diverse citizens of Turkey after the passage of the 
Surname Law in June 1934, which required all citizens to adopt Turkish surnames, 
effective 1 January 1935. In November of 1934, the Grand National Assembly 
bestowed the surname Atatürk on the president, thereby literally naming him 
“father of the Turks.” Atatürk, thus, symbolically became the lineage founder of the 
new Turkish national patriline, and father of the citizens of the Republic. 
The Surname Law stipulated the following:  
1) Every Turk must bear his surname in addition to his proper name; 2) the 
second article stated that the surname must follow the proper name in 
signing, speaking and writing; 3) and the third article forbade names which 
were related to military rank and civil officialdom, to tribes and foreign [i.e., 
non-Turkish] races and ethnicities; as well as surnames that were not suited 
to customs or which are disgusting or ridiculous. Male heads of households 
would choose the names, and in their absence, death or mental weakness the 
wife would do so. They were also against the use of ‘historical names’ 
without the proper genealogical evidence…. [Additionally,] surnames needed 
to be taken from the Turkish language. [Türköz 2007:894-895] 
 
Requiring all Turkish citizens to adopt a Turkish surname served to literally name 
individuals as legitimate citizens of the Turkish Republic. Indeed, the Surname Law 
is connected to the Turkish language reform process that began in 1928, as a “list of 
approved pure Turkish names” (Mango 1999:499) was circulated to help heads of 
households decide on surnames for their families. These approved names “stressed 
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masculine qualities: Hard (Sert), Tough (Çetin), Uncovered (Yılmaz), Iron (Demir), 
Steel (Çelik), Rock (Kaya)” (Mango 199:499). 
 This new conception of Turkishness and what it meant to be a citizen of 
Turkey was imposed on the ethnically diverse citizens of the Turkish Republic who 
were faced with pressure to Turkify, and many did. Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002), 
echoing Pierre Bourdieu (2003), contends that one of the main ways to impose 
Turkification on the populace was through the educational institutions, in which the 
language of instruction was Turkish. As she describes it: 
Throughout the years of Republicanism, many people were brought up to be 
Turks in republican institutions, whether their ancestors be Abkhazian 
Muslim immigrants from Georgia, Slavic converts to Islam from Serbia, 
Armenian-speaking Muslims of the Hemşin region, or Arabs, Kurds, Lazs, 
Circassians, or other. Turkishness was internalized and adopted to varying 
extents and in various fashions. Some people had an easier time in assuming 
Turkishness as an identity then others. Some were willing to assimilate or 
assume this identity, while others were not… Muslim-born populations who 
might have wished to claim minority status and rights, such as the Kurds, 
could not do so without serious consequences (e.g., war). As Muslims, they 
were officially designated and categorized as Turks. [49] 
 
Indeed, public displays of efforts to Turkify the citizenry can still be found on the 
sides of mountains and buildings in Turkey today, where one can see the phrase, “Ne 
mutlu Türküm diyene,” or “How happy is one who says, ‘I am a Turk.’” Yet, not all 
Turkish citizens were happy to call themselves Turks, preferring instead an 
alternative collective identity category. Among these groups were the Kurds 
 
Resistance to Turkification 
 I first met Welat during preliminary fieldwork, near the end of his last 
semester of university. He was a political science student, originally from a village in 
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the province of Mardin, attending Bilgi University, a private university at which the 
language of instruction was English. During our first meeting, we spent several 
hours talking as we walked around the Beyoğlu area in central Istanbul. As the day 
wound down, we started ambling up İstiklal Caddesi, toward Taksim Square.  
İstiklal was bustling on this early evening. We came upon a group of three young 
male musicians, singing in Kurdish. They were standing in front of a sheet of 
plywood that had been placed on the façade of a building that was under 
construction; the plywood had been spray painted with all manner of graffiti, 
providing a colorful backdrop for this little concert in a language that had been, until 
relatively recently, banned by the Turkish government. A crowd had formed a semi-
circle around the performers. The general mood was positive, almost joyous. Many 
could be seen singing along, or at least mouthing the words. The crowd sporadically 
clapped along with the music. At one point, a couple of young men started dancing 
around the performers, moving in a circular pattern, just inside the ring of 
spectators. They were joined by other young men, until, by the end of the song, there 
were five dancers. Several of the spectators had cameras or smart phones out, 
snapping pictures and taking videos. The crowd was overwhelmingly young, and 
mostly male. There were smiles, cheers, and enthusiastic applause at the end of 
every song. 
 Welat intermittently translated lyrics for me. One song included the phrase, 
"Kurdistan, Kurdistan, your name is so sweet; all Kurds fight for you." Another song 
was about the imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan: "You are like a sun in the 
Middle East." Political songs. Protest songs. Kurdishness on display. Kurdishness 
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being belted out for all those around to hear. There was evident joy at this display of 
Kurdishness, from the performers and the crowd. Yet there was also, seemingly, an 
air of defiance. This defiance was clear in the lyrics of the songs the three men were 
singing. After Welat translated the lyrics about Ocalan, I asked, "They are singing 
political songs?" "Yes,” he replied. “Political songs. Kurdish songs are about two 
things: politics or love." 
 The second time we met, we decided to go for tea. We turned left off of 
İstiklal Caddesi, then right, then left again, then through a door on the right into a 
dark entryway. We crowded into a small elevator with two men who appeared to be 
in their mid- to late-20s. After exiting the elevator, we walked up a narrow, winding 
flight of rainbow painted stairs, at the top of which we found ourselves in a sunny, 
welcoming room. There were booths lining three walls, and wooden tables and 
chairs filled the middle. A bar and the stairs were on the fourth wall.  
We sat down at a booth along the far wall and ordered çay (tea), which was brought 
to us quickly, steaming hot and in the tulip-shaped glasses that are ubiquitous in 
Turkey. I recognized the voice of Ciwan Haco, whose music I knew had been banned 
in Turkey in the not-so-distant past, serenading us over the sound system. There 
were several other tables, with couples or small groups seated, with tea, engaged in 
conversation, many smoking, some playing tavla (backgammon). 
 “Is everyone Kurdish?” I asked. 
 “Yes,” Welat replied with a smile. “Here we can live our culture.” 
 I started by asking about the name of the place, Kaçakçay, which Welat had 
mentioned translated to “illegal tea”:  
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Lydia: It means "illegal tea"? 
 
Welat: Yes, illegal tea. Kurds don't like Turkish tea, so they bring tea from 
Persia, from Syria. Families would bring it to their family members across the 
border. So, it's illegal tea. 
 
 I later learned that the term ‘kaçak,’ in addition to “illegal,” can also be 
translated as “contraband” or “smuggled,” which made sense, as Welat was 
describing smuggling non-Turkish tea across the border form Persia or Syria. 
Apparently, in Turkey, even the tea must be nationalistic. And Turkish (i.e., grown in 
Turkey). According to my interlocutors, while packaged Ceylon tea, which is what 
kaçakçay is, is available to purchase in supermarkets in Turkey, many Kurdish shop 
owners will sell unregulated Ceylon tea that has been brought into Turkey illegally 
because it is less expensive. Thus, the moniker “kaçakçay.”  
 The name of the café was also a cheeky nod to the agentive practice of 
smuggling goods of various sorts across the porous Turkish borderlands as 
described by Fırat Bozçalı (2020), in the case of oil smuggling across the Turkey-
Iran border, and by Ramazan Aras (2020), with regard to the smuggling of various 
good across the Turkey-Syria border. Smuggling goods across the border, in an area 
that was divided up by external forces after World War I, has a long-standing 
history. Trade routes were maintained in part because of kinship and social 
networks that predated the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and were, thus, 
able to withstand the arbitrary lines drawn on the map. Taking pride in this history, 
by naming a café, staffed and frequented by Kurdish young adults, for the practice of 
smuggling tea, is tied to the challenging of narratives in which my interlocutors are 
engaged. Indeed, publicly naming a café for an illegal, and thereby counter to the 
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state, practice is claiming a connection to the practice of tea smuggling and the 
challenge to state power and sovereignty that illegal economic activity represents. 
This particular café was also seen as a safe space to be Kurdish, to speak Kurdish, to 
listen to Kurdish music. A place to, as Welat said, to “live our [Kurdish] culture.” By 
drinking “illegal tea” at a café in central Istanbul, then, Welat and the other students 
with whom I spent time at Kaçakçay were making assertions of their Kurdishness. I 
could see the appeal for Kurdish students to frequent a café such as Kaçakçay. It was 
a hidden away place where they could speak their language, listen to their music, 
discuss their politics, and drink their tea. It was, indeed, a place to “live” 
Kurdishness. 
 Kurdish ethno-linguistic identity, and the basis for identifying as Kurdish, has 
been described in a variety of ways, by a variety of scholars, working in a variety of 
places, at a variety of times. Lale Yalçın-Heckmann (1991) looked primarily at issues 
of kinship and tribal organization in her ethnographic account of Kurds in a village 
setting in Hakkari, Turkey, where she conducted fieldwork in the 1980s. Early on in 
her account, Yalçın-Heckmann connects Kurdish identity to language and 
interactions with the state. She begins by claiming that “Kurdish identity… is most 
clearly based on speaking Kurdish as the mother tongue” (27). This is an ethno-
linguistic description of Kurdishness. She also describes Kurdishness as in 
opposition to the Turkish state. She says Kurdish identity “interacts with the state, 
its representatives and agents in the region. The immediate relations and 
encounters with governmental, military and civil administrators (who are local or 
non-local, of Kurdish or non-Kurdish origin) shape most of the concepts villagers 
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hold about the state, the government and national political structures” (27). This 
echoes Barth’s (1998) assertion that ethnic identities are negotiated in perceived 
boundaries between ethnic identities. In other words, ethnic identities come into 
focus when they are seen up against other ethnic identities. Ethno-linguistic identity 
as counter to the ethno-nationalism of the state came up again and again in the 
accounts of my interlocutors, as in the comment about Kurdishness being political 
made by Zana that is quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Being Kurdish, and 
asserting one’s Kurdishness is political precisely because, in its very articulation, it 
is a challenge to the dominant state narrative of Turkey as a state for Turks. 
Moreover, because the Turkish state has set up a totalizing picture of what a Turkish 
citizen “looks like;” anything that deviates from this state-articulated ideal is 
automatically positioned as against the state’s concept of Turkish citizenship.  
 This concept of Kurdishness as something counter to the Turkish state is also 
described by Martin van Bruinessen (1992) in his comprehensive account of socio-
political organization among the Kurds describes such organization at various 
levels, from local to state. In describing the Turkification policies of the early 
republican era, and Turkish state responses to Kurdish revolts that had taken place 
during the same time period (e.g., the Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925), he asserts that 
“gendarmerie posts and schools brought the state closer to the tribesmen and 
taught them that they were no Kurds anymore but Turkish citizens. Everything that 
recalled a separate Kurdish identity was to be abolished: language, dress, names and 
even the tribes themselves” (191). It is this erasure that my interlocutors are 
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fighting back against, in making their emphatic assertions of Kurdishness. They are 
agentively speaking and writing themselves back into the narrative. 
 Kurdishness being constructed as oppositional to the Turkish state and the 
modern Turkish nation-building project is echoed by Christopher Houston (2001). 
Houston claims that “contemporary Kurdish identity resides at the point of an 
intersection, the dangerous place where being (de-)constituted (assimilated) and 
constituting oneself collide” (2001:18). In describing Kurdish identity this way, 
Houston is asserting that Kurdishness (at least in Turkey) is found in the reaction of 
Kurds against the Turkish state’s attempts to Turkify the Kurdish population in 
Turkey. In their articulation of an alternative Kurdish collective ethno-linguistic 
identity category, Kurds in Turkey challenge the dominant Turkish collective ethno-
linguistic identity category imposed on them by the Turkish state. Similarly, Cihan 
Ahmetbeyzade (2007) describes Kurdish identity in the form of Kurdish nationalism 
in the following way: 
The minority Kurdish nationalism that resulted from modernization, 
standardization, and state regulations developed as a counterresistance to 
the impositions of the state. The imposed notion of a Turkish national 
identity and the prescription of a Turkish self are contested by many Kurds 
who recognize their own version of history and imagine their own 
ethnonational identities and communities. [163] 
 
Kurdishness, then, according to this account by Ahmetbeyzade, is constituted 
against the imagined Turkish ethno-national community.  
 Again, this idea of Kurdishness in opposition to the assimilationist policies of 
the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state is something my interlocutors 
articulated repeatedly. Not only that it was being done, but that it was an essential 
part of being Kurdish. Zana points to this when she says it would be a mistake to say 
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she is not political, because she is Kurdish. Kurdishness and asserting that particular 
ethno-linguistic identity is always already political. As Zana, and other interlocutors 
described it, the two are impossible to separate. 
 Another component of this narrative that relates to anthropological 
scholarship on Kurds, and Kurds in Turkey specifically, is Ahmetbeyzade’s (2000, 
2007), focus on gender issues. Ahmetbeyzade describes how ideas about the 
significant roles Kurdish women played in the Kurdish national struggle, especially 
the armed conflict that has taken place in the Kurdish majority region of Turkey 
since 1984. This has included turning “traditional” gender roles on their heads. As a 
result of Kurdish men being largely absent from the village setting, due to their 
voluntary or forced participation in the armed struggle, “peasant communities are 
largely represented by women in the Kurdish region” (2000:192). She continues by 
stating that “in the war zone Kurdish peasant mothers and wives create and re-
create new oppositional gender-specific social roles as female heads of their 
households” (2000:193). While the majority of my research was conducted with 
young men, a young woman, Zana, was a key interlocutor in Istanbul. I see her 
boldness in engaging in a self-imposed graffiti project, as will be described later in 
this chapter, to be connected to the same significant roles played by Kurdish women 
Ahmetbeyzade describes. 
 Patriliny is a key concept in the anthropological literature relating to identity 
and citizenship in the Middle East (e.g., Delaney 1991; Kanaaneh 2002; King 2018). 
Diane E. King (2014) shares how her interlocutors, Kurds in the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq in the 1990s, described Kurdishness, along with religious identity, as something 
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that is patrilineally conferred, passing from fathers to their children, and that “since 
men beget members of their ethnic and religious group and women do not, ethnic 
and religious identity remains, in theory, singular from generation to generation… In 
the patrilineal Middle East, there are no ‘half’ ethnic categories” (76). This idea of no 
“half” identities is further described by her interlocutors in the following manner 
later in the book: “When group membership is reckoned patrilineally, you know 
who is in your group (tribe, class, lineage) and who is not in your group by knowing 
to which father each person was born” (118). Thus, identity, in this case 
Kurdishness, is considered by King’s interlocutors to be conferred through the male 
line. To be considered Kurdish, then, if one’s ethnic identity is being reckoned 
patrilineally, one must have a Kurdish father. King also describes finding that her 
interlocutors described Kurdish identity as revolving around what she calls “a man 
on the land” (66), or a patrilineage connected to a particular piece of land.  
 I did see hints of this connection to land in conversations with my 
interlocutors. For example, during the same conversation with Welat at Kaçakçay, I 
asked him about his village. He said, “When someone dies here [in Istanbul], they 
take the body back to the village. They believe their life is not here. Life begins in the 
village and finishes in the village.” 
 “Do you want to be buried in your village,” I asked. 
 “Yes,” he replied. 
 And with that, Welat pulled out his iPhone to show me pictures of his village. 
Clearly, then the village is an important part of Welat’s life. Wanting to be buried in 
the village is a direct reference to the “man on the land” concept. The importance of 
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the village in the imaginations of many of my interlocutors is a part of how they 
conceptualize their identities. I heard similar sentiments from several of my 
interlocutors. However, the displacement experiences of their early childhoods 
seem to have complicated this, as their lives are in Istanbul now, rather than in the 
village.  
 For Zana, this way of thinking, of wanting to be buried in the village was 
more a ting for her parents, than herself. She said, “I was born there [in the village], 
and my father and my mother want to die there. I feel that I’m not; I don’t belong 
there. I’m here [in Istanbul]. I belong here.” Welat was a few years older than Zana 
so he may have had more vivid memories of life in his village. Likely what is at play 
here is a generational shift in level of connectedness to the village. While Zana visits 
her village, with other members of her family, she sees her life as being centered in 
Istanbul, to the point that she is not sure that she belongs in the village. I heard a 
similar sentiment while talking to Reşo. 
 As I was preparing to return to Istanbul for dissertation research in 2016, 
Azad suggested I contact a friend of his named Reşo. Azad had met Reşo in Chicago, 
while Reşo was there for six months to take English language courses. At the time 
we met, he was a master’s student in history at Istanbul Bilgi University. We met at a 
café, just off Istiklal Street. We chatted for a bit. I asked him about his hometown. He 
told me his family was from Sivas, a province in the east of the central region of 
Turkey. They moved to Istanbul in 1980, where Reşo was born. I asked if he ever 
went to Sivas to visit his hometown. 
Reşo: I have only been there three times, because nobody lives there. Even 




Lydia: When did you go to your hometown? 
 
Reşo: One time when I was a child. Six years ago, my grandfather died, so I 
went for his funeral. Then, I went again one year later for the anniversary of 
his death… My grandfather said, “I want to be buried there [in the village].” 
My family still has a house there, but I don’t visit. There is nothing there, just 
nature and a small house. I don’t think Sivas is important for me. On some 
levels it is important: it’s my hometown. But everything I do is here [in 
Istanbul]. My family is here.  
 




Lydia: What about your parents? 
 
Reşo: I don’t know. 
 
Lydia: What do you say when someone asks, “Where are you from?” 
 
Reşo: I don’t like the question, where are you from? It’s not important. It’s a 
secondary question. What you do is more important. 
 
Here, the generational divide in feelings about the village is more stark. Reşo’s 
grandfather wanted to be buried in the village, and clearly, the family complied with 
his wishes. Yet, the only two times Reşo has been to his family’s village were for 
events surrounding the death of his grandfather. He acknowledges his hometown as 
Sivas, rather than Istanbul, despite having been born in Istanbul. However, he does 
not visit his hometown, nor does he seem to have much desire to do so. Rather, he 
sees his family and his life in Istanbul. Reşo’s seeming nonchalance about his 
hometown was a bit of a surprise to me. The anthropological literature (King 2014; 
Aras 2014; Yalçın-Heckmann 1991) points to strong connections to the land for 
Kurds, and as such I expected a stronger expression of connection to Sivas from 
Reşo. Yet, clearly, for Reşo, there is some level of disconnection from his hometown. 
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He says there is nothing there, that it is not so important to him, and in his dislike of 
the question “Where are you from?” he expressed a desire to be known for his 
actions, rather than the location of his ancestral homeland, which echoes Welat’s 
frustration with the “Where are you from?” question during the job application 
process. Serhad, who was a 26-year-old journalism master’s student and Uber 
driver in Chicago when I interviewed him in 2016 discussed both the feeling of not 
being fully connected in addition to kinship-related elements of Kurdishness. 
 Serhad was born in a village in the province of Kars, in northeastern Turkey, 
and moved to Istanbul with his family in 2002, when he was 12. He hadn’t gone back 
to his village since his family moved away. I asked him why and he said, “I don’t 
know. I was busy. I was enjoying Istanbul.” Then, I asked what his village meant to 
him: 
Serhad: It’s like part of my childhood. I remember every street of the village, 
or the town, you know? But the things that we saw, that I saw, it wasn’t very 
nice, the political issues. You know, you saw some commandos, or soldiers, 
with the tanks and stuff, they come to your village. You don’t even know what 
they are, and you know, they occupy the village. They bring their flags and 
they put it there. It’s like, okay, who are you guys? What’s going on there? It’s 
scary to you. I don’t know. I don’t have good memories about the village, but, 
you know, some good ones, bad ones. But, to me, it’s like part of culture, you 
know? 
 
Lydia: What do you mean? 
 
Serhad: Like, Kurds are usually, like, nomads or villagers. They only settled in 
a few cities. So, to me, being Kurdish, is like being a villager or being a nomad. 
You know, that’s why I find in that place my identity. 
 
Lydia: How would you describe your identity? Who are you? Are you a 
villager? 
 
Serhad: I’m not a villager. I’m an urban person. You know, I lived in Istanbul 






Serhad: Yeah. Like, my identity, it’s… I don’t want to be a nationalist person. 
But the things that I saw or that I have experienced, you know, they push me 
to describe myself as a Kurd. Because, when someone asks me this question, I 
would say, “Oh, I’m a person, I’m a human,” you know? But, when someone 
asks this question now, I’m saying, “Oh, I’m Kurdish.” 
 
Lydia: What makes you Kurdish? 
 
Serhad: I think, the political issues, you know, when you have some big 
pressure on you, you just want to embrace what people put pressure on, you 
know? Like, they make pressure on Kurdishness, so I say, “Oh, okay, this is 
mine.” Like, it’s protected. And, my mom, she is like, I mean, when you see 
her, she is like Kurdish. I mean, she has a white [headscarf], she is brave, 
she’s talkative, she’s strong, you know? When you see her, you just say, 
“Okay, she is Kurdish.” When I am talking about my Kurdishness, I just 
remember her, because she is, kind of, Kurdishness. … Mothers are, kind of, 
the symbol of culture. Women are very important for culture, you know, they 
raise kids, and they give them the language. Kids spend more time with their 
moms, not their dads. So, they are kind of the symbol of culture, political 
issues, any kind of issues that are related to Kurdishness. 
 
As he was talking about the importance of women, and mothers in particular, to 
Kurdish culture, I was reminded of several things I had encountered during 
fieldwork. First, the struggle for the right to “mother tongue education,” one of the 
key human rights issues being pursued by Kurdish activists in Turkey. The mother 
tongue education campaign, which my interlocutors referenced, was a reaction to, 
and continuation of, the politicization of language in the ethno-nationally assertive 
Turkish state. A response to the Kurdish language being banned in the early years of 
the Republic, through Turkish state programs such as the “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!” 
(Citizen, Speak Turkish!) campaign that sought to promote the use of the Turkish 
language and eliminate the Kurdish language in the Kurdish-majority areas of 
Turkey. Second, the Saturday Mothers, a group of female protestors, most wearing 
white headscarves, who have sat in silent protest along İstiklal Caddesi every 
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Saturday with the photos of family members who have been disappeared, since at 
least the 1990s. Third, the images I had seen of female PKK guerrillas camped out in 
the mountains, ready to fight the Turkish state and, more recently, female units of 
Kurdish soldiers fighting the so-called Islamic State in Syria. Indeed, there are 
images of strong Kurdish women, strong Kurdish mothers, that seem to be a key 
part of the Kurdish ethos, and Serhad seemed to be tapping into that in describing 
his mother as a key part of his own Kurdish identity. But his main emphasis in 
discussing his mother’s role in fostering his Kurdishness is the teaching of the 
Kurdish language that happens in the home, perpetuated by his mother. In Turkey, 
where the Kurdish language was banned, and Kurdish language instruction has been 
limited to elective courses housed largely in folklore departments at a handful of 
Turkish universities, Serhad points to the importance of Kurdish mothers in 
ensuring the next generation learns the Kurdish language. Additionally, Serhad 
points to the political element of asserting a Kurdish ethno-linguistic identity in the 
ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state. 
 In aiming to eliminate Kurdish social spaces, yet refusing to name them as 
Kurdish, the Turkish state both fostered feelings of Kurdish identity, or Kurdishness, 
and excluded the possibility of a Kurdish identity in the public (“Turkish”) sphere. 
As Mesut Yeğen (1996) describes, in his examination of Turkish state narratives 
from the 1920s to the 1980s, the development of these feelings of Kurdishness was 
political, as the constitution of “Kurdishness” as a collective identity category 
developed against the nation-building project of the early Turkish state.  
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 This sentiment of Kurdishness being constructed as a form of resistance to 
the modern Turkish nation-building project is echoed by Christopher Houston 
(2001), who conducted research in Turkey, and mainly in Istanbul, in the 1980s and 
1990s, He claims that “contemporary Kurdish identity resides at the point of an 
intersection, the dangerous place where being (de-) constituted (assimilated) and 
constituting oneself collide” (18) Thus, Kurdishness in Turkey is found in the 
reaction of Kurds to the Turkish state’s attempts to Turkify the population; in their 
articulation of a Kurdish alternative to the Turkish collective identity category 
imposed on them by the state. 
 “Kurdishness” is constituted in reaction to, in contrast with, and as resistance 
against the imagined Turkish nation, and within the very social spaces where the 
ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state attempts to use other adjectives in order to 
avoid using any derivation of the word “Kurd.” As Cihan Ahmetbeyzade (2007), who 
conducted ethnographic research among Kurds living in Istanbul in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, describes it: 
The minority Kurdish nationalism that resulted from modernization, 
standardization, and state regulations developed as a counterresistance to 
the impositions of the state. The imposed notion of a Turkish national 
identity and the prescription of a Turkish self are contested by many Kurds 
who recognize their own version of history and imagine their own 
ethnonational identities and communities. [163]  
 
Additionally, according to Anna Secor (2004), “the word ‘Kurd’ was not to be 
pronounced, while the eastern and southeastern regions and their population were 
referred to as tribal, outlaw, reactionary, and backwards” (355). Yet, despite the 
attempts of the Turkish state to ignore or deny the existence of a Kurdish minority 
within its borders, Secor also found Kurds who were “moving from assimilation to 
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the assertion of identity” (364), as Welat and I experienced with the musical display 
of Kurdishness on İstiklal Caddesi.  
 “Kurdishness,” as I use it, is based on how my interlocutors tend to define it 
and entails a conception of collective ethno-linguistic identity. My interlocutors tend 
to foreground language when asked about what “makes” someone Kurdish. These 
echoes assertions found in the anthropological literature, including Lale Yalçın-
Heckmann’s (1991) description of Kurdish identity being tied to speaking Kurdish 
as one’s “mother tongue” (27). In his list of “everything that recalled a separate 
Kurdish identity” (van Bruinessen 1992:191) that the Turkish state sought to 
abolish, van Bruinessen lists language first. Certainly, the nascent Turkish state 
banning the Kurdish language in 1924, only one year after the establishment of the 
republic, indicates that the state saw the Kurdish language as a threat to the 
Turkishness of Turkey.  
 The importance of language to conceptions of Kurdishness in Turkey is also 
borne out in broader explorations of the topic. The Turkish state’s focus on 
language, according to Secor (2004) is due to the fact that “Turkey has historically 
viewed claims to Kurdish linguistic, cultural, or political rights as sources of 
instability and threats to national unity” (356). However, the state ban on 
Kurdishness did not eliminate the language from Turkey. Indeed, as Nicole Watts 
(2010) points out, “ordinary people’s continued use of a Kurdish language 
(Kurmanji or Zazaki)” and “naming children with Kurdish names” (12) are common 
forms of resistance in Turkey. Kurdish language rights, including the right to 
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“mother tongue education” in Kurdish, are a major focus of Kurds in Turkey in the 
present (Hassanpour et al. 1996; Watts 2010; Çoşkun et al. 2011). 
 Kurdishness can be found in Kurdish reactions against the Turkish state’s 
attempts to Turkify the population, in their articulation of a Kurdish alternative 
ethno-linguistic collective identity category to the dominant Turkish ethno-
linguistic collective identity category in Turkey. Mesut Yeğen (1996) describes 
“Kurdishness” as a collective identity category as being constituted vis-à-vis the 
nation-building project of the early Turkish republic. He argues that the social 
spaces that were the focus of much of the modernizing state project, “tradition (the 
social and political structures of ‘premodernity’), the peripheral economy 
(smuggling), and religion (the Caliphate and tarikats)” (225) were the same social 
spaces in which Kurdish identity was constituted. In aiming to eliminate these social 
spaces, yet refusing to name them as “Kurdish,” the Turkish state fostered feelings of 
Kurdishness, or the development of a distinct ethno-linguistic Kurdish identity, 
while simultaneously excluding Kurdishness from the “Turkish” public sphere. Thus, 
this understanding of Kurdishness as a concept that is articulated in contrast to 
Turkishness is tied to the experiences of my interlocutors who challenge state 
narratives. 
 Linking this back to language and sociocultural anthropology more explicitly, 
Houston (2008) asserts that Turkish linguistic policies were part of an “aural 
politics” (122) designed to silence Kurdish in public. Yet, as Houston (2008) 
describes, Kurds created private spaces for the maintenance of the Kurdish language 
as an important aspect of Kurdish culture: “In Turkey Kurdish is taught at private 
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educational foundations, half-disguised under names such as ‘Mesopotamian 
Culture Center.’ Their common rooms agitate with songs in Kurdish, their artists 
and listeners re-presenting the rhythm of being non-Turkish” (156). My 
interlocutors grew up in these types of Kurdish spaces in Istanbul. However, it 
appears that limiting their Kurdishness to the private spaces of their homes is no 
longer enough. Rather, my interlocutors and their contemporaries have taken their 
assertions of Kurdishness outside the home, into public spaces, such as the streets of 
central Istanbul and Kurdish language classrooms at Turkish universities.   
 
Asserting Kurdishness 
 The concept of “asserting” a collective identity category is related ideas of 
“claiming citizenship” (Nordberg 2006; see also Hahonou 2011). I have chosen to 
use “asserting,” rather than “claiming,” as it implies a more forceful action. Making 
an assertion requires a certain level of confidence that is not implied by the term 
claim. As my interlocutors are certainly confident of their Kurdishness, asserting 
their Kurdishness is a more accurate descriptor for what they are doing when they 
speak Kurdish on the street or participate in a protest. “Asserting,” as I use it to talk 
about “asserting Kurdishness” in Turkey, falls at the intersection of two ideas: 1) 
Biner’s (2007, 2010) concept of unmasking public secrets and making claims to 
space based on cultural heritage; and 2) Neyzi’s (2002) description of the tension 
between the competing ethno-linguistic identity claims made by the state and 
individuals who are citizens of that state. I will now elaborate on each, in turn. 
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 In her description of Armenians and Syriac Christians living in Mardin, 
Turkey (in the southeast), Zerrin Özlem Biner (2007, 2010) draws on Michael 
Taussig’s (1999) “distinction between ‘secrecy’ and ‘public secrecy’… [Secrecy is] a 
site of power where social and political relationships are disguised in the form of 
fetish… Public secrecy derives from people’s complicity in disguising the power 
relations behind the fetish” (2010:74). Secrets and public secrets can, according to 
Biner, be “unmasked” (76). To illustrate this, Biner describes a woman, Sofi, the 
grandmother of one of her informants. Sofi was Armenian at birth but had changed 
her name to Ayşe and converted to Islam. Her grandchildren and other relatives 
knew that she had been an Armenian Christian, and after her death they unmasked 
her public secret by referring to her as Sofi. As Biner describes it, “Ayşe was 
unmasked and turned back into Sofi through the revelation of public secrets in the 
fragmented narratives of her relatives” (2010:76). Sofi’s relatives, then, were 
“claiming” her Armenian-ness. Unmasking, then, is a form of claiming, yet falls a bit 
short of making an assertion of ethno-linguistic identity. Thus, unmasking highlights 
public secrecy, and makes claims to knowledge of the existence of this public secret. 
However, these claims, at least as described by Biner, do not go beyond admission of 
knowledge for fear of potential retribution. 
 In addition to this unmasking of secrets, Biner (2010) also discusses making 
claims based on “cultural heritage” (86) in the city of Mardin. These claims involve 
competing claims to rights associated with structures and spaces made by Kurds, 
Arabs, and Syriac Christians. Syriac Christians are making claims to spaces that they 
assert they were forced out of during the Armenian genocide that began in 1915. 
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However, as Biner describes, Kurds seem to be indifferent to these claims, and the 
Arab elites in the city reinforce the silencing of this period of Turkish history 
through their non-reactions. 
 In her discussion of the claiming of alternative identities, Leyla Neyzi (2002) 
presents the story of Fatma Arığ, a member of the Sabbatean religious minority in 
Istanbul. In doing so, she addresses issues of national identity, assimilation, history, 
and subjectivity in contemporary Turkey. According to Neyzi, Turkishness was 
something to be performed, and in “performing Turkishness, subjects felt the need 
to hide alternate histories in the public sphere, and sometimes in the familial sphere 
as well” (138). This hiding of alternate histories echoes Biner’s (2010) discussion of 
public secrecy. 
 This, then, leads Neyzi (2002) to turn to histories and alternate histories, and 
specifically what she calls the “rediscovery of history” by the citizens of Turkey: 
The rediscovery of history in Turkish society in the 1990s suggests that the 
Turkish modernity projects’ attempt to create a new basis for identity has 
been limited by the refusal to acknowledge the cultural heritage of the 
Ottoman Empire… The turn to the past in Turkish society suggests the 
emergence of a new subjectivity (and demands for a new concept of 
citizenship) predicated upon having a personal history which necessitates the 
public acknowledgement of a plural cultural heritage. [138] 
 
 The history of the Ottoman Empire is, of course, a history of a plurality of 
ethnic and religious identities. This plurality, in fact, continued throughout the more 
recent history and present of the Turkish state, despite the attempts at Turkification 
of the early republican period. “Remembering” this plurality, “unmasking” the public 
secret, in an echo of Özyürek’s (2007) concept of “public memory,” creates spaces in 
what Trouillot (1995) would call the “silences” in Turkish history for the claiming of 
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alternative histories that counter the dominant historical narrative of the Turkish 
state. 
 The claiming of a personal history must be negotiated against the denial of 
alternative histories by the ethno-nationally assertive Turkish state and in the 
public spaces of Turkey, as well as against the “suppression of memory within the 
family” (Neyzi 2002:152). This idea of alternative histories to the idea of individuals 
claiming identity in Neyzi’s presentation of the life of Fatma Arığ, allowing her to 
focus on “individuals engaged in the process of searching for their past, rather than a 
discrete community” (147). In Neyzi’s description Fatma Arığ desires to claim her 
personal history and her Sabbatean origins. In doing so, Neyzi argues, she is part of 
“a growing demand on the part of Turkish citizens for the right to a personal history 
which acknowledges the plural cultural heritage of the people of Turkey” (148). 
Neyzi demonstrates this in the case of Fatma Arığ, by explaining that her personal 
past as a Sabbatean has been denied by both her family and the public discourse of 
the Turkish state. Thus, in making assertions about her past, Fatma Arığ is 
countering both of these denials. 
 “Asserting,” then, as I use it falls at the intersection of the ideas described 
above, regarding ethnic/religious minorities claiming their identities and rights 
based on those identities. Asserting alternative (i.e., non-Turkish, non-Sunni 
Muslim) identities in Turkey must necessarily be articulated vis-à-vis the Turkish 
state’s nation-building project and the dominant ethnic/religious/linguistic 
narrative in Turkey since 1923. These ethno-linguistic identity assertions are 
presented as forms of counter-narrative to the constructed historical narrative of 
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the Turkish state and denials of the pluralist past of the land and peoples now 
contained within the internationally recognized borders of the Turkish state. These 
assertions are made out loud and in contrast to a history of silences, though they 
need not be made loudly. 
 I argue that the concept of asserting is a useful theoretical tool for examining 
Kurdishness in Turkey, as I have seen similarities between the kinds of claims 
described by Biner (2007, 2010) and Neyzi (2002) and the assertions made by 
Kurds, and specifically Kurdish university students, in Turkey. As described 
previously, Kurds have been subject to silencing (Trouillot 1995) by the Turkish 
state in variety of ways, including denial of existence and denial of language rights. 
Despite denials of Kurdish existence in Turkey, the fact that Kurds do exist was 
essentially a public secret that is now being publicly unmasked. I also like that 
asserting, as in making an assertion, implies the use of language, given the history of 
the Kurdish language being banned and the fact that the Kurdish language has 
become a potent political symbol of the larger Kurdish struggle for rights in Turkey. 
Additionally, the implication of language use in asserting is interesting, as I see it as 
a counterpoint to silencing, which can be seen as an absence of speaking, and 
absence of the use of language. Dominant Turkish state narratives have silenced 
Kurdish (and other) alternatives. Thus, in making assertions about their 
Kurdishness, Kurds are breaking these silences. These assertions also serve to 
challenge dominant state narratives about Kurds, including denial of existence, as in 
the case of Azad’s history professor, who claimed Kurds do not have a history, and 
descriptions of Kurds as “terrorists,” as I will discuss in the next chapter. 
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 My interlocutors in Istanbul have linked their Kurdish identity to various 
factors, including language and politics. Welat told me, “I am a Kurd. The important 
things for the Kurds are their language, their traditions, family, friends, and sharing.” 
Language is the first thing he lists as important, echoing Lale Yalçın-Heckmann’s 
(1991) assertion that Kurdish identity is linked most importantly to language. Later 
in our conversation, Welat begins talking about identity as connected to language 
again. “I feel Kurdish. Kurds are, you know, Kurds. They speak their language, and 
they have a different culture, and they have an ethnicity and customs. And, when 
you were born into the same things, you feel like a Kurd.” So, here again language is 
foregrounded. Yet, Welat also introduces the idea of Kurdish identity being 
connected to a particular feeling, and this feeling can then be connected to ideas 
about being political. At another point in our conversation, Welat said, “I have one 
identity. It is politics. … I have one political position. I am Kurdish. … I want the 
Kurds to take all of their rights in a democratic situation.” Clearly, for Welat, his 
Kurdish identity is comprised of language, a particular feeling of Kurdishness, and 
being political, and specifically a form of being political that should counter the 
dominant discourse of the Turkish Republic. 
 Şervan, a 21-year-old law student, also talked about the importance of 
language to concepts of Kurdishness. “If a nation doesn’t have freedom, they can’t do 
anything. ... They can’t speak their language. They can’t live however they want. ... 
They can’t speak, they can’t write. I am 21 years old. I am only now learning how to 
write Kurdish. ... Language is important.” This discussion about language points back 
to Yael Navaro-Yashin’s (2002a) point about the education system being used for 
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indoctrination by the Turkish state. Both Şervan and Welat can speak and write in 
Turkish and English, because they were required to learn both of these languages as 
part of their education. Yet, though Kurdish was the first language each man learned 
to speak, it was not until they were at university that they were able to gain literacy 
in their mother tongue, as their university is one of those that offers formal Kurdish 
language classes. That these university classes are sanctioned by the Turkish state is 
particularly interesting, in that the state is allowing for the creation of spaces that 
challenge the dominant state discourse.  
 The sentiments raised by Welat and Şervan were echoed by other students 
with whom I spoke. Diyar, a 25-year-old master’s student in journalism said that for 
a person to say they are Kurdish means “language, culture, and a common 
imagination for the future.” When asked what makes her Kurdish, Zozan, a 22-year-
old translation student, said, “My language, culture, and thoughts make me a Kurd. If 
you say, ‘I am a Kurd,’ the Kurdish language has to be your best-known language and 
you can use your language with other Kurds.” And Rojda, a 21-year-old mathematics 
student, responded that “language and culture” are what make her Kurdish. Clearly 
for all of these students, the Kurdish language is intimately linked with their ideas 
about Kurdish ethno-linguistic identity and their assertions of that identity.  
 
Kurdish Space at a Turkish University 
 Welat was a political science student at Bilgi University, one of two 
universities in Istanbul to offer Kurdish language classes at the time. He had taken 
advantage of this opportunity and was enrolled in the advanced level Kurdish class. 
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I had asked Welat about his Kurdish identity, and specifically, when he first became 
aware that he was Kurdish. His answer was directly related to the Turkish education 
system and language: 
Lydia: So, do you remember the first time you thought to yourself, “I am 
Kurdish?” 
 
Welat: Yeah.  
 
Lydia: Can you describe it to me? When did you first realize, “I am Kurdish?” 
 
Welat: When, actually, when I first went to school, my teacher spoke Turkish, 
and everybody spoke [Turkish] with the teacher. I never spoke with my 
teacher, until the fourth year. And then, on my first day, when I went to the 
school, I said to my mother, “I'm not, I am not like my friends.” So, I have a 
different identity. I was aware of my Kurdish identity…. And then, it 
continued. When I went to high school, reading about the Kurds. Also, on the 
Internet, not in books, because many things were banned. So, you cannot 
learn everything about the Kurds. Also, when I encountered the Internet, I 
met my Kurdish identity.  
 
Lydia: So, first, the first day of school, and then again with the Internet? 
 
Welat: The Internet, yeah. 
 
Lydia: Okay, so what happened with the Internet? What do you mean when 
you say that? 
 
Welat: I started to research the Kurds, and the Kurdish language, and Kurdish 
traditions, and then I found good things about the Kurds, their life, their… 
Because you don’t learn anything about their life in Turkish books. It’s like, 
it’s like “mountain people,” it’s “danger,” every time it’s, you know, like that. 
And then, I started to research on the Internet and read books. My friends, or 
my brothers, they also read, and said, “I am Kurdish.” Now, I know something 
about my culture, about my customs, everything. Now I feel I am Kurdish. 
 
Welat very clearly describes learning about his Kurdishness, first in a Turkish 
classroom, and then through conducting research on the Internet. His experience in 
the classroom was one of being othered, though not being able to speak the 
language of instruction, and therefore not speaking to his teacher for four years. 
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When he realized that he would not be learning about his history or culture in the 
Turkish classroom, Welat took it upon himself to use the Internet to educate himself 
about the history and culture of Kurds. This highlights an emphasis on education 
and language, tied to Kurdishness, that I heard from my interlocutors.  
 Bilgi University was one of the first universities in Turkey to offer Kurdish 
language classes, beginning in 2009 (Anadolu Agency 2015). I spoke to the Kurdish 
language instructor at Bilgi, Ronayi, about the importance of the class. She told me, 
“Some students know Kurdish, speaking and listening, but they don’t know how to 
read and write. They are shocked to see texts in Kurdish for the first time…. Kurdish 
used to be invisible, but now it is very visible in the cities in Turkey. People used to 
speak Kurdish quietly in public; they were afraid, but now they are not afraid to 
speak Kurdish in Turkey.” It seemed that Ronayi felt she was contributing to the 
lessening of the fear to speak Kurdish in public, through teaching her Kurdish 
students more about their language. 
 I attended a Kurdish class with Welat on two occasions, to sit in and observe. 
All but one of the students I met were Kurds who might have grown up speaking 
some Kurdish at home, but had been educated in Turkish, and now wanted to 
strengthen their Kurdish language skills. On one occasion, during my second visit to 
the class, the students were presenting their final projects for the semester. It 
became clear that they had been tasked with putting together a report, in Kurdish, 
on any topic of interest to them. The topics ran the gamut, from how chocolate is 
made to the life of Kurdish linguist, journalist, and politician, Celadet Alî Bedirxan. 
One of the female students stood up and started talking. Welat quietly translated for 
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me. He told me she was talking about her uncle being disappeared. She was on the 
verge of tears for most of her presentation, and the instructor walked over at one 
point to give her a hug. The other students offered words of encouragement. I was 
struck, in that moment, by what this classroom and the environment created by 
their Kurdish teacher meant for these students. It was a safe space to be Kurdish, to 
speak Kurdish, and to speak about Kurdishness. It was also a space to learn all 
aspects of their language for the first time. I asked the instructor, Ronayi, how she 
had come to teach Kurdish at Bilgi, and she said, “The government said they would 
allow Kurdish classes. The students asked and the university responded.”  
 After Welat moved to Chicago in 2016, I asked him about his experience as a 
Kurd at his university: 
Lydia: At university, specifically, were you comfortable saying “I’m Kurdish” 
in your classes with Turkish students or Turkish professors? 
 
Welat: Yeah, in my university, we had a Kurdish class. And, my teacher, her 
name is Ronayi. When I was in high school, she was my English teacher, and 
we knew each other. I felt my identity strongly in that class: I am Kurdish. I 
had one teacher; he was arrested several times by the Turkish government. 
The reason is that he was sometimes speaking nicely about the Kurds. 
 
Lydia: Oh, okay, but is he Kurdish? 
 
Welat: No, he is, kind of like, from the Black Sea area. Sometimes, when he 
was talking about the Kurds, some students, they say, “Don’t make 
propaganda for the Kurds in the classroom. We are coming to listen to the 
lesson.” It was kind of like they were being rude with the teacher sometimes. 
The class was Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Problems in the Region. 
And, he said, “Well, we are in Turkey, we live in Turkey, we have some 
problems, we need to talk.” And, when he tried to talk, the students, some of 
them, they said, “We don’t want to listen to Kurdish propaganda in class.” 
They became really, really rude sometimes. And, when it’s like that class, you 
don’t feel, kind of like, I’m going to say I’m Kurdish in class. But mostly, I say 
that I’m Kurdish and am proud of my Kurdishness… One of my friends, he 
studied at Marmara University. He studied journalism. Sometimes, we saw, 
he had some marks on his face, because conservative and nationalistic 
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people, they attacked him. And, he said, “I never said anything in that class, 
like I’m Kurdish. It was only my skin, that people discriminated against me 
and hit me.”  
 
Lydia: But it sounds like you were pretty comfortable saying, “I’m Kurdish” 
on your campus? 
 
Welat: Yeah, because it’s kind of like a more liberal school.4 
 
Lydia: A more liberal school? Yeah. Okay. So, were there Kurdish student 
groups at your university? 
 
Welat: Yeah, we had one group, it was really, really active. 
 
Lydia: Tell me about it. 
 
Welat: Yeah, it was the Bilgi University Cultural Group. We organized some 
events about the Kurdish problems, Kurdish movies, Kurdish music, Kurdish 
history. We tried to solve the Kurdish issues, problems, kind of like, more in 
the academic area. We had several big conferences. One, I remember you 
joined, the one conference. That one was the biggest one, and we worked 
with the İsmail Beşikçi5 Foundation, too. Mostly, in our club, when a student 
comes from the Kurdish region, we think about, how are they going to 
survive in Istanbul? How can we help them? How can they be connected to 
each other? How are we going to share something? That’s why we, kind of 
like, established the club. And, literally, it became, for all of us, beneficial. We 
learned many things from that club, and we had many responsibilities. 
Mostly, our friends are not lucky like us, because they want to establish some 
Kurdish clubs in their schools, but the management of the school, the 
university, they don’t allow them. It’s seriously a big issue in the university. 
But Bilgi is good for us, because it was more liberal. 
 
For Welat and his classmates, the Kurdish language classroom and the Kurdish 
student organization are two sides of the same coin. Their Kurdish language 
instructor, Ronayi, was involved with the student organization, as an advisor. So, 
                                                        
4 Universities in Turkey are notoriously political. Schools like Bilgi and Middle Eastern Technical 
University (Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi) were known for their liberal leanings, while schools like 
Gazi University were known for being quite nationalistic, and other schools, like Fatih University, 
were known for being affiliated with the Gülen movement. 
5 İsmail Beşikçi is a Turkish sociologist who has written extensively about the Kurdish population in 
Turkey. He has been imprisoned on multiple occasions on charges of “propaganda.”  
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Welat’s friend group were taking language courses together, where they were 
discussing Kurdish issues, and this extended to their extracurricular activities as 
well, participating in the planning of events, including conferences, to academically 
explore Kurdish issues in Turkey, and the broader region. 
 The Turkish government, by allowing for the teaching of the Kurdish 
language, was also allowing for the creation of spaces in which the Turkish 
nationalist narrative, of Turkey as a country for the Turks, was openly challenged, 
through the speaking of a language other than Turkish, and through the topics that 
were discussed in class. This effectively turned the Kurdish language classroom at a 
Turkish university into what I call an “incubator of Kurdishness,” because it allowed 
for the ability to reclaim their “mother tongue,” to discuss what it means to be a 
Kurd in Turkey, and to process their shared history. These types of conversations 
are precisely what an educator might expect in a university classroom, though it was 
likely not what the Turkish state had in mind when it agreed to allow Kurdish 
language courses for university students. 
 
University Students within the Anthropology of Youth 
 The study of youth has been a classic topic of anthropological study, with 
early studies focusing on youth as a period in the human life cycle (Mead 1928; 
Turner 1964). As such, youth, or adolescence in the case examined by Margaret 
Mead (1928), was seen as something that happened to young people, a stage that 
had to be gotten through on the way to becoming an adult. Later studies saw a shift 
to a critique of the study of youth as subject to the forces around them and focused 
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instead on youth as agents in their own right (e.g., Willis 1981). Often these more 
contemporary studies took the form of the school ethnography (e.g., Bettie 2003). 
Still others include ethnography focusing on issues such as identity, belonging, and 
activism among various youth populations (Mir 2014; Vora 2013; Shankar 2008; 
Varzi 2006). It is this last set of ethnographies to which I now turn. 
 Identity exploration is a component of being a university student. As Shabana 
Mir (2014) describes, in the experiences of Muslim American women negotiating 
identity as undergraduate students at universities in the United States, “the 
undergraduate social world is the site of crucial identity work” (33), by which she 
means that in the university setting young people generally gain a better 
understanding of who they are as individuals and begin to assert their identities. For 
the young women among whom Mir did her fieldwork, this identity negotiation was 
done in a sphere in which they were “othered.” Coming face-to-face with the way 
they were perceived by non-Muslim student peers ultimately created spaces for 
agency. As Mir describes it: 
My participants became objects to themselves when they met the “Muslim 
Woman” in their peers’ heads and internalized this image, but this 
objectification created possibilities of agency against symbolic violence. The 
possibility of agency is in fact catalyzed from the mix of conflicting Orientalist 
stereotypes that case Muslim women as objects of fear and objects of pity, as 
sexual objects and virginally chaste: this repetition and doubling, these 
contradictions, betray the weakness in Orientalism, and they engender the 
possibilities for stereotyped persons to transcend inscribed identities… My 
research participants “did agency” vis-à-vis multiple forces and centers of 
power. [38-39] 
 
Mir found that her interlocutors were able to exercise agency in asserting Muslim 
identities countered “popular and highly destructive notions of Muslim identity as 
Other, as pathological and as ‘given’ and unchangeable” (42). Thus, in this case, 
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Muslim youth were disrupting stereotypes in their negotiation and assertion of their 
identities as Muslim that did not map neatly onto common stereotypes of Muslims, 
and Muslim women in particular. In this way, they seem to be countering a historical 
Orientalist narrative of Muslim-ness. 
 A component of realizing one’s identity and asserting it in an ethno-
nationally assertive state, such as Turkey, is the question of what citizenship looks 
like in that particular context. Neha Vora (2013) examines issues of citizenship and 
belonging among diasporic Indians living in Dubai. Vora calls these Indian residents 
of Dubai “impossible citizens” (3), because “their modes of citizenship and belonging 
occur not despite but through the very legal structures and technologies of 
governance that prevent them from naturalizing and that produce their 
temporariness as short-term workers tied to individual citizen-sponsors (kafeels)” 
(175). While the details are different, Vora’s term “impossible citizens” recalls, for 
me, Yegen’s (2009) description of Kurds as “pseudo-citizens,” based on the idea that 
Turkish citizenship is simultaneously a political and an ethnic designation. As such, 
Kurds can only be political citizens, but not ethnic citizens, of Turkey. 
 Issues of identity and belonging among university students, specifically, are 
also addressed by Vora (2013) within the context of the South Asian community in 
Dubai. As Vora describes: 
Indian and Pakistani students who attended schools like American University 
in Sharjah articulated identifications that were extensions of their South 
Asian noncitizen positionality in Dubai, but these identifications were also 
differently enabled and mobilized as they experienced first-hand the 
promises and failures of global and neoliberal citizenship that Western 
universities in the Gulf deploy. The narratives and experiences of these 
young people challenge the forms of belonging and exclusion through which 
South Asians in Dubai have historically been interpellated and through which 
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my other interlocutors expressed their understandings of citizenship, 
migration, and identity. The emerging forms of politicization and claims to 
“second-class” citizenship by South Asian university students point to 
potential larger-scale shifts in the relationship between Gulf States and their 
foreign resident populations, and to new claims to the city, the Emirati 
nation, and the region within South Asian diasporic futures. [147-148] 
 
 I see multiple connections between the situation of South Asian university 
students in Dubai described by Vora (2013) and my fieldwork with Kurdish 
university students in Turkey. There is a similar disconnect between education and 
lived experience, though the focus is a bit different. I have yet to hear mention of 
neoliberal “promises,” but there is certainly a disconnect between a pervasive 
articulation of Turkey as a nation of Turkish citizens who are ethnically Turkish in 
primary, secondary, and tertiary education (Navaro-Yashin 2002a; Altınay 2004) 
and the experiences of Kurdish students as Kurds. For example, Azad told me about 
being told by a university professor on the first day of class his first year at Istanbul 
University that there is no such group as “the Kurds,” echoing the “Mountain Turks” 
rhetoric of the early 20th century Turkish state. Yet, through organizations of 
Kurdish students, or in Kurdish language classrooms (at the handful of private 
universities that have them), young Kurds are able to come together and discuss 
their experiences as Kurds in Turkey. Thus, as Vora (2013) notes for South Asian 
students in Dubai, I have seen a political element to these interactions between 
Kurdish students in Turkey. 
 Language can be an important component of identity formation. As already 
discussed, my interlocutors often foreground the Kurdish language in conversations 
about Kurdishness. Shalini Shankar (2008) also points to the importance of 
language in identity formation among Desi teens in Silicon Valley. Shankar argues 
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that “how youth decide to speak a heritage language, with whom, and how this 
positions them at school is linked to cultural capital” (101). I find this particularly 
interesting in light of having been told by more than one interlocutor that being 
Kurdish means speaking Kurdish, the implication being that to be a “real” Kurd one 
has to know and use the Kurdish language. This is particularly striking in the context 
of urban Turkey, where, as Anna Grabolle-Çeliker (2013) noted a “decline of Kurdish 
language use” among the Kurdish migrants with whom she did fieldwork in 
Istanbul. Thus, it would seem that there may be a form cultural capital implied in the 
designation of Kurdish language use as a marker of being Kurdish among Kurdish 
university students in Istanbul. 
 Even seemingly “simple” or “small” acts can be acts of resistance for young 
people who desire to challenge what they perceive as oppressive ethno-nationally 
assertive state narratives and assert their Kurdishness. Similarly, Roxanne Varzi 
(2006) discusses ways in which Iranian youth, including university students resist 
the dominant narrative of the state that attempts to produce “Islamic citizens” (10), 
including through the attempted enforcement of an “Islamic public sphere” (7), thus 
highlighting youth as political agents. In one case Varzi discusses clothing as a 
potential site for resistance: “Even Islamic dress provides room for interpretation. 
Altered and played with, clothing meant for a specific use can be utilized in ways 
that transform its planned effect so as to allow for resistance” (125). In much the 
same way that clothing can be a marker of an assertion to an alternative ethno-
linguistic identity, so too could something equally as mundane, such as the drinking 
of kaçakçay, as I experienced with Welat. And yet, despite the fact that my 
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interlocutors are creating and interacting in spaces in which they can assert their 
Kurdishness, the history of being compelled to leave their villages leads to an 
apparent sense of unsettledness for my interlocutors. 
 
Belonging and Not Belonging 
 I first met Zana, a linguistics student, in the summer of 2014, while on a 
weekend trip to Istanbul from Ankara, where I was studying the Turkish language. 
She is the younger sister of Azad, one of the Kurds living in Chicago, and he had 
arranged for us to meet.  
 Zana was doing an internship at the İsmail Beşikçi Foundation Library, an 
institute named for the esteemed sociologist, who for many years was one of very 
few ethnically Turkish academics speaking out about the plight of Kurds in Turkey. 
The library houses what used to be Beşikçi’s personal library. It was a well-lit, sunny 
space comprising two floors of a building just off İstiklal Caddesi. After meeting me 
on the street, in front of the building, Zana escorted me up a flight of stairs and into 
the office, where she promptly offered me tea, coffee, or water. She quickly mixed up 
two cups of Nescafe and handed one to me and we chatted for a while. She offered to 
give me a tour, which I eagerly accepted, and she walked me through the stacks, 




Figure 4 Inside the İsmail Beşikçi Foundation Library. (Photo by the author.) 
 
 My next meeting with Zana was just a few days after arriving in Istanbul for 
dissertation research, in February of 2016. During our conversation, I asked Zana to 
tell me about her village and whether or not she spends time there: 
Zana: I visit my hometown because my father goes there in the summer, and 
my mother also goes there. When I find time to go, I go. 
 
Lydia: Okay. About how often, usually? 
 
Zana: Last time I went was two years ago. Two summers ago. 
 
Lydia: So, it’s been a while? 
 
Zana: Yes. I want to go this summer. As you know, I work in a library, and it’s 
so far to go. Like, one day to go by bus. If I go Sunday, I have to come back 




Lydia: Yeah, of course. So, you usually go in the summertime, then? 
 
Zana: Yes, yes.  
 
Lydia: Okay. So, what does your hometown mean to you? You haven’t been 
there for two years. You live here. What do you think about your hometown? 
 
Zana: My hometown is my hometown. We couldn’t cut our relationship with 
our hometown, because my mother—my family—goes there in the summer, 
and it has a big meaning for me. 
 
Lydia: What do you mean by that? 
 
Zana: I was born there, and my father and my mother want to die there. I feel 
that I’m not; I don’t belong there. I’m here [in Istanbul]. I belong here. 
 
Lydia: You don’t belong there? 
 
Zana: I feel that Istanbul is okay. There are Kurdish people. I know 
everyone—not everyone… 
 
Lydia: It seems like you know everyone. 
 
Zana: Most of them. I feel it’s like my hometown, but it’s not my language, and 
it’s not my school. Like, when I started to go to school, I didn’t know Turkish 
and I don’t remember anything about my first and second years in primary 
school because I didn’t know Turkish and there wasn’t space in my mind for 
this… Sorry, but I remember things about my third year in primary school 
because I knew Turkish. If you don’t know the language, you can’t remember 
anything about these memories. And, my mother’s side lives in our 
hometown, and my father loves it because we have land in our hometown to 
grow things like tomatoes, peppers, and grapes. And, you know, my mother 
always brings something with her when she comes to Istanbul. We have a 
strong relationship with our hometown. 
 
 This sort of belonging and not belonging expressed by Zana is not unusual 
among the Kurdish university students with whom I spoke. Many of them were 
brought to Istanbul at such a young age that most of their lives have been lived in 
the city. Even if they do return to their villages for visits, they may be limited by time 
and distance, or their language abilities, in making strong connections with family 
members who may still live in or near the village. Zana explains that her parents 
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“want to die” in the village, which I took to mean they want to be buried there, a 
sentiment I have read about and heard from other interlocutors. However, Zana 
does not seem to share her parents’ desire. While her village is clearly important to 
her, and she has an understanding of its importance to her family, more generally, 
she uncertainty as to whether she fully belongs there. She seems to feel more at 
home in Istanbul, among the Kurds in her predominantly Kurdish neighborhood, 
Tarlabaşı. As we continued to talk, Zana explained more about Tarlabaşı, and life for 
Kurds in Istanbul: 




Lydia: I know; it’s a big question. 
 
Zana: No. I was thinking being a Kurdish student in Turkey is so easy. I was 
thinking this, but two weeks ago I went to Eskişehir, and then I went to 





Zana: Because the quantity of Kurdish people is not so much, and there are a 
lot of fascist people in Eskişehir. And, like, what you saw when I speak with 
my friends in Kurdish, I think, “It’s okay.” But, in Eskişehir, if you are 
speaking Kurdish, you can see people are aware and looking… I am so 
relaxed in Istanbul, because there are a lot of Kurdish people, especially in 
my life, and my friends, most of them are Kurdish. And when I went to 
Ankara, I have a friend from Rojhilat, and we spoke in Kurmaji. We were on 
the Metro, but we had some big bags. I saw again the looks in people’s eyes, 
like, “We will kill them,” because they were looking at us like we are 
terrorists. It is so sad. I didn’t like Ankara and Eskişehir, and I think the only 
city to live in, in Turkey, for Kurdish people, is Istanbul. You can’t live in 
another city… Kurdistan is okay. 
 
Lydia: The Kurdistan part is okay?  
 




Lydia: Nothing in the middle? 
 
Zana: Yes. Because, Ankara is a big city, and Izmir is a big city, but, you know, 
a lot of [people are] stupid, and in Eskişehir also. And, the other cities are so 
small, to live there, and there are a lot of stupid people, like in Tokat or Ozgat. 
They kill you if you speak in Kurdish. Yeah. And so, in Istanbul it’s okay to live 
for Kurdish people. But, in other cities it is so difficult. 
 
Lydia: But, have you ever felt scared here? 
 
Zana: In Istanbul?  
 
Lydia: Yeah, speaking Kurdish, or, with like, the current situation? 
 
Zana: You know, I live in Tarlabaşı. You know, Tarlabaşı is Kurdish people’s, 
like, village, like our village. I’m so, so happy when I go to the Kurdish area. 
Okay, Kadiköy is okay to live, but you know there are a lot of people who live 
there, and you know it is not your hometown. And, like, Taksim over there, 
there are a lot of Kurdish people, and this café [is owned by] Kurdish people. 
 
Lydia: Yeah, I know. 
 
Zana: And it is so relaxed… I am a student in Istanbul University, and, you 
know, there are a lot of Kurdish students in Istanbul University, so 
everything is okay. It is possible, you know, Arılık? … Minority. If you are not 
a minority, everything is okay. 
 
Lydia: You don’t feel like you’re a minority at Istanbul University? 
 
Zana: Yes… But, when I was in primary school, we were the minority. We 
were afraid of, like, our teachers, because we were not Turkish people. But, in 
high school and middle school, everything was okay. You know, I met with 
my friends from Sakarya University, they are Kurdish, and they came here, 
and I asked them, “How is it in Sakarya, to be a Kurdish student?” They say, 
“Sometimes, we are afraid of [using] our language, because we can’t find any 





Figure 5 A view of the Tarlabaşı neighborhood. The large sign on the building in the foreground includes a picture 
of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Mayor of Beyoğlu, Ahmet Misbah Demircan, advertising the “Yeni [New] 
Tarlabaşı” project, a gentrification project aimed at “renewing” this predominantly Kurdish neighborhood. (Photo 
by the author.) 
 
 For Zana, Tarlabaşı is a safe space, where she can be Kurdish and speak the 
Kurdish language freely. She also feels safe speaking Kurdish at her university, 
because of the large number of Kurdish students who attend. The issue of Kurdish 
language rights is a very political issue in Turkey, and the importance of speaking 
Kurdish is something that has come up time and again in my conversations with my 
interlocutors. This is especially true when I ask about what makes a person 
“Kurdish.” Often, the first thing mentioned is being able to speak the Kurdish 
language. Feeling the freedom to speak Turkish out loud, in the open, in urban 
Turkey is tied to challenging the Turkish state narrative of Turkey as a nation-state 
of and for Turks. In speaking their language out loud, Zana and her Kurdish friends 
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are asserting not only their own Kurdishness, but also their right to take up space 
within Turkey. Zana expanded on this idea of taking up space through a self-
imposed project she created for herself: graffitiing Kurdish phrases on walls around 
central Istanbul. 
 
Writing Kurdish on Walls 
 Zana mentioned language first, when asked about what allows one to claim 
Kurdishness: 
Lydia: So, what makes you Kurdish? Why do you get to say, “I am Kurdish?” 
 
Zana: My language.  
 
Lydia: Your language? 
 
Zana: Language is the first thing, yes. You know, I have a lot of friends from 
Kurdistan, but some of them don’t know, and don’t want to learn, Kurmanji, 
to speak it fluently. I say to them, “You are not Kurdish! Because you can 
speak Turkish fluently, without any mistakes, but you can’t say your name in 
Kurdish, or where you are from.”  
 
Clearly, for Zana, being able to speak the Kurdish language is an important part of 
her Kurdish identity. Of course, as noted earlier, the Kurdish language is not only 
related to Kurdish identity for Zana; its use is also a political act. As, she told me, “It’s 
a political [action], because you speak your own language.” Zana takes this a step 
further by using written Kurdish as a political act as well. Zana had created a project 
for herself in which the Kurdish language and political action melded. She had 
recently started spray painting graffiti, Kurdish phrases, on walls around her 
neighborhood, Tarlabaşı, as well as other parts of the area around the Beyoğlu 
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neighborhood of Istanbul. She called this project “writing Kurdish on walls.” I asked 
her about it: 
Lydia: So, why did you start writing on walls in Kurdish? 
 
Zana: Five months ago, I saw a news story; it was about the best writing on 
walls [graffiti] in 2015. And, I looked at them and they were so funny. I loved 
them. And, I thought, “Why isn’t there any Kurdish writing on walls?” In 
Kurdistan, okay, there are a lot of people [who write on walls]; but in Turkey, 
no. Especially in Istanbul. I bought a can of spray paint, and I started to write. 
I started with a classic poem, by Renas Jiyan. And then, I saw that a lot of 
people liked it, and I am still writing. 
 
Lydia: What kinds of things do you write? 
 
Zana: I say to myself, “They won’t be so political… It will be about Kurdish 
language, Kurdish culture, and Kurdish life, whatever we have.” I follow 
special days for Kurdish people, like Newroz, like Mahabad Republic Day. I 
wrote something about these days. But I’m afraid of going to prison because 
of this… Because being a Kurdish person is dangerous, and if you are writing 
some things on the walls, and in Turkey, and in Istanbul, it can be so 
dangerous. And, you know, the Turkish government wants to find some 





Figure 6 “Ez sergovend tu bingovend” (“I am the leader of the dance circle, you are the last person in the dance 
circle”), one of the phrases in Kurdish spray painted on a wall in Istanbul by Zana, April 2013. (Photo by the 
author.) 
 
 As Zana had previously stated, being Kurdish, and speaking the Kurdish 
language, is an inherently political act. Yet, she feels so strongly about the political 
aspect of her identity, that she does something that she describes as dangerous, 
something she fears may lead to her being arrested, in order to promote the Kurdish 
language in public. And, the Turkish state had noticed her project, as evidenced by 
the fact that some of her graffiti had been painted over. In an earlier conversation 
about it, she informed me that she had spray painted a phrase on one of the main 
streets near İstiklal Caddesi, “but the municipality erased it. Mostly, I write in our 
neighborhood [Tarlabaşı]. It’s not a problem because Kurds live there. But, on the 
main street? They erased it with white paint. But, don’t worry. I will write there 
again,” she said with a giggle that bordered on mischievous. In this way, Zana is not 
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only asserting her Kurdishness but also making assertions on public space in 
Istanbul. By spray painting Kurdish phrases on wall in Istanbul, Zana is claiming 
space for herself and her language, in what has been, since 1923 and according to 
the dominant state narrative, a Turkish space. In making assertions in this space for 
herself, and by extension for Kurds more generally, she appears to be making the 
argument that Kurds have a right to see themselves in the environment of Istanbul, 
and that non-Kurds should see them there as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 Yeğen (1996) contends that Kurdish identity was constituted in social spaces, 
and that it was precisely these same social spaces that were the targets of the 
modernizing state project. In aiming to eliminate these social spaces, yet refusing to 
name them as Kurdish, the ethno-linguistically assertive Turkish state both fostered 
a feeling of Kurdish identity, or Kurdishness, and excluded the possibility of a 
Kurdish ethno-linguistic identity in the public (“Turkish”) sphere. Houston (2001) 
echoes this sentiment of Kurdishness being constructed, through spaces, as a form 
of resistance to the modern Turkish nation-building project. We see these social 
spaces of counterclaiming in Zana’s graffiti, spray-painted Kurdish phrases on the 
walls of central Istanbul, as well as in the Kurdish language classrooms of the 
university where Welat, Şervan, and their classmates learn how to read and write 
their language. Also, we see it in the seemingly complete lack of fear that Welat 
exhibited one day when speaking Kurdish in public. I was on a bus with Welat, 
traveling to a Kurdish music concert (a social space of claiming Kurdishness in its 
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own right), when he received a phone call. He answered the phone and began 
speaking to the person on the other end in Kurdish. I could sense an older 
gentleman on the other side of me tense up, yet Welat continued on for several 
minutes, seemingly not afraid at all for the entire bus to know that he is Kurdish, 
which he asserted through his use of the Kurdish language. 
 Asserting Kurdishness, for my interlocutors, is linked to ideas about language 
and being political. It is an act of defiance against the Turkish state and nearly 100 
years of state denial of their existence, their linguistic distinctiveness, and their 
demands for equal rights. Their assertions of a Kurdish ethno-linguistic identity are 
made in public spaces in Istanbul, as challenges to the dominant Turkish state 
narratives that, in the not-so-distant past, and still in some ways today, deny Kurds 




CHAPTER 5. CHALLENGING NARRATIVES OF THE ASYLUM-SEEKING PROCESS 
 I was sitting at the dining table in the kitchen of the apartment shared by 
Azad, Welat, and Robîn in the Jefferson Park neighborhood on the northwest side of 
Chicago. Azad had brought ice cream as a surprise when he came home from work, 
and the four of us were enjoying it while talking about the day. The topic of 
conversation turned to the narrative Robîn was in the process of writing for his 
asylum application. Welat began teasing him about how long he was taking to write 
his narrative, saying, “I wrote my story in just one week!” Everyone laughed. I 
turned to Azad and asked, half joking, “Does everyone apply for asylum?” “Most of 
us,” he replied. A couple of weeks later I would be asked to copy edit the final draft 
of Robîn’s narrative for submission with his other asylum application materials, and 
just a week after that I would be asked to do the same for another young man, Jîro. 
 In this chapter, I both affirm and challenge anthropological literature on 
migrants, refugees, and asylum seeking. I argue that my interlocutors, through the 
ways by which they onward migrate and apply for political asylum, are challenging 
the narrative found in the anthropological literature of what asylum-seeking “looks 
like.” To do so, I explore the onward migration experiences of those who have made 
the decision to leave the ethno-nationally assertive state in which they were raised, 
and of which they were citizens. In onward migrating, they are strategically 
pursuing a better life. In doing so, they initially migrate to the receiving country, in 
this case the United States, to pursue further education, specifically at language 
institutes. To do so, they apply for and secure student visas, in order to enroll in 
language courses after their arrival in the United States. Before migrating and after 
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arrival, they interact with members of the same ethno-linguistic group who have 
already migrated and established lives in the receiving country. In doing so, they 
engage in a system of information sharing, what I call a “hospitality network.” After 
arriving and spending some time in the host county, most of my interlocutors 
elected to apply for political asylum, on the basis of assertions of their particular 
ethno-linguistic identity. They were encouraged through the process by those who 
had already navigated the bureaucratic system of applying for political asylum. 
Through this process of migrating to the United States and applying for asylum, my 
interlocutors continue to make emphatic assertions of their Kurdishness, challenge 
Turkish state narratives, and challenge assumptions of what asylum seeking “looks 
like.” 
 In the anthropological literature, the asylum seeker is most often a tragic 
figure. The anthropological and anthropology-adjacent literature on asylum seeking 
appears to conflate “refugee” and “asylum seeker,” with an official designation of 
“refugee” as a necessary precondition for, or at minimum a concomitant condition 
to, applying for asylum (Rabben 2016; Fassin 2005, 2011; Ticktin 2006, 2011).  
Rebecca Hamlin (2021) describes a situation in which the classifications of 
“migrant” and “refugee” are set up as dichotomous categories, with migrants seen as 
economically motivated and therefore less deserving of assistance from the 
receiving country, and refugees seen as politically motivated and therefore more 
deserving of assistance, often in the form of being granted political asylum by the 
receiving country. Hamlin calls this dichotomy a “legal fiction” (5), as migrants and 
refugees do not fit neatly into these binary categories. My interlocutors certainly 
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challenge this classification system, as they have described their motivations for 
migrating to the United States as educational, economic, and political. Those who 
migrated to Chicago did so initially in pursuit of educational and economic 
opportunities, and then they elected to apply for political asylum. Hamlin (2014) has 
also highlighted that refugee status is often a prerequisite for applying for asylum in 
the United States. However, my interlocutors challenge this assumption as well, as 
they have not been officially classified as refugees. Yet, because of this supposed 
necessary precondition, the emphasis in the anthropological literature on asylum 
tends to be on refugees, fleeing imminent danger in their home country, such as war 
(e.g., Chatty 2010; Rabben 2016; Fassin 2011). Their arrival in the receiving country 
is also fraught, as they are often described as being held in detention centers, 
arrested, or even deported. Contrary to these types of depictions of asylum seekers, 
my interlocutors have exercised their agency in finding a fairly systematic way to 
migrate from an ethno-nationally assertive state to a receiving country that they 
find more welcoming and applying for asylum. My interlocutors do occasionally still 
interact with agents of the ethno-nationally assertive state from which they 
migrated and of which they are still citizens, for official purposes, such as renewing 
government identification or voting. However, their migration and asylum-seeking 
experiences do not seem to be as overwrought as those often reflected in the 




Anthropology of Asylum Seeking 
 Fraught accounts of tragic figures predominate in the anthropology of 
asylum seeking. Linda Rabben (2016) provides a wide-ranging overview of the 
history of the concepts of sanctuary and asylum around the world. By way of 
definition, Rabben asserts: 
An asylum seeker could be said to be a person who is trying to become a 
refugee. According to the UN Refugee Convention of 1951, a refugee is a 
person who “owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it” (chapter 1, article 1[2]) [9-10]. 
 
This definition links the concepts of refugee and asylum, implying that refugee 
status, or a contemporaneous argument that one is a refugee, is necessary for 
seeking asylum in a country other than the country of which one is a citizen, or in 
which one previously resided. Turning to the United States, Rabben asserts that, 
“the United States has used immigration policy to build the nation… [and] the United 
States has also sought to manage the kinds and numbers of people who could enter 
the county” (197). These attempts to manage who is and is not allowed to enter 
and/or remain in the county have resulted in a system in which “around 60 percent 
of asylum seekers in the United States never gain asylum” (Rabben 2016:198). 
Rabben further asserts that “asylum seekers face the prospect of arrest and 
detention as soon as they set foot in the United States” (198), and then goes on to 
recount several stories of asylum seekers who have been detained, arrested, and/or 
exiled, sometimes for incredibly long periods of time, during their asylum-seeking 
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processes. Rabben shares similar stories of detention, arrest, and exile in the 
Canadian, Australian, United Kingdom, and broader European contexts as well, 
seemingly implying that these types of experiences are typical for asylum seekers 
coming to these geographical areas. 
 Similar fraught accounts appear in other anthropological examinations of the 
asylum-seeking process, and the associated status of refugee. Didier Fassin (2005) 
examines the plight of asylum seekers in the Sanagate Camp, a “transit camp” (363) 
near Calais, France, who were hoping to either apply for asylum in France or 
continue on to the United Kingdom and apply for asylum there. Additionally, Fassin 
and Estelle D’Halluin (2005) and Fassin (2011) highlight the dual forms of state 
violence endured by asylum seekers: first, the physical violence done to them in 
their countries of origin, and second, the additional violence done to them by the 
host countries to which they have fled, in having to recount and prove the harm 
done to them in order apply for asylum. Miriam Ticktin (2006) points to the 
“inhumane and insalubrious conditions” (36) of detention centers in which refugees 
and asylum seekers might find themselves awaiting decisions about their cases in 
France. Ticktin (2011) also highlights the importance placed on narratives that 
foreground illness and/or victimhood in asylum applications. Both of these 
conditions, of course, center on a form of suffering and point to the ways in which 
those working with refugees and asylum seekers are implicated in these narratives. 
Wendy A. Vogt (2013) examines the experiences of migrants from Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras, many of whom are hoping to apply for asylum in the United 
States, as they cross through Mexico, where they regularly encounter multiple forms 
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of violence, including “abuse, rape, dismemberment, and death” (764) as they move 
north. Each of these accounts focuses on the experiences of asylum seekers, most of 
whom are also considered refugees, who are made to endure terrible conditions in 
spaces of transition, such as camps and detention centers. Another site that features 
prominently in anthropological accounts of asylum seeking is “the border” (e.g., 
Coutin 1995; De Genova 2002; Cabot 2013; Vogt 2013) While asylum seekers 
necessarily need to cross an internationally recognized border, to enter into another 
country, in order to apply for asylum, seeking asylum can happen beyond the 
border. Indeed, my interlocutors who had migrated to Chicago initially came under 
the auspices of student visas, in order to study English. It was only after having been 
in the United States for some time that they initiated the political asylum application 
process.  
 In this chapter, I explore how Kurdish migrants, and specifically recent 
university graduates from Turkey, navigate the United States immigration 
bureaucracy. Specifically, ways in which these migrants interact with the student 
visa and asylum-seeking processes will be considered. Additionally, I will examine 
the ways in which my interlocutors are challenging the dominant narrative in the 
literature of the asylum-seeking process. In doing so, I am answering Heath Cabot’s 
(2019) call for the anthropology of asylum seeking to move beyond “tropes of 
victimhood” (266). I agree with Cabot that it is necessary to move beyond cliché 
stories of suffering in looking at the experience of refugee and asylum seekers, 
largely because the experiences of my interlocutors do not reflect these tropes of 
victimhood. Indeed, while my interlocutors the violence of being evacuated from 
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their villages with their families as young children, and while they have endured 
ongoing othering, discrimination, and physical and political violence as Kurdish 
citizens of the ethno-nationalist Turkish state, in coming to the United States, they 
are exercising their agency. My interlocutors do have to recount the discrimination 
and violence they were subject to Turkey. This recounting is painful for them. Yet, in 
writing their narratives, I see my interlocutors engaging in an agentive process of 
committing these stories to paper and presenting them to a foreign government, and 
the United States government in particular. Indeed, my interlocutors expressed a 
certain pride in telling their stories and, as Azad put it, “unearthing the real face of 
the Turkish government.” 
 My interlocutors were part of violent displacement experiences in Turkey as 
children, during the height of the armed conflict between the PKK (or, Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party) and the Turkish State in the early 1990s. Recently, these young 
adults have found themselves displaced again, as they migrate to the United States 
for a variety of reasons, including pursuit of educational and economic 
opportunities, avoidance of mandatory military service, and escape from an 
oppressive political climate in Turkey. This chapter will examine the ways in which 
these Kurdish young adults interact with United States bureaucracy through seeking 
political asylum while staying connected to their Kurdish identity and building 
community in Chicago. My interlocutors have utilized a combination of securing 
student visas before coming to the United States and subsequently applying for 
political asylum after having been in Chicago for some time in order to ensure long-
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term residence in the United States, and as the first steps toward eventual 
naturalization and citizenship.  
 
“A Long History in Chicago” 
 I first learned of a Kurdish presence at the World’s Columbian Exposition, 
commonly referred to as the World’s Fair, held in Chicago from 1 May to 30 October 
1893, from Azad. He showed me scans of several pages from the Souvenir 
Programme of the Turkish Theater on the Midway Plaisance, an area that ran along 
59th Street in what is now the Hyde Park neighborhood on the south side of the city. 
Among the performances put on at the Turkish Theater was “The Kurdish Drama,” a 
play in three acts. Act I is described as opening on “A company of Kurds, showing 
their home life—eating, drinking, weaving stockings, spinning, amusements.” I 
asked Azad about the scanned pages. He had learned of the drama while doing some 
research to see what he could find out about Kurds in Chicago and then had a friend 
scan a copy of a book in the library collections at Northwestern University that 
contained the program and other information about the Turkish Building at the 
World’s Columbian Exposition. As we were chatting about how interesting it was 
that there were Kurds performing at the World’s Fair in Chicago over 100 years ago, 
Azad said, “This theater really means a lot to me.” It was a source of pride for him to 
know that Kurds had been in Chicago so long ago. The subject came up again a few 
times during my fieldwork with Azad and his friends. On one of these occasions, 
Azad said with a smile, “The Kurds have a long history in Chicago.” My interlocutors, 
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of course, came to Chicago under very different circumstances than these Ottoman 
subjects who came as performers to entertain visitors at the World’s Fair.  
 The Kurdish community in Chicago, at the time of my dissertation research, 
was predominantly made up of recent university graduates who attended higher 
education institutions in Istanbul or other cities in Turkey. These recent university 
graduates were overwhelmingly male. Indeed, at the time of my dissertation 
research there was only one female recent university graduate who was a member 
of the Kurdish community in Chicago. While, according to Azad, one of my 
interlocutors, the Kurdish community in Chicago began with a few migrants as early 
as the 1990s, the majority of Kurdish migrants coming to Chicago from Turkey have 
migrated since 2005. These migrants are part of a general wave of Kurdish 
migration to Europe and North America since the early 2000s.  
 Most of my interlocutors were part of violent displacement experiences as 
young children, having been impelled to flee their villages with their families during 
the height of violence between the Turkish military and PKK (or, Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party) militants in the early 1990s, when their villages were evacuated 
and, in some cases, razed. They are also among the first generation of Kurds to 
attend university in Turkey in large numbers. Indeed, most of my interlocutors were 
the first in their family to attend university, and if they were not the first, it was an 
older sibling who was. After graduating from university, they were confronted with 
high unemployment among recent university graduates in Turkey, which stood at 
over 19 percent in 2016 (Gurcan 2016). Thus, many of those who have migrated to 
Chicago have been doubly displaced, once from their villages due to threat of 
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physical violence and again from Turkey due to a lack of employment opportunities. 
In addition to seeking employment in the United States, these recent university 
graduates were also engaged in or preparing for pursuit of graduate studies in the 
United States. 
 In addition, many were eager to avoid the mandatory military service 
required of all male citizens of Turkey. Azad explained the motivation to migrate to 
Chicago in the following manner: “People searched for a refuge. I was scared 
something would happen to me if I went into the military. I knew something would 
happen to me if I stayed in Turkey. So, I was thinking, maybe go to Iraqi Kurdistan or 
the U.S. I got a visa for here, so I came here.” I asked him what he meant when he 
said that something would happen to him. He replied, “Well, I was [politically] 
active. You never know when the police might come and take you.” Azad’s 
description of his motivation to leave Turkey points to the fact that many of the 
Kurds who have migrated to Chicago in recent years have been doubly displaced, 
once from their villages due to threat of physical violence and again from Turkey 
due to the absence of employment opportunities and an oppressive political climate. 
In addition to seeking employment in the United States, these recent university 
graduates also often hope to eventually pursue graduate studies at universities in 
the U.S. They also remain politically active in Chicago. 
 As for the current Kurdish community in Chicago, the early (i.e., 1990s) 
migrants have established families and most have moved to the suburbs, though 
they remain involved in the Kurdish Cultural Center of Chicago (Navenda Kurdan a 
Chicagoyê or KCC, now known as the Kurdish Cultural Center of Illinois). The KCC 
 
 156 
was, during the time of my fieldwork, housed in a commercial rental space in the 
Jefferson Park neighborhood on the northwest side of the city. Many of the more 
recent Kurdish (i.e., since 2005) migrants to Chicago live in or near this 
neighborhood, near the KCC. Azad informed me that Turks in Chicago have dubbed 
this area of the city “Little Qandîl,” as in the Qandîl Mountains where the PKK has its 
central command. I asked him what the Kurds living there, who had no specific 
moniker for their own neighborhood, thought about Turks calling the area Little 
Qandîl. He replied that he thinks it’s good, “because the Turks know you are there.” 
In 2016, Azad informed me that there were about 10-15 families with children and a 
total number of around 200 members of the Kurdish community in the Chicagoland 
area. 
 Since coming to Chicago, Welat has continued to follow the news related to 
Kurdish issues in Turkey. He has also gotten involved in the Kurdish community in 
Chicago, serving as a Board member for the Kurdish Cultural Center of Chicago (now 
the Kurdish Cultural Center of Illinois). He has also had, as did all of my 
interlocutors, continuing interactions with the Turkish Consulate in Chicago: 
Lydia: And then, what do you think about the Turkish Consulate here? Do you 
ever have to go there? 
 
Welat: Yeah, I’ve visited them like three times. Two times it was for the 
election in Turkey. I volunteered for Kurds, the HDP [Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi, or Peoples' Democratic Party, the pro-Kurdish party in Turkey], to not 
steal their votes.  
 
Lydia: So, what did you do as a volunteer for the HDP? 
 
Welat: I was kind of like, in the election organization. I was kind of like 
müşahit, observing, and when some Kurds come there [to the Consulate to 








Lydia: So, you were there for several hours doing this? 
 
Welat: Several, almost like one month and five days. 
 








Lydia: So, you would make sure Kurds were able to vote? 
 
Welat: Yeah. And we, our friends, we organized breakfast together, and we 
went to the Consulate when we could vote for our party. 
 
Lydia: So, you voted with all of our friends? 
 
Welat: Yes. We want them, the Turkish Consulate, to know Kurds are 
everywhere. 
 
Lydia: And have you participated in any of the protests in front of the 
Consulate? 
 
Welat: Oh, yes, I did. 
 
Lydia: Yes, and? 
 
Welat: I did, kind of like, several times. I guess it was four times. No, five 
times.  
 
Lydia: Do you think it’s important to protest in front of the Consulate? 
 
Welat: Yeah, it’s important, because when something happens in Turkey, if 
we became silent, who is going to know Kurds in Turkey are in danger? 
When you protest, many people come around you and ask what is going on in 
Turkey. What’s happening to Kurds over there? And you start to inform 
them, and they go home, and they start googling the Kurdish issue in Turkey, 
the Kurdish issue in Syria. It’s kind of like, more to make people aware about 
the Kurdish issue. And, when you protest, in a western country, it’s much 
better than in Turkey, because in Turkey, the media never shows anything. 
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Even if you have, kind of like, millions of people protesting something. But, 
when you do something here, some American media, some foreign media, 
they talk about the issues. That is one of our goals here.  
 
So, as I had heard from several of my interlocutors, Welat was engaged in being 
political as a part of his daily life, in one instance committing over a month of his 
time to helping ensure that other Kurds who were citizens of the Republic of Turkey 
were able to vote in Turkish elections at the Turkish Consulate, protesting the 
Turkish state in front of the Consulate, and doing his part to continuously remind 
the Turkish state and the world of the plight of Kurds, in an effort to raise 
awareness. He also expressed that this last part, increasing awareness, was easier to 
do in the United States, because the media was more apt to cover their protests than 
the Turkish media, if the protest were to be held in Turkey. 
 
Figure 7 Members of the Kurdish community in Chicago protesting in front of the Turkish Consulate, 20 July 2016. 




 A Turkish Consulate being located in downtown Chicago, as an extension of 
the Turkish state, means that the specter of the Turkish state continues to loom in 
the lives of my interlocutors. I asked Jîro about his experiences with the Turkish 
Consulate in Chicago: 




Lydia: Yeah? Why have you had to visit the Consulate?  
 
Jîro: Well, I was at school, for summer school. It’s on Michigan Avenue 
downtown. I finished my class, and I called Azad, and I said, “Where are you?” 
He said, “We are in the Turkish Consulate.” Two of our friends were doing 
some marriage process. 
 
Lydia: Oh, like getting their marriage license, or something? 
 
Jîro: Yeah. I went there. We were sitting in the lobby. We were speaking 
Kurdish, and there was a guy, he went to the conference at Northwestern 
University. Do you remember? There were two guys from the Turkish 
Consulate? 
 
Lydia: Yes, I do remember. 
 
Jîro: Yeah, okay. We were speaking Kurdish, and he heard us, and he came to 
play a video on YouTube. There is, like, a racist song for Turks, and they say, 
“Turks are good, Turks are perfect,” something like that. In front of us. He 
played this video in front of us, I mean. 
 
Lydia: Oh, like he knew you were sitting there? 
 
Jîro: Yeah, we are Kurdish and speaking Kurdish, and they were, like, really 
angry with us, but they couldn’t tell us, and then they played a video for, 
like… 
 
Lydia: So, you could hear it? 
 
Jîro: Yeah, we could hear it. 
 




Jîro: No, we saw it and heard it. We were, like, looking at each other. Yeah, it 
was, like, really fascist, like a racist thing. Yeah, I remember that. I won’t 
forget it. 
 
Lydia: So, you’ve been there for that. Did you go there to vote? 
 
Jîro: No, not yet. I will, I think. 
 
Lydia: And then, you’ve protested in front of the Consulate, yeah? 
 
Jîro: Yeah, I protested in front of it, yeah. 
 
Lydia: Do you think it’s important to protest in front of the Consulate? 
 
Jîro: Well, yeah, sure. But it should be, like, more people.  
 
Lydia: Why do you think it’s important? 
 
Jîro: Because, if there was, like, many people, some newspaper might say, 
“Okay, there were many people, we have to write some articles, something 
about that, some news.” And many people can hear about our protest. I think, 
if we are two here, and we are yelling, and there is somebody, they cannot 
hear us, but think if there are, like, ten people, and we are yelling together, 
they can hear, like, clearly. Do you understand? 
 
 Jîro, Azad, and their friends experienced racism within the Turkish Consulate, 
at the hands of one of the consular officers who was sent to observe a conference 
that had been held at Northwestern University in November of 2016, “Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives on Kurdish Politics,” sponsored by the Keyman Program 
in Modern Turkish Studies and the Buffett Institute for Global Studies. It seems that 
facing these kinds of reactions to their Kurdishness in the United States via agents of 
the Turkish state, are tied to the feeling that protesting in front of the consulate is a 
good thing. Echoing Welat, Jîro sees joining his voice with those of his fellow Kurds 
in Chicago as a way to make their voices heard by the Turkish state, and perhaps, 
more broadly. 
 I asked Azad for more information about life as a Kurd in Chicago: 
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Azad: The Kurdish community, they are doing some good stuff, you know? 
 
Lydia: Like what? 
 
Azad: We have a Kurdish Center; we are a lucky group. And, we have some 
language courses. We have some protests, you know, when something 
happens in Kurdistan or Turkey, you know, against the Kurdish people. And 
then, at election time, we go to the Turkish Consulate to vote. Well, kind of, 
it’s an active group. Like, there are many students and young people. They 
are trying to do something. If we have some newcomers, they help each other 
to find a place to stay or get a job. They help each other. Yeah, it’s a good 
community. 
 
Lydia: It sounds like it’s supportive? 
 
Azad: Yeah, they support each other. 
 




Lydia: In what capacity? 
 
Azad: Well, I was one of the founders of the Center. At first, we decided to buy 
a place and we collected money, around $20,000. But we didn’t. We said, 
“How about first, having a rental place?” So, now we keep the same place. 
 
Lydia: How long has the actual Center been there? 
 
Azad: It was established, I think, in 2013. Yeah, I taught Kurdish language for 
a while. And then, I helped some Kurdish students who came to Chicago, if 
they needed a place, or job, we tried to help them. And, we have tried to have 
some connection with some universities. The University of Chicago, 
Northwestern. And then, we have had a few events at the University of 
Chicago, you know, like a movie. Yeah, we watched a Kurdish movie there. It 
was really nice. And then, at Northwestern, they have some events on Turkey 
or the Middle East, and we join these events. 
 
 Azad and the other members of the Kurdish community in Chicago were 
proud of having a physical location where they could meet and host community 
events. In addition to the Kurdish classes that Azad taught, the Center hosted Iftar 
dinners during Ramadan, Eid celebrations, lectures, and for a few months, book club 
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discussions. They had a small kitchen, where tea could be prepared, a small library 
of books donated by members of the community, and a ping-pong table. It also 
served as a space for community support, including assisting newer community 
members with navigating immigration and asylum processes. 
 
Securing a Student Visa 
 The generation of Kurds of which my interlocutors are a part, is the first to 
have attended university in Turkey in large numbers. They were afforded 
educational opportunities that were not available to their parents and grandparents. 
Most have expressed the realization and/or development of their Kurdishness, their 
ethno-linguistic identity as Kurds, within the context of education. Most also came to 
the U.S. initially to pursue education, on student visas, primarily to study English at 
specialized institutes. This student status provided the opportunity to come to the 
U.S., and then once in the U.S., they were able to use the realities of what it means to 
be a Kurd in Turkey to apply for political asylum. Several had ambitions to pursue 
graduate studies of one sort or another at universities in the U.S. Earning a graduate 
degree would, of course, bring with it increased social capital.  
 My interlocutors seem to be using their student status in a flexible way. They 
see applying for a student visa as what they see to be the easiest way to gain entry to 
the U.S., and those already in Chicago counsel those in Turkey who are thinking 
about coming to the U.S. to apply to English language institutes in order to get the 
necessary paperwork to apply for a student visa (F-1).  Once in the U.S., they are 
then able to apply for asylum. Yet, many also do actually hope to continue their 
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educations, through attending graduate degree programs in the United States, and 
most have done so. In going through this process, they transition from student to 
non-student, to student as needed to navigate the system and pursue their goals of 
asylum, citizenship, and graduate education.  
 Azad was the first member of the Kurdish community in Chicago I 
encountered. I reached out to him in the fall of 2012, after learning about the 
Kurdish Cultural Center of Chicago, to ask if I could visit the Center during my next 
trip to the city. He agreed. A few months later, I found myself sitting with Azad and 
four other men, talking about Kurdish issues over tea. Azad became an important 
gatekeeper, providing me with my first contact in Turkey, Welat, and facilitating 
introductions to other members of the Kurdish community in Chicago as I began my 
research in the city. 
 Azad was born in a village in the province of Mardin. His family was 
evacuated from their village in 1993, due to the conflict between the PKK and the 
Turkish state. They initially moved to the town of Dargeçit, also in Mardin Province, 
and from there to Istanbul in 2001. Azad then came to the United States in 2010 
through the Summer Work and Travel Exchange Program, a program sponsored by 
the United States Department of State that provides an opportunity for university 
students from other countries to come to the United States to live and work for one 
to three months (USDOS n.d.a), through which he spent several months working in 
the fish industry in Alaska. When he subsequently moved to Chicago, he had a 
student visa. I asked him about how his immigration status had changed over time 
and his experience migrating to the United States and applying for asylum: 
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Lydia: So, how has your immigration status changed since you first came to 
the U.S.? 
 
Azad: When I came to Chicago, I attended an ESL school, and I had an F-1 
visa. And then, after that, I applied for asylum. 
 
Lydia: Political asylum? 
 
Azad: Yeah, political asylum. After, I got a green card. 
  
 As I spent time with my interlocutors, I became aware that most were using a 
particular method of initially migrating to the United States. Specifically, they had 
applied for F-1 student visas while still in Turkey, in order to continue their 
educations by attending one of several English language educational institutions in 
Chicago. The F-1 student visa is the visa required for non-United States citizens to 
come to the United States to attend one of the following types of institutions: 
university or college, high school, private elementary school, seminary, 
conservatory, or “another academic institution, including a language training 
program” (USDOS n.d.b).  It is a nonimmigrant visa, meaning the person acquiring 
the visa must attest that they do not intend to stay in the United States beyond the 
length of their program of study. The institution the student plans to attend must be 
approved by the Department of State’s Student and Exchange Visitor Program 
(SEVP). The student visa application process is somewhat complicated and involves, 
by my count, seven steps (for a concise list of these steps, see the Appendix).  
 This complex process is what each of my interlocutors in Chicago had gone 
through to come to the United States initially, in order to attend English language 
classes at an institute in Chicago. All the steps and fees that must be carefully 
navigated in order to procure a student visa recall anthropological discussions of 
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bureaucratic documents (Hull 2012), and what they reveal about the rules and 
knowledge required to successfully navigate the process. This points to the 
necessity of what I have come the “Kurdish Hospitality Network,” or the system by 
which Kurds who have been in Chicago for some time assist those who are planning 
to migrate to the city or are newly arrived, which I discuss in more detail later in 
this chapter. Those recent university graduates who are planning to migrate to the 
United States often reach out to the Kurdish Cultural Center of Chicago (now the 
Kurdish Cultural Center of Illinois). for guidance. It is at this point that they are 
encouraged to apply to one of several institutes in Chicago that offer English as a 
foreign language course, and then subsequently apply for a student visa to come to 
the United States. Assistance with completing the necessary forms is also provided. 
In this way, those who have already migrated are able to share the knowledge they 
gained through their successful navigation of the process in order to assist other 
members of their community. These potential migrants are sometimes known to 
members of the community in Chicago, either directly or in a sort of “friend of a 
friend” way. This is how Welat came to migrate to Chicago. He was an acquaintance 
of Azad, as their families had lived in the same neighborhood in Istanbul. 
 After graduating from Bilgi University in Istanbul with a degree in political 
science, Welat had some difficulty finding a job. He told me, 
Now, when you go to apply for some work, they ask you, “Where are you 
from?” You say, “I am from Mardin,” and they say, “Are you a terrorist?” or 
“Why do you want this job?” They ask you these questions. When we take 
Kurdish classes, it goes on our record. When we apply for a job at a 
nationalist company, their faces can really change when they see that, and I 




 Welat’s account of what it is like to look for a job in Turkey as a Kurd is 
striking. A person’s birthplace was printed on the front of their Turkish state 
identity card, what is often referred to in everyday conversation in Turkey as a 
person’s memleket (most commonly translated into English as “hometown,” it also 
implies a familial place of origin). On the reverse was printed the province (il), 
district (ilçe), and neighborhood (mahalle) or village (köy), under the heading of 
“registry” (kayıtlı olduğu), providing more detailed information about a person’s 
place of origin. When applying for a job in Turkey, it is common for there to be a 
place of origin question on the job application. Additionally, it is routine for an 
applicant to provide a copy of their identity card with their application materials. 
Either of these instances of sharing his memleket, or a verbal question asked during 
the actual interview could have been to what Welat was referring when he 
mentioned questions about where he is from being problematic during the job 
application process. According to Welat, being from a memleket in the southeastern, 
Kurdish-majority region of Turkey can lead to suspicion on the part of interviewers, 
echoing the territorially based minoritization of Kurds described by Klein (2020).  
 Welat’s description of the memleket question recalled for me the discussion 
of “immersive invisibility” among Palestinians living in Tel Aviv described by 
Andreas Hackl (2018). Hackl describes a tactic used by educated middle class (or 
upwardly mobile) Palestinians living in Israel, in which they elect to minimize their 
Palestinian identities in order to better fit in with work colleagues. Of course, for 
Welat, being asked about his memleket makes any form of immersive invisibility 
impossible for him, as his answer immediately marks him as “other.” However, my 
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interlocutors, rather than striving for invisibility, are actually actively engaged in 
making their Kurdishness more visible. This is seen in Zana’s graffiti project, in 
Welat answering the phone loudly in Kurdish on a crowded bus in the middle of 
Istanbul, and in my interlocutors in Chicago protesting in front of the Turkish 
Consulate. Yet, more visibility also has the potential to bring more retaliation. 
 Welat also described being asked if he is a terrorist by potential employers, 
based on his response to the memleket question. This is an additional example of 
how the state narrative of Kurds as terrorists discussed in the previous chapter 
plays out in the lives of my interlocutors. This form of discrimination made an 
already difficult job market even more difficult to navigate for Welat and other 
Kurdish recent university graduates in Turkey.  Additionally, Welat clearly felt that 
the fact that he had taken three Kurdish language classes while attending university 
that were listed on his transcript, which he might also have to provide to potential 
employers, led to his being discriminated against as a jobseeker. It was a cruel irony 
that the classrooms in which he felt free to explore and express his Kurdishness 
resulted in a marker of identity, a marker of otherness, that set him apart as an 
“undesirable” applicant in the eyes of potential employers. Implicated in Welat’s 
frustration with the job search process is the various bureaucratic documents that 
serve to other him and his Kurdish contemporaries: the job application and identity 
card that reveal his memleket, and the university transcript that reveals the Kurdish 
language courses he took as a student. The difficult job market, coupled with 
ongoing discrimination, left Welat looking for alternatives. Ultimately, this led him 
to the United States. I asked him about his decision to move to Chicago: 
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Lydia: When did you come to Chicago? 
 
Welat: Well, I came here in 2014. 
 
Lydia: Why did you come? 
 
Welat: First of all, in Turkey I didn’t have too much practice in English. I came 
here to improve my English. One reason is that the circumstances in Turkey 
at that time were seriously problematic for Kurds. They started to arrest 
Kurdish students, academicians, politicians. That’s why I want to come to the 
United States. 
 
Welat is describing the government crackdown the occurred in Turkey in the wake 
what were commonly known as the “Gezi Park Protests,” a series of anti-
government protests that began in Istanbul after the government announced plans 
to raze Gezi Park, next to Taksim Square in central Istanbul, in order to rebuild the 
Ottoman-era military barracks that had stood on the site, prior to creation of the 
park (Walton 2015). The protests were met with a swift and particularly violent 
show of state force (Babul 2017) that resulted in an ongoing crackdown on any 
activity seen as potentially threatening to the Turkish state. This show of force was 
also quite public, as it was broadcast on various news and social media channels 
around the world. The crackdown in response to the Gezi Park protests resulted in 
numerous stories of academics, students, and activists being arrested. These stories, 
and heightened security measures on the part of the Turkish state continued 
throughout the mid-2010s. I encountered the security apparatus of the Turkish 
state on several occasions during my fieldwork.  
 One day in April of 2016, I met up with Zana and her friend Rohat after my 
Kurdish class. We went to a bakery to pick up some treats, then went to a small park 
overlooking the Bosporus to enjoy our treats and chat.  From the park, we went to 
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DEPO, a small art gallery in the Tophane neighborhood, just down the hill from 
İstiklal Caddesi, to see their newest exhibitions. When we were done at DEPO, we 
decided to head toward Taksim Square, and started climbing the hill toward İstiklal. 
 As we came out onto Istiklal, we could hear protestors chanting to our left, 
near the Tünel entrance. We turned right, to head toward Taksim Square. As we 
walked, we found ourselves approaching a group of police officers, holding riot 
shields, in the middle of Istiklal, with a Toma (i.e., an armored water cannon vehicle) 
to one side. All of a sudden, the police spread completely across the street, shoulder 
to shoulder, holding their overlapping shields in front of them, and the Toma backed 
up to be in line with them. Zana quickly led us to the far left of the line of police, 
opposite the Toma, and we scurried past the police, through a narrow opening 
between the last police officer in line and the building. After we got past them, I 
turned to Zana, “Do you know what they are protesting.” “Yes, I do,” she replied, 
“You know secularism? They are protesting because of that.” I asked, “Because of the 
politician who said secularism should be removed from the constitution?” “Yes.” A 
little later, I asked, “Just to clarify, they are protesting in favor of secularism?” “Yes,” 
Zana answered, “they are members of the CHP" (the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or 
Republican People’s Party, the Kemalist political party in Turkey).  
 Another example of increased state security in Istanbul came at the end of 
April, as I was preparing to return to Chicago. I was walking to Taksim Square, with 
Zana, and noticed hundreds of portable fencing sections stacked up against the side 
of a building adjacent to the square, in an area where I would normally expect to see 
a row of flower vendors’ tents set up. I asked Zana what the fence sections were for, 
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and she informed me that they were there in anticipation of May Day protests. This 
display of the ubiquitous security apparatus of the state (Ochs 2011) was 
undoubtedly the continuation of the heightened security efforts of the Turkish state 
to curtail or silence those seen as politically other that began with Gezi, as those 
likely to participate in May Day protests were also likely to have participated in the 
Gezi Park protests (i.e., younger, more liberal, leftist factions of the populace). I raise 
these events here, to further elucidate the climate in Turkey in the mid-2010s that 
contributed to Welat deciding to migrate to Chicago. 
 
Figure 8 Anticipating May Day Protests, Taksim Square, Istanbul. (Photo by the author.) 
 
 Welat first came to the United States on a student visa, to study English at an 
English language institute. I asked him about his visa status: 







Lydia: You had a student visa? 
 
Welat: Yeah, I had a student visa, an F-1. Later, I changed my visa. Now, I am 
not a student. 
 
Lydia: You don’t have a student visa anymore? 
 
Welat: Yeah. I have a different status, I guess. 
 




As many of his friends had, Welat had first come to the United States on a student 
visa, and then subsequently applied for asylum. After spending some time in the U.S. 
and taking several English language classes, Welat began the political asylum 
application process. An Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services form I-589, can only be submitted after a 
person has arrived in the United States, and must be filed within one year of arriving 
in the United States I asked Welat about his process of applying for asylum: 
Lydia: Have you gotten your green card yet? 
 
Welat: No, I don’t have it yet. 
 
Lydia: You’re still waiting? 
 
Welat: I didn’t have any interview. It’s almost been like two years, nobody 
has called me, nobody sent any letter about my issues. It’s getting, kind of 
like, sometimes, I feel, why am I here? It’s getting really depressing about that 
issue. 
 
Lydia: Yeah, did they give you work authorization already, and a social 
security number? 
 
Welat: Yeah, they already gave me the social security, and I got my work 
authorization. And, I have all the identification, city identification, driver’s 
license, but the only thing is, you know, not knowing what is going to happen 
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in my future in this country, because it’s getting, kind of like, too much time 
you are waiting, and that makes you uncomfortable. 
 
Lydia: Right. So, how long were you here before you applied for asylum? 
 
Welat: It was almost, like, seven months.  
 
Lydia: Okay, so you waited awhile. When did you come in 2014? Early in 
2014, right? 
 
Welat: In 2014, yeah. February. 
 
So, at the point of this interview with Welat, he had been in Chicago about 2 years 
and 10 months. While he had been given a social security number and granted work 
authorization, meaning he could legally work in the United States, he was clearly 
exasperated by the fact that there was little communication about his case and the 
length of time he had been waiting to progress through the process of the political 
asylum application process. 
 After arriving in the United States and taking several English language 
classes, my interlocutors would then begin the political asylum application process. 
In order to be eligible to apply for political asylum in the United States, two 
conditions must be met. The applicant must: 
Be physically present in the United States (it doesn’t matter how you arrived) 
for less than one year from the date of your last arrival, unless you can show 
that you qualify for an exception to this requirement; and  
Demonstrate that you were persecuted or that you are afraid you might be 
persecuted because of your race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership in a particular group. [USCIS 2020] 
 
As presence in the United States is a prerequisite for applying for asylum, these 
young men had needed to find a way to come to the United States initially. The way 
through which they chose to do this was by furthering their educations, learning 
English (or improving their English language skills), and securing student visas to 
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do so. After arriving in the United States and taking English languages classes at an 
institution in Chicago, my interlocutors would then begin the asylum application 
process. This involved completing form I-589, a 12-page form, and writing a 
narrative describing the conditions of their lives in Turkey and an explanation of 
their fear of persecution if they were to return. 
 As I was conducting my fieldwork, I was asked on two occasions to help copy 
edit asylum applications. In July of 2016, I was asked to look over Jîro’s application. 
At the time, Jîro was 25. Originally from a village in the province of Muş, his family 
had migrated to Istanbul in 2007. He was a 2014 graduate of Dicle University, in 
Diyarbakır, and had worked as a photojournalist and for aid organizations in 
Istanbul before coming to Chicago in November of 2015 (so, eight months prior to 
when he was preparing his asylum application). His narrative is illustrative of the 
types of information my interlocutors choose to include in their asylum 
applications: 
In 2015, I was working as a volunteer for aid associations [in Istanbul]. We 
were gathering money in order to help the Kurds of Syria. With the aim of 
bettering myself, I went to some conferences and read a lot of books.  
Sometimes, I would call my school friends, but they would not answer the 
phone. I asked their families about them, but they also did not know where 
their children were. As for my journalist friends, they were taken into 
custody. Some of them were disappeared; we did not receive any news from 
them. I was constantly followed. In September 2015, on my way home, two 
people followed me. I noticed they were moving closer to me and I got 
scared, so I ran away. They caught me in a dark [alley] and started to beat me 
and swore at me, saying, “Dirty Kurd!” Some nearby people heard my voice 
and rescued me; otherwise, they would have killed me. When I got back 
home, my family saw me drenched in blood. We understood that Istanbul 
was not safe for me, so I would move to Muş. When I arrived in Muş, I found 
that a lot of the residents had migrated to other locations in Turkey. Kurds 
who were still living in Muş were threatened with death. There were dead 
bodies in the middle of the streets. Muş was also unlivable. As a result of that, 




Jîro’s narrative tells of his life in Turkey, his attempts to move from one city to 
another to ameliorate his situation, and his ultimate realization that not just 
Istanbul or Muş, but all of Turkey was not safe for him. His narrative contained other 
similar stories of violence at the hands of both Turkish citizens and agents of the 
Turkish state. So, as he describes, he decided to leave Turkey and come to the U.S. to 
seek safety. When I interviewed Jîro in December of 2016, he was still waiting for 
his social security number and work authorization, the next step in the process. 
Being granted a social security number and work authorization means that one can 
legally work and remain in the U.S. while awaiting an asylum interview. Jîro 
received his social security number and work authorization in February of 2017 and 
is currently waiting for his asylum interview.  
 Concerns about safety were also raised by Serhad, when I was asking him 
about his experience migrating to Chicago. Serhad initially came to the United States 
in 2012 for three months, for a work and study program, after which he returned to 
Turkey. He moved to Chicago on 25 November 2014. He found members of the 
Kurdish community in Chicago via Facebook and contacted them before arriving. In 
a familiar story, Serhad had initially come to the United States on a student visa, and 
subsequently applied for political asylum. He received his social security number 
and work authorization about one year after he submitted his asylum application. 
 I asked Serhad what life was like for him, as a Kurd in Chicago: 
When you’re in Turkey, you know, people are against you, they don’t like you, they 
stare at you. I mean, this is what I felt like, especially before I moved here. My last 
few months, it was a nightmare. Seriously, I didn’t want to take the bus, I didn’t want 
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to talk to people. Because, when you talk, they approach you like they don’t like you, 
you know? So, you’re just aware of that. On the bus, they know you’re Kurdish. You 
don’t want to speak, like, Kurdish on the phone. You don’t want to talk about 
anything. So, it was terrible. Here, there’s, like, more freedom, you know? People 
don’t care what you are, who you are. It’s nice. You can just talk on the phone on the 
train, I mean, in Kurdish. Here, there’s more freedom. It’s better.  
 
Serhad expressed similar concerns about his safety in Turkey as others of my 
interlocutors, particularly if he were to assert his Kurdishness out loud. However, he 
also made a point of expressing his feelings of relative freedom in the United States 
to be Kurdish and to speak Kurdish in public. 
 Azad, Robîn, Jîro, Serhad, and the other recent university graduates who have 
migrated from Turkey to Chicago have all employed a similar method of coming to 
the United States as students, with student visas in hand, so that they could continue 
their educations by taking English language courses. Subsequently, after some time 
in the United States, they then made the decision to apply for political asylum. They 
were counseled through the process by one of their peers who has already 
successfully navigated the United States immigration bureaucracy. They are going 
through the process together, as all of my interlocutors were at various stages in the 
lengthy process. In addition to their Kurdishness, their shared hopes and dreams for 
an eventual Kurdish state, and their continued involvement in political issues they 
see as tied to their Kurdishness (such as voting in elections in Turkey and protesting 
in front of the Turkish Consulate in Chicago), the experience of going through the 
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political asylum application process together seems to strengthen the bonds 
between these young men and further contribute to their feelings of community. 
This feeling of community, in Chicago, and further afield in the U.S., is fostered by 
what I like to call the Kurdish Hospitality Network. 
 
The Kurdish Hospitality Network  
 I was sitting at the dining table in a three-bedroom apartment in the 
Jefferson Park neighborhood on the northwest side of Chicago that served as a de 
facto social hub for young adult Kurds in the city. Also at the table were Serhad, 
Heval, Welat, and Welat’s Chinese American girlfriend, Mei. We were all drinking tea 
and talking. The guys were explaining to Mei how the area they call Kurdistan had 
been divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria by international borders at the end 
of World War I. At one point, Serhad exclaimed, “I hate borders! We are Kurdish, we 
ignore borders.” This statement highlights the experience of Kurds as members of 
what has been described as the world’s largest nation without a state. These young 
adult Kurds, living far from their homeland, in Chicago, transcend borders to stay 
connected to the friends and family they left behind, to stay involved in the political 
process of Turkey, and to share their hopes and ideas for the future of Kurdistan.  
 The majority of members of the Kurdish community in Chicago have 
migrated since 2005, though a few Kurds migrated to Chicago in the 1990s. These 
early migrants have established families, and most have moved to the suburbs, 
though they remain involved in the Chicago Kurdish Cultural Center (KCC, now 
known as the Kurdish Cultural Center of Illinois), as it was known while I was 
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conducting fieldwork. The name of the center has since been changed to the Kurdish 
Cultural Center of Illinois. The KCC was housed in the Jefferson Park neighborhood 
on the northwest side of the city. The more recent group of Kurdish migrants to 
Chicago is part of a general wave of Kurds migrating to the U.S. and Europe from 
Turkey, beginning in the early 2000s.  
 There are, as might be expected, social connections between these Kurds 
who have migrated and the Kurdish friends and family members they left behind in 
Turkey. Most of the Kurds in Chicago are recent university graduates who came 
from Turkey in search of employment opportunities and/or further education. Most 
of these recent university graduates attended universities in Istanbul. I managed to 
sort of follow one of them, Welat, as he transitioned from university student in 
Istanbul to migrant in Chicago. I first met Welat during preliminary fieldwork in 
Istanbul in May of 2013. At the time, he was preparing to graduate in June of that 
year, and was taking one final Kurdish language class. His university was one of 
three in Istanbul that offered Kurdish language classes as electives at the time. After 
graduating, he attempted to find a job in Turkey, to no avail. He expressed at one 
point that having Kurdish language classes listed on his university transcript might 
have been hindering his job search. He told me, “When we take Kurdish classes, it 
goes on our records. When we apply for a job at a nationalist company, their faces 
can really change when they see that [Kurdish courses on the transcript]. I took 
three classes.” The implication being that explaining away three Kurdish classes on 
his academic record would be more difficult than a single class. So, faced with a 
difficult job market, and the added difficulty of having Kurdish courses on his 
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academic record, Welat began the arduous processes of procuring both a Turkish 
passport and a student visa to come to the United States as an English language 
student. Turkish passports are notoriously expensive, as I was told by multiple 
people I talked with in Turkey and Chicago.6 In addition to the fees, Azad told me 
that a background check is part of the application process, which adds an extra layer 
of complexity, and potentially difficulty, to the passport procurement process for my 
politically engaged interlocutors. As he was getting things in order to come to the 
U.S., Welat got in touch with his friend, Azad, from the neighborhood in Istanbul 
where both of their families now live. Azad arranged for Welat to move into an 
empty bedroom in the three-bedroom apartment where he lived in Jefferson Park 
with Heval. This was one of the first instances of a phenomenon I have taken to 
affectionately calling the “Kurdish Hospitality Network” that seems to highlight how 
functioning in a global social space works in the everyday lives of these young adult 
Kurds. 
                                                        
6 In 2016, the total cost for passport application and passport book fees in Turkey were as follows: 1-
year passport = 250.80 Turkish Lira (TL); 2-year passport = 355.90TL; 3-year passport = 465.80TL; 
10-year passport = 620.60 (Milliyet 2015). In U.S. dollars, these fees were roughly equivalent to 
$85.52, $119.94, $156.97, and $209.14, respectively. In 2016, the annual household income per 




Figure 9 The physical space of the Kurdish Cultural Center of Chicago served multiple purposes for the local Kurdish 
community. (Photo by the author.) 
 
 Welcoming new Kurdish migrants to Chicago is one of the functions of the 
KCC. This typically involves assistance with applying for a visa to come to the U.S. 
(often as an English language student at one of several educational institutions in 
Chicago), help finding temporary and/or long-term housing, assistance finding a job, 
driving lessons, gifts of household and other goods, assistance with navigating 
United States immigration bureaucracy, etc. Frequently, short- and long-term 
housing were provided by Azad and his roommates during the time I was 
conducting fieldwork. When I first arrived in Chicago to begin my year of 
dissertation research in January of 2016, Azad, Welat, and Heval were providing 
temporary housing for two other young men who were sharing the living room as a 
bedroom. One was in need of new housing as his previous roommate had recently 
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gotten married; the other was a recent arrival to Chicago. Azad joked that the living 
room had been converted into a “refugee camp.” The two men staying in the living 
room, Serhad and Wedat, were in the process of looking for an apartment that they 
planned to share with, Jîro, another Kurd who was, at the time, living at an Islamic 
center in the city that offers housing. Within about a week of my arrival in Chicago, 
they were actively on the hunt for an apartment. 
 
Figure 10 A typical breakfast spread in the apartment shared by Azad, Welat, and various other recent migrants in 
the Jefferson Park neighborhood on the north side of Chicago. (Photo by the author.) 
 
 One day, after having breakfast with Azad and his roommates, I was getting 
ready to leave the apartment. Serhad asked, "Are you coming with us?" He, Wedat, 
and Jîro were about to leave to look at an apartment. "Oh, yeah, we can all go," Azad 
said, "That way we don't need to use two cars." So, the five of us piled into one car 
and went to meet the property manager at the apartment. It was a third-floor walk-
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up. A three-bedroom apartment with a nice sized kitchen and decent light, even on 
the grey January afternoon. They quickly decided they were interested. The 
property manager passed out applications and employment verification forms. "We 
need your employment information and social security number. We will do a credit 
check,” she said. At this point, I noticed what seemed to be worry on the guys’ faces. 
Serhad gestured to the other two and said, "They are students, do you take I-20?" 
The property manager didn't know what this was. Jîro pulled his out to show her. 
She said she didn't understand, and that she would prefer a bank statement as proof 
that they had enough money to pay rent.  Each of them needed to fill out an 
application. Azad handed Jîro his car keys and asked him to go down and get his 
backpack. He started to fill out one of the applications. Confused, I turned to Azad 
and quietly asked what he was doing. Azad replied, "He doesn't have money.” It 
became clear that Azad was filling out the application on Jîro's behalf. Having been 
in Chicago for over three years and having permeant resident status, Azad knew he 
would have no problems with the credit check. Thus, he was using his status in 
order to help another member of his community secure housing. 
 The Kurdish Hospitality Network not only operates to help new Kurdish 
migrants with their arrival in Chicago. It also serves as a resource for Kurds from 
Chicago who might find the need to travel for one reason or another. For example, 
Azad had, after several years in the U.S., finally decided to pursue his goal of earning 
a doctoral degree in history. He had applied to eight schools and was accepted by 
two. He decided to visit the school he was leaning toward attending. At first, he was 
going to drive to the school with Serhad for a quick one- or two-night visit. However, 
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at the suggestion of another friend, Ronî, the three men decided to take a road trip 
together. The trip was about a week and a half long. Azad, Serhad, and Ronî were 
able to utilize the Kurdish Hospitality Network at several points along the way to 
find free places to stay with other Kurds. Shortly after starting his doctoral program 
in the fall of 2016, Azad got a call through the Kurdish Hospitality Network, from a 
friend of a friend he had never met before. This fellow graduate student wanted to 
spend some time using some of the library resources at Azad’s university. Azad 
hosted him for two nights. 
 It is clear that life for these young adult Kurds, in Istanbul and Chicago, is 
being lived in a global social space. The unboundedness of their social space leads to 
flexibility in negotiating and moving through this space. One way this plays out in 
the everyday lives of the young adult Kurds with whom I have been conducting my 
research is through their utilization of what I call the Kurdish Hospitality Network. A 
key component of this network, in the context of Chicago, is assisting more recent 
members of the community with the political asylum application process, a process 
that is steeped in the history of the U.S. immigration system more broadly. They 
assist each other with navigating the U.S. asylum process, a complicated 
bureaucratic system that, while it holds out the promise of hospitality, is inherently 
inhospitable in its complexity. 
 
Historical Context of United States Immigration 
 The history of United States immigration bureaucracy is punctuated by 
racialized policies aimed at various specific populations of immigrants over the 
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course of U.S. history. These policies have often been justified as necessary for the 
protection of the U.S. and its citizens, usually under the guise of preventing crime or 
protecting the economic interests of the United States. Kanstroom (2007) points to 
the ways in which the immigration system has and continues to be racialized, from 
shifting concepts of “whiteness,” to specifically targeting certain populations (e.g., 
Acadians, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans) for deportation. These changes can alter the 
category into which the government places individuals. As Kanstroom puts it, 
different groups can be “transformed into aliens” (45) by the way in which the 
government views different groups as “acceptable” or “unacceptable” immigrants. 
Those classified as “unacceptable” have, of course, changed in response to migration 
patterns to the U.S., as evidenced by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Japanese 
internment during World War II, and the “Operation Wetback” program aimed at 
deporting Mexican laborers. Since the events of September 11, 2001, and the 
ensuing “War on Terror,” the U.S. has focused much attention on how to deal with 
migration from the Middle East. (Razack 2008) This reached a critical point in early 
2017, when President Trump announced the immediate implementation of 
Executive Order 13769, which included suspension of immigration from seven 
Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, and Yemen), what has come to be known as the “Muslim ban.” It was within 
the political climate that culminated in this attempt at a wholesale ban of people 
from certain Muslim-majority countries that I was communicating with my 
interlocutors about their own experiences migrating to the city of Chicago. 
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All but one of my interlocutors during fieldwork in Chicago had applied for or were 
in the process of applying for political asylum.7 The law that governs asylum is Title 
8 US Code §1158, which states: “Any alien who is physically present in the United 
States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of 
arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been 
interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s 
status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section.” It goes on to assert 
that “the burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the applicant is a 
refugee.… To establish that the applicant is a refugee… the applicant must establish 
that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant” (8 
USC 1158). To apply for asylum, an individual must complete form I-589, the 
“Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal,” provided by US Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS). I-589 is a 12-page application with 14 pages of 
instructions. 
 The process of applying for asylum is lengthy and can be complicated 
(Rabben 2016). Over the course of my fieldwork, I witnessed my interlocutors 
discussing the process, offering each other advice, and working together to finalize 
applications. I was asked on a couple of occasions to assist with editing the narrative 
                                                        
7 The one exception had been issued a Diversity Immigrant Visa through a program widely known as 
the “green card lottery.” According to the US Citizenship and Immigration Services website, “The 
Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV Program) makes up to 50,000 immigrant visas available 
annually, drawn from random selection among all entries to individuals who are from countries with 
low rates of immigration to the United States” (https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/diversity-visa : 
accessed 15 January 2019). 
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accounts of their previous lives in Turkey, and the persecution they suffered there, 
as these narratives were key components of their applications. After applying for 
asylum, there were four milestone moments, involving a change in status and 
additional U.S. government documentation (and often, additional applications and 
fees) in the process: first, being granted work authorization and a social security 
number, meaning the applicant could legally work in the U.S.; second, being granted 
asylum; third, being granted permanent resident status (also known as a “green 
card”), for which the individual could apply one year after being granted asylum; 
and, forth, if desired, and only after four years had passed since being granted 
permanent resident status, naturalization (i.e., citizenship). I now turn to the stories 
of two of my interlocutors, Azad and Hevel, to shed light on the process.  
 
Examples of the Asylum-Seeking Process in the United States 
 The following accounts, in which Heval and Azad describe their onward 
migration and asylum-seeking experiences, serve as examples of the ways in which 
my interlocutors came to the United States and navigated the asylum application 
process. These two men have had different experiences with the United States 
immigration bureaucracy, yet they both demonstrate how my interlocutors are 
using their agency and challenging the dominant narrative found in the 
anthropological literature on asylum-seeking. Far from being tragic figures, they are 





 Heval’s Story 
 I first met Heval shortly after he arrived in Chicago, from Atlanta, where he 
had been living for several months with a friend who had moved there in 2006. 
After arriving in Chicago, he moved in with Azad and was in the process of getting 
his paperwork together to apply for political asylum. Heval grew up in Suruç, a town 
in Şanlıurfa Province, in the southeastern Turkey. He went to Balıkesir, in western 
Turkey, for high school and then began his undergraduate studies at Dicle 
University in Diyarbakır, where he studied archaeology for two years before 
transferring to Ankara University, where he graduated with a degree in journalism. 
When asked about why he transferred universities, he said, “I had a problem with 
the Turkish police and other officials. They threatened me, and I had to leave… I was 
working for, I mean, as a volunteer, we were protesting the Turkish government 
because of their Kurdish policies. We were protesting and sometimes we would 
gather and discuss Kurdish issues, and that’s why I had a problem with [the police].” 
Before leaving Turkey Heval had been studying for a master’s degree in political 
science at Ankara University and working as a journalist. In April 2013, just two 
months shy of his anticipated graduation from his master’s program, Heval migrated 
to the U.S. I asked him about this: 
Lydia: Why did you leave so close to being finished with your master’s? 
 
Heval: I had a case in Turkish court, you know. 
 
Lydia: So, were you arrested? 
 
Heval: I was arrested. I stayed in jail three months, when I was in Ankara, and 
my case kept going, you know. They sentenced me to seven years and two 
months, but my attorney appealed to the high court… One day, I was sitting 
with my attorney, and I was saying, “What’s going on? What’s gonna 
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happen?” And he said, “Hey, Heval, let me be honest with you, you should go 
to another country if you don’t want to go to jail. You should leave. I guess, 
the higher court is going to accept your sentence, and I recommend, you…” 
 
Lydia: Just go? 
 
Heval: Yeah, and that’s why, I mean, in two weeks I applied to the American 
Embassy, and I got my visa. That’s why I didn’t finish. 
 
Lydia: Ah. So, what were you arrested for? 
 
Heval: I mean, I was detained many times. [laughs] 
 
Lydia: For all this protesting? 
 
Heval: Yeah. For example, I was protesting, I mean, you know there was an 




Heval: Yeah, I attended his funeral and that’s why, for example, I was 
detained. 
 
Lydia: You were detained at his funeral? 
 
Heval: Yeah, and the Turkish police questioned me, “Hey, are you an 
Armenian? Why did you go there?” I mean, like these stupid questions. And, 
as I said, I was detained many times, but I was jailed one time when I was in 
Ankara, and I stayed three months in jail, and then they released me, but my 
case kept going, you know. 
 
Lydia: So, this time, when was it? 
 
Heval: Let me remember the exact date... I just, I think I just graduated from 
university like two, three months earlier, and then they detained me and put 
me in jail. It was 2007… 
 
Lydia: Oh, 2007? Oh, so you had been out of, you had been released a long 




Lydia: Wow, that’s a long time. That’s like five years, six years. 
 




Lydia: Okay. So, what did you do to be detained? 
 
Heval: As I said, I went to Ankara University in 2003, and in 2007 I 
graduated, and they asked me about when I was in Ankara, they questioned 
me about [the period] between 2003 and 2007, when I was a student, and all 
my activities, you know. “Hey, we know you, and you were in Diyarbakır, and 
you are doing this, this, this, this,” you know, and “When you came to Ankara, 
we just kept track.” 
 








Lydia: Them finding you at different events, or whatever. 
 
Heval: Yeah, they said, “At this time you went to this meeting, and you were 
in this protest or demonstration, and you attended Hrant Dink’s funeral,” 
and, I mean, a lot. 
 
Lydia: It’s like they were following you, or something. 
 
Heval: Probably, but yeah, I realized maybe two, three times they were 
following me, yeah. 
 
So, while Heval used the same method of initially coming to the United States as a 
student, he chose to do so because his freedom was at immediate risk, due to his 
ongoing court case. 
 I asked Heval about his decision to move from Atlanta to Chicago: 
Lydia: So then, why did you leave Atlanta to come to Chicago? 
 
Heval: I wanted to apply for asylum, you know, and I contacted the Kurdish 
Cultural Center and some friends said, “We have an attorney, and he can help 
you.” That’s why I decided to come here, you know, for my asylum case. 
… 
 




Heval: I think it was, like, December 2013, or November, something like that. 
I don’t remember the exact date. 
 
Lydia: After you came here, though, right? 
 
Heval: Before, but I was in contact with my attorney, and I got a lot of 
information. I think I sent him a few documents. I know he applied at that 
time, at the end of November, December, something like that. 
 
Lydia: And when did you get work authorization and a social security 
number? 
 
Heval: Six months after I applied, I got my social security number. Five or six 
months. 
 




Lydia: Where are you in the process currently? 
 
Heval: Now? My case is in immigration court. 
 
Lydia: Immigration court? So, you’re still waiting for a green card? 
 
Heval: I’m still waiting. I mean, I had an interview with immigration, and they 
sent my case to immigration court, and I went there for the first time, and 
they, they said, 2019. I mean, they postponed it, you know. 
 
Lydia: They postponed it? 
 




Heval: I don’t know. 
 
Lydia: They didn’t give you a reason? They just said, wait until 2019? 
 
Heval: They just asked me my name and, “When did you come to United 
States? Which school did you go to?” Like, a few basic questions, and then 
they gave me a date. I am still waiting. 
 






Lydia: Another court appearance? 
 
Heval: Another court appearance, yeah. 
 
Lydia: Oh, my goodness. And so, then, you still don’t know if you’re going to 
get a green card after that? 
 
Heval: Yeah, of course, I don’t have any idea. 
 
 The story of Heval’s case highlights the lengthy bureaucratic process that is 
applying for political asylum in the U.S. At the point we were having this 
conversation, in December of 2016, he had applied for political asylum three years 
earlier and had gotten his work authorization and social security number after six 
months. He then had an asylum interview and went to immigration court, where he 
was told he would have to wait for four years for a second court date. During the 
intervening years he can work legally, but his status is very precarious, as he doesn’t 
have the added protection a resident alien card (green card) can provide, nor has 
the countdown to naturalization begun. It is only after receiving a resident alien 
card that the additional four year wait beings for political asylees before they can 
apply for naturalization. So, if Heval successfully gets his resident alien card after his 
court date in 2019, he will be eligible to apply for naturalization in 2024, eleven 
years after he first came to the U.S. 
 
 Azad’s Story  
 Azad had initially come to the United States through a work and travel 
program, spending several months working in the seafood industry in Alaska. 
Before moving to Chicago, he had procured a student visa and, after his arrival, he 
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took English classes at an institute on the north side of the city. I asked him about 
his immigration status and applying for asylum: 
Lydia: Do you remember when you first applied for asylum? 
 
Azad: Yeah, it was, 2011, or maybe 2012. 
 
Lydia: Do you remember how long it was before you got work authorization 
and social security? 
 
Azad: Yeah, well, I already had social security because of the work and travel 
program. So, this time it didn’t take a lot of time, just a few months. And then, 
I didn’t have a lawyer. I wrote my story.  
 




Lydia: So, you did the whole application yourself? 
 
Azad: No, I had a friend. Well, I wrote my story on my own. It was in Turkish 
and then we translated it into English. At that time, my English was bad. But I 
knew my case. I mean, I didn’t need a lawyer, you know, because they just fill 
out the application, that’s all. So, I applied for political asylum. I went to an 
interview, and they said, “Well, okay,” and they accepted it. 
 
Lydia: And so, then, how long did it take to get your green card? 
 
Azad: So, I mean, for this, after being granted [asylum status], you have to 
wait one year, and then after one year you can apply for the green card. 
 
Lydia: So, was that application process pretty short? 
 
Azad: Yeah. I had an interview within three months, so it was short. Now, it 
takes two or three years, because of these Iraq and Syria wars, a lot of people 
have applied for asylum. 
 
 Azad’s experience, applying for political asylum in 2011 or 2012, highlight’s 
how the process continues to change over time. He applied for political asylum 
before any influx of those fleeing the Syrian civil war and/or the various conflicts 
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involving ISIL was able to have an impact on the political asylum application 
process.  
 As I talked with those who were still in the midst of the political asylum 
application process, I learned that they had made initial contacts with members of 
the Kurdish community in Chicago either through personal connections in Turkey, 
or through finding the Chicago Kurdish Cultural Center Facebook page and sending 
a message asking for more information about coming to the U.S. and Chicago, as well 
as assistance. In each case, my interlocutors were counseled to register for English 
classes at a language institute and apply for a student visa in order to come to the 
U.S. legally. Once in Chicago, one of the members of the community who had already 
successfully navigated the political asylum application process would advise the 
new applicant regarding how to complete their application paperwork, write their 
narrative, and gather other information to support their application. During the 
period of my fieldwork, the task of application mentor fell to Azad.  
 According to Form I-589: 
To qualify for asylum, you must establish that you are a refugee who is 
unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality, or last 
habitual residence if you have no nationality, because of persecution or a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. This means that 
you must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for 
your persecution or why you fear persecution. 
 
 I asked Azad about the advice he gives to other migrants who are preparing 
their asylum applications. “I tell them it should have a structure. It should have an 
introduction, a thesis statement, a conclusion, at least three body paragraphs,” he 
said with a laugh. He continued, “Sometimes it is hard to remember what has 
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happened. I give them a small notebook to take to class, to work. I tell them to write 
things they remember. Then, we can look at them and choose what to include, what 
to exclude.” I asked, “What kinds of things do you choose to include?” Azad replied, 
“Experiences with the Turkish military. I ask them about their student life at 
university, ‘Were you political?’ Welat published a few small [articles]; this can be a 
problem. You don’t want to bother the [asylum] officers. [The story] should be 
organized and short.” “Short?” I asked. “Yes, if you have a lot of information, you will 
get a lot of questions. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to speak, you may be 
confused about dates. You want good examples and clear dates.” Azad went on to 
explain that a short narrative makes it easier to be sure that what one says in their 
interview with the asylum officer matches what was written in their narrative. Any 
discrepancies between the two, he said, “means you are lying, and they will deny 
you.” I made a comment about how it must be difficult to remember things that 
happened, in some cases, years ago, especially things one might not want to 
remember. “Yes,” he replied, “The things that you want to forget, or erase from your 
mind, this asylum case makes you [remember] them.”  
 Clearly, then, the political asylum application process can be an emotional 
one for applicants. Old memories of mistreatment at the hands of Turkish state 
actors (usually the police) must be remembered and recorded. This must be done to 
make the case that if they were to return to Turkey, they would be persecuted for 
being Kurdish. This remembering and recording memories in a notebook is 
something akin to the collection of records (and in particular, documents) to 
support legalization described by Gray Albert Abarca and Susan Bibler Coutin 
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(2018) in their study of the cases of undocumented migrants from Mexico and 
Central America in the United States. As in those cases, my interlocutors must 
present a collection of evidence of their experiences in Turkey, and particularly their 
interactions with the Turkish state in order to support their applications for political 
asylum. Rather than the financial and medical records described by Abarca and 
Coutin, my interlocutors are collecting their own memories, they record these 
memories in a narrative that is included as responses to several questions on the 
asylum application form. As in the case of the documents collected by those with 
whom Abarca and Coutin conducted their research, the narratives my interlocutors 
create with their collected memories are imbued with immense power. The point at 
which this power is made most manifest is during the interview, during which 
verbal responses to questions about their experiences in Turkey must match their 
written narratives. 
 Thus, even though they have moved away from Turkey, the political nature of 
who they are, of their existence, within the space of the Turkish state must be 
recounted in order to argue that returning to Turkey would pose a threat to their 
lives. And yet, Azad also told me about how writing their narratives and submitting 
them along with their asylum applications to the United States government was a 
point of pride for himself and the others who had applied or were preparing to 
apply for asylum. Azad told me: “We are proud to tell our story. Basically, we are 
putting the Turkish government’s dirty laundry on the table… It’s going to affect the 
Turkish human rights record. I did it on purpose, you know, because you want to 
put the Turkish government in, like, a difficult situation. So, we were really proud. 
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We want to show what is going on there [in Turkey].” Azad’s description of feeling 
proud about telling his story, his “narrative of violence” (Günay 2019), points to the 
agency inherent in telling one’s story. Through the telling of their stories, my 
interlocutors are engaged in an agentive process of taking charge of the narrative of 
their own lived experiences, challenging Turkish state narratives from afar, and 
challenging tropes of victimhood. 
 Through their asylum-seeking processes, I see my interlocutors challenging 
the narrative found in the anthropological literature of fraught refugee and asylum-
seeking experiences, centered on the border and other sites, such as detention 
centers (Rabben 2016; Fassin 2005, 2011; Fassin and D’Halluin 2005; Ticktin 2006, 
2011; Coutin 1995; De Genova 2002; Cabot 2013; Vogt 2013). Rather, my 
interlocutors came to the United States on student visas, initially. Only after 
spending some time in the United States, and after some encouragement from those 
who were already engaged in the asylum-seeking process, did more recent migrants 
to Chicago then initiate the asylum application process themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have explored the migration and asylum-seeking 
experiences of my interlocutors. Their accounts demonstrate how they challenge 
the dominant narrative in the anthropological literature of refugees and asylum 
seekers that centers stories of victimhood. My interlocutors use their agency to 
employ strategies that allow for a less fraught migration and asylum-seeking 
process. In migrating from Turkey, the ethno-nationally assertive state in which 
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they were raised, to the United States, my university educated interlocutors use 
pursuit of further education as method to secure a student visa and come to the 
United States legally. After they are here, and with the encouragement and 
assistance of those Kurdish young adults who migrated before them, my 
interlocutors embark on the asylum-seeking process. This particular way of 
engaging with the United State immigration bureaucracy and navigation of the 
asylum application process challenges tropes of victimhood found in the 




CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION  
 In this dissertation, I have explored how young adults may respond to ethno-
nationally assertive narratives of a modern state. In this case, they respond by 
pursuing and attaining higher education and emphatically asserting their ethno-
linguistic identity. Thus, as I have shown, the environment of higher education can 
foster activism and challenges to the dominant narratives of ethno-nationally 
assertive states. The case of my interlocutors illustrates how university students 
create spaces to emphatically assert an ethno-linguistic identity that is counter to 
the state’s concept of who constitutes an ideal citizen; a concept that has been 
promoted by the state through the education system as part of its nation-building 
project, as seen in the anthropological literature (e.g., Adely 2012; Kaplan 2006; Coe 
2005; Luykx 1999). Further, through pursuing educational opportunities as a means 
to migrate transnationally and eventually apply for political asylum, recent 
university graduates challenge anthropological narratives of asylum seekers as 
tragic figures (e.g., Chatty 2010; Rabben 2016; Fassin 2011). Moreover, both of the 
groups that comprise my research population are foregrounding their ethno-
linguistic identity in their interactions with the states in which they live.  
 My interlocutors have consistently been told by the ethno-nationally 
assertive Turkish state, agents of the state such as the military and the education 
system, and ethnically Turkish citizens of Turkey that, as Kurds, they do not have a 
history, they do not exist as a distinct ethno-linguistic group, they are terrorists. It is 
these narratives that my interlocutors are challenging, in both Istanbul and Chicago. 
In both contexts, they are engaged in making emphatic assertions of their 
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Kurdishness and striving for increased visibility. In Istanbul, this has included 
challenging dominant state narratives in university classrooms and through Kurdish 
language graffiti. In Chicago, this has included protesting in front of the Turkish 
Consulate and submitting narratives of the various forms of violence they endured 
at the hands of the Turkish state as part of their political asylum applications to the 
United States government. 
 This dissertation, based on one year of fieldwork, conducted in Istanbul, 
Turkey, and Chicago, Illinois, during the 2016 calendar year, examines how my 
interlocutors, who are university students, are challenging the dominant narrative 
of the ethno-linguistically assertive state that seeks to erase and silence them. I also 
examined how recent university graduates are using the furtherance of their 
education as a means to migrate to the United States, where their navigation of 
immigration bureaucracy and the asylum-seeking process challenges dominant 
narratives of asylum seeking found in anthropological literature. In doing so, I 
explored the interplay between agency and state imposition, and how young adults 
who have migrated within one state and to another are navigating the states and 
bureaucratic systems in which they live.  
 The particular context in which my interlocutors live, or from which they 
hail, serves as an archetype of a modern nation-state that posits itself as a bounded 
territory of and for members of a particular ethno-linguistic group, with no 
tolerance for alternative ethno-linguistic identities. As such, I began with a summary 
of some of the relevant history and geopolitical context in order to frame an 
anthropology of agency in the face of an ethno-nationally assertive state. I then 
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turned to an examination of the ways in which language has been politicized as a 
component of the ethno-nationally assertive state’s nation-building project in 
Turkey. Promoting use of the Turkish language through means such as language 
reform, the adoption of the Latin alphabet, literacy promotion, and the expansion of 
the education system were key components of the Turkification policies in the early 
years of the Republic of Turkey. Thus, the Turkish language, from the outset was 
part of a political, state-building project in Turkey.  In recent years, this 
politicization is countered by the politicization of the Kurdish language by young 
people, such as my interlocutors. Through politicizing their own language, my 
interlocutors are able to use their language as a means of challenging dominant 
state narratives that have sought to silence them, other them, and even deny their 
existence as a separate ethno-linguistic group. In doing so, they present an example 
of agency in action and use language as a potent symbol of their resistance to the 
ethno-nationally assertive state. It is in these challenges that I see Kurdish 
university students in Turkey emphatically asserting their identities and pushing 
back against Turkish state narratives of what it means to be a Turkish citizen. 
 I addressed concepts of “the state,” hospitality, and citizenship, and the ways 
in which my interlocutors interact with these concepts. The “messiness of the state” 
leads to a certain flexibility and room for challenges to the state narrative that I see 
my interlocutors taking advantage of in making assertions to a particular ethno-
linguistic identity that are at odds with the narrative of the ethno-linguistically 
assertive state in which they live or from which they hail. I also looked at the double 
displacement of my interlocutors, both the violent internal displacement 
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experiences they went through as young children, and the international migration 
experiences they went through as recent university graduates. 
 Finally, I explored the way by which my interlocutors come to seek asylum in 
the United States, and how their experiences challenge narratives of asylum seeking 
that rely on tropes of asylum seekers as tragic figures. Rather than the fraught 
asylum-seeking experiences reflected the anthropological literature on migration 
and asylum-seeking, my interlocutors have managed to find a relatively calm system 
of migration and asylum-seeking that relies on first coming to the Unites States as 
students, via securing student visas to study English at language institutes in the 
United Sates, and then subsequently applying for asylum. Through their asylum 
applications, my interlocutors continue to challenge the narratives of the state from 
which they hail, as they are required to provide to immigration officers of the United 
States narratives of their own mistreatment at the hands of agents of the Turkish 
state.  
 My interlocutors are engaged in challenging narratives in several ways. They 
challenge the ethno-nationally assertive narratives of the state in which they live, or 
from which they hail. In doing so, they make emphatic assertions of their own 
ethno-linguistic identity and make themselves more visible, counter to the 
narratives of the state that have sought to silence and erase them. In sharing the 
experiences and stories of my interlocutors, I have framed an anthropology of 
agency in the face of an ethno-linguistically assertive state. I have shown how my 
highly educated interlocutors challenge the dominant narratives of the ethno-
nationally assertive Turkish state, and how their particular onward migration and 
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asylum-seeking experiences challenge the narratives of asylum seekers as tragic 
figures found in the anthropological literature on migration and asylum-seeking. In 
so doing, I have shown how my interlocutors are agentively engaged in the emphatic 






APPENDIX: STEPS FOR SECURING A STUDENT VISA 
 Following is a list of the steps a potential international student must navigate 
in order to procure a student visa to come to the United States. This list was derived 
from the United States Department of State student visa website (USDOS n.d.b), The 
steps are: 
1. Apply to and be accepted by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) approved institution. 
2. Pay the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) I-901 fee 
(currently $350 [USICE 2020]). 
3. The institution issues an I-20 form to the student. 
4. Complete a Nonimmigrant Visa Application Form (form DS-160) and pay the 
application fee (currently $160).  
5. Schedule an interview at a United States Embassy or Consulate in the country 
where the applicant lives.  
6. Attend the interview, at which the following must be presented to the 
interviewee: passport, visa application, application fee payment receipt, 
photo, and I-20 form. Additional information, such as transcripts or proof of 
ability to pay educational and living costs in the United States may also be 
required at the interview. 
7. Receive visa approval. At this point an additional visa issuance fee may be 
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